Jones v. Honeywell Int. Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 August 2003
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 01-540-D-M1.,CIV.A. 01-540-D-M1.
• Citation: 295 F.Supp.2d 652
• Parties: Barbara G. JONES v. HONEYWELL INT. INC., F/N/A Allied Signal Specialty Chemicals & XYZ Ins. Co.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana

295 F.Supp.2d 652

Barbara G. JONES v. HONEYWELL INT. INC., F/N/A Allied Signal Specialty Chemicals & XYZ Ins. Co.

No. CIV.A. 01-540-D-M1.

United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana.

August 13, 2003.

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Kevin Lovell James, Kevin L. James and Associates, Baton Rouge, LA, for plaintiff.

Gordon A. Pugh, Douglas K. Williams, Anthony Todd Caruso, Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, Baton Rouge, LA, Steven R. Cupp, Watkins, Ludlam, Winter and Stennis P.A., Gulfport, MS, for defendant.

RULING & ORDER

BRADY, District Judge.

Pending before the court is a motion for summary judgment filed by defendant, Honeywell International, Inc. ("Honeywell").¹ Plaintiff, Barbara Jones ("Jones"), filed suit against Honeywell under several state theories of recovery for what she essentially claims to be a wrongful termination. Honeywell seeks to have some or all of Jones's claims disposed with in summary fashion. The parties have briefed the matters raised by the complaint and the motion. The court did not require oral argument. Jurisdiction is rightly predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1332, because the parties are of diverse citizenship and Jones seeks to recover in excess of $75,000, exclusive of costs and interest. For the reasons provided below the court will grant the motion with respect to Jones's claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, but will deny the motion with respect to Jones's claims for workers' compensation retaliation and breach of contract. The court will construe the contract claim as a claim under § 301(a), Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947 ("LMRA"), 61 Stat. 156, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At its heart, this dispute concerns Honeywell's right to terminate Jones. Honeywell employed Jones from December of 1976 until it officially terminated her employment on May 24, 2000.² Honeywell ended its employment relationship with Jones because she was injured and had not been released to return to work despite having exhausted twenty-six weeks of short-term disability leave time.³ Jones ceased reporting to work at Honeywell on November 21, 1999 due to an injury that she suffered on the job on May 4, 1998. On that day, Jones stepped off an incline to avoid an oncoming vehicle and broke her left elbow, right wrist, and right ankle. As an immediate matter, Jones missed only four days—May 5 to May 8, 1998. She then returned to work and attended work regularly until November of 1999. She testified that her ability to work was reduced, that Honeywell put her on light duty, and that for at least some portion of this time she performed essentially no productive function.

It is when Jones determined in November that she needed to revisit her earlier injury that her problems with Honeywell began. On advice of a physician, Jones decided that she should have surgery to repair damage sustained in her fall. On November 15, she applied for short-term disability benefits and FMLA leave time so that she could get that surgery. At some point during her leave, Dr. Scimeca, on behalf of Honeywell, determined that due to the injury Jones could not perform the essential functions of her job. In March, Jones decided to file a claim for workers' compensation and Honeywell received notice of that decision on March 23, 2000. Less than a month later, on April 19, 2000, Honeywell informed Jones that she would be terminated on April 28, 2000, if she was not able to return by that date. At the time it made this revelation, Honeywell knew that Jones had not been cleared to work by her physician and that she was not scheduled to have that determination reviewed until early May.

