Jones v. Hubbard

• Citation: 740 A.2d 1004,356 Md. 513
• Decision Date: 16 November 1999
• Docket Number: No. 25,25
• Parties: Oliver JONES et al. v. Selbe HUBBARD.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland

740 A.2d 1004

356 Md. 513

Oliver JONES et al. v. Selbe HUBBARD.

No. 25, Sept. Term, 1999.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

November 16, 1999.

Elise Davis, Easton, for petitioners.

Stephen Z. Meehan (David C. Wright of Wright & Meehan, on brief), Chestertown, for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL and HARRELL, JJ CATHELL, Judge.

On November 8, 1994, petitioners agreed to sell the property described as 10693 Chesterfield Forest Road, Millington, Maryland to respondent for $100,000.00. On March 7, 1996, respondent filed an action against petitioners in the Circuit Court for Kent County to recover for breach of contract arising out of that real estate transaction. The case came before the circuit court for a hearing on the merits on February 13, 1997. Prior to trial that day, the trial judge rendered a judgment pursuant to the parties' consent in favor of respondent in the amount of $5,000.00 with a proviso that it could be settled upon the payment of $2,550.00 within thirty days. The judgment was indexed and recorded.

The thirtieth day fell on Saturday, March 15, 1997. In a handwritten memo dated March 10, 1997, petitioners advised respondent that they would pay the judgment on Monday, March 17, 1997 with a cashier's check. On March 17, the thirty-second day, petitioners presented respondent with a cashier's check for $2,500.00 and $50.00 cash and requested that respondent mark the judgment "released and satisfied." Respondent refused to file an Order of Satisfaction arguing that the $2,550.00 should have been paid by March 15, 1997, even though that day was a Saturday.

On April 3, 1997, respondent filed a Petition for Deposition in Aid of Enforcement of Judgment. Petitioners filed an answer to that petition on April 8, 1997, and filed a Motion for Injunction, claiming that they had effectively paid within the thirty-day requirement because, pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1995 Repl.Vol.), Article 94, section 2 and Maryland Rule 1-203(a), they had until March 17, 1997, to satisfy the judgment at the discounted rate. The circuit court denied this motion and on May 5, 1997, petitioners filed a Motion to Amend or Revise the Judgment, which was also denied.

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court, holding that the discount provision did not constitute a court order. We granted a writ of certiorari to consider whether the trial court properly ruled that the parties' agreement to discount a judgment for payment within thirty days was not governed by Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol.), Article 1, section 36¹ and Maryland Rule 1-203(a), and the due date for payment, therefore, was not extended by virtue of falling on a Saturday. We hold that the trial court erred, that the agreement to discount the judgment was a court order governed by Maryland Rules 1-203(a) and 1-202(n), and the due date for payment was extended by virtue of falling on a Saturday. Accordingly, we reverse. We shall not reach the applicability of Article 1, section 36.

I. Discussion and Analysis

The threshold issue is whether the discount provision was a court order governed by the relevant provisions. To make this determination, we need to analyze three distinct questions of law: (1) whether the trial court rendered a final judgment; (2) if a final judgment was rendered, whether it included the discount provision; and (3) if a final judgment, which included the discount provision, was rendered, whether and how Maryland Rule 1-203(a) would affect the due date for payment of the judgment.

A. Consent Judgments

There are two rules of court which are determinative as to whether the trial court rendered a judgment in this particular case. Maryland Rule 1-202(n) defines judgment as "any order of court final in its nature entered pursuant to these rules." Accordingly, a judgment is an order of court. Additionally, at the time this judgment was rendered, Maryland Rule 2-601 (1997)² prescribed the manner in which a judgment must be entered as follows:

(a) When Entered.—Upon a general verdict of a jury or upon a decision by the court allowing recovery only of costs or a specified amount of money or denying all relief, the clerk shall forthwith enter the judgment, unless the court orders otherwise. Upon a special verdict of a jury or upon a decision by the court granting other relief, the clerk shall enter the judgment as directed by the court. Unless the court orders otherwise, entry of the judgment shall not be delayed pending a determination of the amount of costs.

(b) Method of Entry—Date of Judgment.—The clerk shall enter a judgment by making a record of it in writing on the file jacket, or on a docket within the file, or in a docket book, according to the practice of each court, and shall record the actual date of the entry. That date shall be the date of the judgment.

(c) Recording and Indexing.— Promptly after entry, the clerk shall record and index the judgment, except a judgment denying all relief without costs, in the judgment records of the court.

