Jones v. Hulse, No. 18885.

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM
• Citation: 391 F.2d 198
• Parties: F. Leland JONES, Appellant, v. Fred B. HULSE, General Chairman of Bar Committees of the Missouri Bar Administration, Forrest M. Hemker, C. Wallace Walter, Clyde J. Linde and James M. Reeves, Members of the Advisory Committee of the Missouri Bar Administration, and Hon. Marion Spicer, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Missouri, Appellees.
• Docket Number: No. 18885.
• Decision Date: 12 March 1968

391 F.2d 198 (1968)

F. Leland JONES, Appellant,
v.
Fred B. HULSE, General Chairman of Bar Committees of the Missouri Bar Administration, Forrest M. Hemker, C. Wallace Walter, Clyde J. Linde and James M. Reeves, Members of the Advisory Committee of the Missouri Bar Administration, and Hon. Marion Spicer, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Missouri, Appellees.

No. 18885.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

March 12, 1968.

391 F.2d 199

Charles F. Hamilton, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant, F. Leland Jones, atty., pro se, on the brief.

D. Jeff Lance, St. Louis, Mo., for appellees, Frederick H. Mayer, St. Louis, Mo., on the brief.

Before VAN OOSTERHOUT, Chief Judge, MATTHES, Circuit Judge, and HARRIS, Chief District Judge.

PER CURIAM.

This action is a sequel to a disciplinary proceeding in the Supreme Court of Missouri resulting in the suspension of F. Leland Jones, an attorney, from the practice of law in Missouri for a minimum period of three years. The facts underlying Jones' solicitation of personal injury claims, through the agency of and in conjunction with one Walter Candy, in violation of Rules 4.27 and 4.28 of the Supreme Court of Missouri, V.A.M.R., can be found in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Missouri, not officially published.

A petition for rehearing filed by Jones was denied by the Missouri Supreme Court on February 14, 1966. On February 15, 1966 that Court, in response to Jones' motion, ordered its mandate stayed for a period of 90 days. Thereafter, Jones, appellant herein, petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari to review the order of suspension, which was denied on October 12, 1966. In re Jones, 385 U.S. 866, 87 S.Ct. 126, 17 L.Ed.2d 93 (1966).

Following the denial of certiorari Jones promptly filed this action on October 14, 1966 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. On the same day the Supreme Court of Missouri again stayed its mandate presumably until the outcome of the federal litigation. In response to Jones' second amended complaint, filed on February 28, 1967, defendants,¹ appellees herein, filed a motion to dismiss or alternatively for summary judgment.² The district court, Honorable Roy W. Harper, Chief Judge, granted appellees' motion to dismiss on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. Jones v. Hulse, 267 F.Supp. 37 (E.D.Mo.1967).

In brief appellant's second amended complaint alleges that the decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri resulted from and was an integral part of state disciplinary proceedings in which appellant's federal constitutional rights to due process of law and freedom of speech and association were violated.³

391 F.2d 200

Appellant predicates the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights on several premises. In particular he submits that the General Chairman and other members of The Advisory Committee, who prosecuted appellant's misconduct in a disciplinary proceeding before the Missouri Supreme Court, (1) knowingly and intentionally introduced and relied on the perjurious testimony of Walter Candy in their brief and oral argument before that Court, and (2) misrepresented to the Supreme Court of Missouri that they had voluntarily complied with appellant's motion to produce certain evidence, whereas in fact they had suppressed evidence favorable to appellant for fear that "Candy might implicate them in his giving of perjurious testimony." From these premises appellant argues that although the Supreme Court expressly disavowed any reliance on the perjurious testimony of Candy, the Court nonetheless either consciously or unconsciously was compelled to and did in fact predicate its judgment on such testimony and thereby deprived appellant of his constitutional right to a fair hearing.

In the nature of relief appellant prayed for an injunction (1) permanently enjoining the members of The Advisory Committee from initiating, taking or participating in any action or proceeding to enforce the mandate of the Supreme Court of Missouri, and (2) restraining the Clerk of the Supreme Court from issuing the mandate.

We affirm. The limited circumstances under which a federal court can scrutinize a state disbarment proceeding have been clearly delineated by the United States Supreme Court in the landmark case of Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 37 S.Ct. 377, 61 L.Ed. 585 (1917). Although Selling is factually distinguishable in that it involved a proceeding instituted in the Supreme Court to strike Radford's name from the roll of attorneys of that Court, its teachings are apposite for the reason that the Supreme Court took into consideration the validity of a judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court disbarring Radford. In speaking to the effect of the state court action the Supreme Court narrowly circumscribed its scope of review of disbarment proceedings:

"We are of the opinion that we should recognize the condition created by the judgment of the state court unless, from an intrinsic consideration of the state record, one or all of the following conditions should appear: 1. That the state procedure from want of notice or opportunity to be heard was wanting in due process; 2, that there was such an infirmity of proof as to facts found to have established the want of fair private and professional character as to give rise to a clear conviction on our part that we could not, consistently with our duty accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or 3, that some other grave reason existed which should convince us that to allow the natural consequences of the judgment to have their effect would conflict with the duty which rests upon us not to disbar except upon the conviction

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