For some reason, and despite giving Jones notice of her impending termination, Honeywell did not actually fire her until May 24, 2000. It seems likely, though it is by no means clear from the record, that Honeywell believed it could not fire Jones until that date under the operative collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") because it entitled her to more short-term disability leave. Jones was a member of the General Truck Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No. 5, which had negotiated a CBA with the Honeywell Baton Rouge operation.⁴ After her termination, Jones applied with Honeywell for a disability pension. On June 30, 2000, Honeywell denied her application and informed her of her right to appeal. Jones did not appeal, but instead grieved under the CBA, claiming that she had been wrongfully terminated. Honeywell denied her grievance. On July 14, Jones and the union appealed the denial. Honeywell refused the appeal on July 30. Jones and the union appealed again. On January 2, 2001, a ruling issued on that appeal. It determined that plaintiff had in fact been wrongfully terminated because the CBA entitled her to twelve months of leave time. Nevertheless, the arbitrator upheld the separation and refused to reinstate Jones because she remained unable to return to work and more than twelve months had passed.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 24, 2001, Jones filed this suit in state court seeking to recover for wrongful termination under various theories. Primarily she claimed that Honeywell terminated her in retaliation for the fact that she filed a workers' compensation claim. She also claimed a right of recovery for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Honeywell timely removed this action to federal court. On January 21, 2002, Jones filed an amended complaint. Jones admits that she remains unemployed and totally disabled from returning to work. She began receiving Social Security benefits based on this disability in December of 2001.

Honeywell now seeks, via motion for summary judgment, dismissal of all or some of Jones's claims. Honeywell argues that Jones's retaliation claim has prescribed, that it is preempted by the LMRA, that Jones has not presented any evidence that she was terminated because she filed for workers' compensation, and that it has articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the termination that Jones has not rebutted. Honeywell also argues that Jones's remaining state claims should be dismissed as being preempted or without support.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits on file indicate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.⁵ When the burden at trial rests on the nonmoving party the moving party need only demonstrate that the record lacks sufficient evidentiary support for the non-moving party's case.⁶ The moving party may do this by showing that the evidence is insufficient to prove the existence of one or more elements essential to the non-moving party's case.⁷

Although this Court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving party may not merely rest on allegations set forth in the pleadings. Instead, the non-moving party must show that there is a genuine issue for trial.⁸ Conclusory allegations and unsubstantiated assertions will not satisfy the non-moving party's burden.⁹ If, once the non-moving party has been given the opportunity to raise a genuine factual issue, no reasonable juror could find for the non-moving party, summary judgment will be granted for the moving party.¹⁰

ANALYSIS

I. Workers' Compensation Retallation Claim

A. Prescription

Honeywell seeks to obtain dismissal of Jones's retaliation claim on the ground that it has prescribed. Jones brings her claim under La.Rev.Stat. § 23:1361(B), which is a delictual cause of action and hence subject to a one-year prescriptive period under La. Civ.Code article 3492.¹¹ The prescriptive period begins to run—that is, the cause of action accrues—when the injured party has actual or constructive knowledge of the facts that would entitle her to bring suit.¹² Honeywell urges that in the context of a wrongful termination action, an employee has actual knowledge of the facts that would entitle her to bring suit when she learns that her employer has decided to terminate her employment. Thus, since Honeywell told Jones on April 19, 2000, that she would be terminated on April 28, 2000, if she did not return to work by that date, Jones knew that Honeywell had decided to terminate her on April 19. Since she did not bring this suit until May 24, 2001, Honeywell argues, her claim is prescribed and the suit must be dismissed.

Most of the authority relied upon by Honeywell interprets federal law and the cases certainly appear to support its position. In Chardon v. Fernandez, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff's cause of action for wrongful termination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 accrues at the moment that she learns of her employer's decision to terminate, even if the actual termination occurs later.¹³ The Supreme Court construed accrual under federal law in Chardon. Though state law determines the length of the prescriptive period under § 1983, accrual of a cause of action is a matter of federal law. Quoting its earlier Delaware State College v. Ricks¹⁴ decision construing accrual under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Supreme Court wrote, "the proper focus is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful. The fact of termination is not itself an illegal act."¹⁵ Thus as far as these federal statutes are concerned, Honeywell has a strong argument that a cause of action accrues when the employee has notice that the employer has made a discriminatory decision, even if it takes the employer a while to carry out that decision.

The Supreme Court based its result in Chardon, as it did in Ricks, on the view that the illegal discriminatory act and the plaintiffs'...