This Court has previously interpreted the interplay between these two rules as follows:

Read in conjunction, Rule 1-202(m)³ and Rule 2-601⁴ make clear that two acts must occur for an action by a court to be deemed the granting of a judgment: the court must render a final order and the order must be entered on the docket by the clerk. These two required acts—rendition of a judgment by the court and entry of the judgment by the clerk—are discrete occurrences. Rendition of judgment is the judicial act by which the court settles and declares the decision of the law on the matters at issue. In other words, rendition is the court's pronouncement, by spoken word in open court or by written order filed with the clerk, of its decision upon the matter submitted to it for adjudication. The second act required under Maryland law—the clerk's entry of the judgment on the docket—is the purely ministerial act by means of which permanent evidence of the judicial act of rendering the judgment is made a record of the court. See Doehring v. Wagner, 311 Md. 272, 533 A.2d 1300 (1987)

; Corey v. Carback, 201 Md. 389, 94 A.2d 629 (1953).

A judgment is therefore not granted until it is both properly rendered and properly entered.

Davis v. Davis, 335 Md. 699, 710, 646 A.2d 365, 370 (1994); see also Claibourne v. Willis, 347 Md. 684, 690, 702 A.2d 293, 296 (1997)

; Board of Liquor License Comm'rs v. Fells Point Cafe, Inc., 344 Md. 120, 127-28, 685 A.2d 772, 775 (1996). In the case sub judice, both of these requirements were met when the court rendered a consent judgment in favor of respondent and the clerk recorded the judgment on the docket and indexed it.

"`Rendition of judgment is ... the court's pronouncement, by spoken word in open court or by written order filed with the clerk, of its decision upon the matter submitted to it for adjudication.'" Fells Point Cafe, 344 Md. at 128,685 A.2d at 775 (quoting Davis, 335 Md. at 710,646 A.2d at 370). In Parkington Apartments, Inc. v. Cordish, 296 Md. 143, 149, 460 A.2d 52, 55 (1983), this Court said:

Black's Law Dictionary 1165 (5th ed.1979)⁵ is instructive as to what the General Assembly may have contemplated when it used the term "rendition of judgment":

"Rendition of a judgment is effected when trial court in open court declares the decision of the law upon the matters at issue, and it is distinguishable from `entry of judgment,' which is a purely ministerial act by which the judgment is made of record and preserved. Ex parte Gnesoulis, Tex. Civ. App., 525 S.W.2d 205, 209 [(1975)]. A judgment is rendered as of date on which trial judge declares in open court his decision on matters submitted to him for adjudication, and oral pronouncement by the court of its decision is sufficient for `rendition of judgment'. Farr v. McKinzie, Tex. Civ.App., 477 S.W.2d 672, 676 [(1972)].

"The rendition of judgment is the pronouncement of the court of its conclusions and decision upon the matter submitted to it for adjudication; a judgment may be rendered either orally in open court or by memorandum filed with the clerk. Travelers Express Co., Inc. v. Winters, Tex.Civ. App. 488 S.W.2d 890, 892 [(1972), overturned on other grounds by Reese v. Piperi, 534 S.W.2d 329 (Tex.1976)

]. `Rendition' of judgment is distinguishable from its `entry' in the records. Rehm v. Fishman, Mo.App., 395 S.W.2d 251, 255 [ (1965) ]. See Entering judgment."

Several courts in other jurisdictions define "rendition of judgment" consistent with this interpretation. Interstate Power Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 909 F.Supp. 1224, 1238 (N.D.Iowa 1991) ("[A] judgment is rendered `when it is announced, or when the judge signs an enrolled judgment order ....'") (quoting World Teacher Seminar v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 406 N.W.2d 173, 177 (Iowa 1987)); Gorum v. Samuel, 274 Ala. 690, 151 So.2d 393, 396 (1963) ("`When a judgment is pronounced in open court, it is rendered and the clerk could ... enter it on the minutes at any time during that term ....'") (quoting DuPree v. Hart, 242 Ala. 690, 693, 8 So.2d 183, 186 (1942)); Willmon v. Arizona, 16 Ariz.App. 323, 324, 493 P.2d 125, 126 (1972) ("Judgment is complete and valid when orally pronounced in open court and entered in the minutes without anything further or any written judgment."); Second Injury Fund v. Lupachino, 45 Conn.App. 324, 337, 695 A.2d 1072, 1080 (1997) ("`A judgment is in fact rendered in a cause tried to the court when the trial judge officially announces his decision orally in open court, or, out of court, signifies orally or in a writing filed with the clerk in his official capacity the decision pronounced by him ....'") (quoting Zoning Comm'n v. Fairfield Resources Management, Inc., 41 Conn.App. 89, 102, 674 A.2d 1335, 1342 (1996)); Gorzik Corp. v. Mosman, 315 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Mo.1958) ("`Rendition' is a judicial act; entering is a ministerial act. The judgment is rendered when it...