Jones v. Huff, 8932.

• Decision Date: 26 November 1945
• Docket Number: No. 8932.,8932.
• Citation: 80 US App. DC 254,152 F.2d 14
• Parties: JONES v. HUFF, General Superintendent, D. C. Penal Institutions.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

80 US App. DC 254, 152 F.2d 14 (1945)

JONES v. HUFF, General Superintendent, D. C. Penal Institutions.

No. 8932.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia.

Argued October 17, 1945.

Decided November 26, 1945.

Mr. John D. Fitzgerald (appointed by this court), of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Mr. Charles B. Murray, Assistant United States Attorney, of Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Edward M. Curran, United States Attorney, of Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee.

Before EDGERTON, WILBUR K. MILLER, and PRETTYMAN, Associate Justices.

PRETTYMAN, Associate Justice.

The court below denied a petition for habeas corpus without a hearing. Petitioner alleged that he was confined to the penal institution at Lorton, Virginia, after judgment of conviction and sentence by the District Court on October 18, 1943, upon a charge of forgery. Among other allegations, he says that his attorney, who was not his present attorney,¹ was incompetent in his defense and that thereby his rights under the "Fourth Amendment of the Constitution" and under the "Civil Rights Statute — Title 18, Sec. 52" were violated. Specifically, he says that after his arrest he denied the charge against him, "but under what is known in Police circles as the Third Degree of questioning the petitioner was forced to state that he had forged the checks in question. Petitioner only made this statement so that the detective would leave him alone." He says that this testimony "which was forced from your petitioner was used against your petitioner at the time of his trial", and that his attorney failed to object "when the forced confession of the accused was offered by the government as evidence against the accused when he knew full well that this evidence was inadmissible at the time of the trial." He further says that he gave to his attorney the names and addresses of several persons who could prove that he was not guilty of the charge against him, and that the attorney refused to call these witnesses. He says that he requested his attorney to have a handwriting expert present at the trial in order that he might prove his innocence of the charge of forgery, but that the attorney offered no defense.

Petitioner further says that during the trial the jury asked the court for "the sample of petitioner's handwriting which they wanted for comparison with the forged instrument", and that this request was refused by the court.² Apparently petitioner intended to include this latter allegation as part of his allegation as to the incompetency of his attorney.

The petition is not expertly drawn, but it alleges in substance that the attorney for the defendant (1) failed to object to the admission in evidence of a confession which had been forced by "Third Degree" methods, (2) failed to call witnesses who would have established the innocence of the accused, and (3) failed to take such steps as would have permitted the jury to see a sample of the defendant's handwriting after a request for this evidence had been made by a juror.

The question which is here presented has been examined by this court twice recently, once in Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, decided Feb. 26, 1945,³ and again in Strong v. Huff, 148 F.2d 692, decided April 23, 1945.⁴ In those cases it was pointed out that the presumption in favor of the regularity of judicial proceedings must be fully indulged, that mere mistakes of counsel cannot be reviewed upon a petition for habeas corpus, and that to justify a writ upon allegations such as these, an extreme case must be disclosed. The court said 148 F.2d 669, "It must be shown that the proceedings were a farce and a mockery of justice." At the same time, the court pointed out that there must be "effective" representation.⁵

The rule laid down in those cases is a stringent one, but we apply it in this case. The question is whether the allegations of this petition, if taken as true, show that the proceedings upon the trial "were a farce and a mockery of justice." If it be true that the evidence against the accused was improperly admitted in violation of his Constitutional right, that witnesses who would have established his innocence were not called by his counsel, that no defense was offered by counsel although the accused was innocent, and that a document which would have established his innocence was not offered by counsel even though a juror requested it, can it be said that the accused had a fair trial even within the stringent rule which we have stated and now apply? We think not. The combination of circumstances, if true, is exceptional. The allegations are improbable, but if they be true, it seems clear that the petitioner did not have a trial as we understand that term. These were not mere mistakes of counsel or errors in the course of the trial. If true, they constituted a total failure to present the cause of the accused in any fundamental respect. Such a proceeding would not constitute for the accused the fair trial contemplated by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

There can be no doubt but that cases of this sort raise questions of extreme difficulty in the administration of justice. As this court pointed out in Diggs v. Welch, supra, it is well known that the drafting of petitions for habeas corpus has become a game in many penal institutions, and the opportunity to try an unsuccessful former lawyer has undoubted attraction to a disappointed prisoner. A rule of procedure more flexible than is necessary to protect the basic right to the writ would impose an unbearable burden upon the trial courts and ultimately result in the defeat rather than the success of justice. But at the same time, the writ of habeas corpus is a precious factor in the preservation of our liberties and its...