Jones v. Illinois Dept. of Rehabilitation Services

• Citation: 504 F. Supp. 1244
• Decision Date: 12 January 1981
• Docket Number: No. 79 C 5396.,79 C 5396.
• Parties: Charles P. JONES, Plaintiff, v. The ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION SERVICES and James S. Jeffers, in his official capacity as Director of the Illinois Department of Rehabilitation Services, and The Illinois Institute of Technology, and Dr. Thomas L. Martin, Jr., in his official capacity as President of the Illinois Institute of Technology, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

504 F. Supp. 1244

Charles P. JONES, Plaintiff, v. The ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION SERVICES and James S. Jeffers, in his official capacity as Director of the Illinois Department of Rehabilitation Services, and The Illinois Institute of Technology, and Dr. Thomas L. Martin, Jr., in his official capacity as President of the Illinois Institute of Technology, Defendants.

No. 79 C 5396.

United States District Court, N. D. Illinois, E. D.

January 12, 1981.

Larry J. Goldberg, Marc P. Charmatz, Washington, D. C., Freda Merritt, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

Tyrone C. Fahner, Atty. Gen. of Ill., Mary Anne Smith, Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FLAUM, District Judge:

This matter comes before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, each motion is granted in part and denied in part.

The parties have stipulated to the facts. Plaintiff is a deaf person and therefore is a handicapped individual within the meaning of section 7(7)¹ of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976), as amended by Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub.L.No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (1976)), Rehabilitation Act Extension of 1976, Pub.L.No. 94-230, 90 Stat. 211 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (1976)), Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub.L.No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (Supp.1980)) (the "Act"), and is a qualified handicapped person within the meaning of 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1979).² Defendant Illinois Department of Rehabilitation Services ("IDRS") is the agency of the state of Illinois which administers that state's vocational rehabilitation program and receives financial assistance from the Rehabilitation Services Administration³ in order to carry out the state vocational rehabilitation program. Defendant James S. Jeffers ("Jeffers") is the Director of IDRS and as such is responsible for the direction and administration of IDRS. Defendant Illinois Institute of Technology ("IIT") is a not for profit corporation under the laws of the state of Illinois and is a postsecondary educational institution. IIT is a recipient of federal financial assistance and has agreed to comply with section 504 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794,⁴ and its implementing regulation, 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.41-84.47, as a condition of receiving such financial assistance. Defendant Dr. Thomas L. Martin, Jr. ("Martin"), is the President of IIT and as such is responsible for the administration of IIT.

Plaintiff, who is a student at IIT majoring in mechanical engineering, must have the services of a qualified interpreter in order to effectively participate in and benefit from his classes and to complete his academic program at IIT. IDRS has determined that plaintiff is eligible⁵ for vocational rehabilitation services,⁶ as those terms are used in 45 C.F.R. § 1361.1.

On August 10, 1979 Jeffers advised IIT in writing that IDRS could not legally assume the cost of interpreter services for plaintiff's classes at IIT which were to begin in the Fall of 1979. On August 27, 1979 plaintiff began his mechanical engineering classes at IIT and IIT provided a qualified sign language interpreter for plaintiff. On October 4, 1979 IIT wrote Jeffers stating that IIT would not continue to provide interpreter services to plaintiff. IDRS provided interpreter services to plaintiff from October 8, 1979 until October 26, 1979 when Jeffers finally determined that IDRS would make no further payments for interpreter services for plaintiff. On October 29, 1979 IIT resumed providing interpreter services for plaintiff and continued to do so until the end of his first semester on December 18, 1979. On December 11, 1979 IIT informed plaintiff that IIT would not provide interpreter services for plaintiff's second semester classes. Subsequently, IDRS and IIT agreed to share the cost of interpreter services for plaintiff pending determination of the cross-motions for summary judgment.

Plaintiff contends that the failure of IDRS and Jeffers to provide plaintiff with interpreter services violates section 103(a)(6) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 723(a)(6),⁷ and the regulation promulgated thereunder, 45 C.F.R. § 1361.1(ee);⁸ section 504 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794,⁹ and the regulations promulgated thereunder, 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.4¹⁰ and 84.52;¹¹ and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.¹² Plaintiff contends that the failure of IIT and Martin to provide plaintiff with interpreter services violates section 504 of the Act¹³ and the regulation promulgated thereunder, 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(d).¹⁴ IIT and Martin contend that the primary obligation for provision of interpreter services to plaintiff is imposed upon IDRS, relying upon the Analysis of the Final Regulations, 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, ¶ 31.¹⁵ With respect to the claim under section 103(a) of the Act, IDRS and Jeffers contend that there is no private right of action under title I of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 720-751, that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and that claims for monetary relief against IDRS and Jeffers are barred by the eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution.¹⁶ With respect to the claims under section 504 of the Act, IDRS and Jeffers contend that sections 101(a)(8), 101(a)(12), and 103(a)(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 721(a)(8), 721(a)(12)¹⁷ and 723(a)(3),¹⁸ prohibit IDRS from providing interpreter services to plaintiff, that IIT and Martin do not have standing, and that claims for monetary relief against IDRS and Jeffers are barred by the eleventh amendment.

The court will first address plaintiff's claim under title I of the Act. The purpose of title I is to authorize grants to assist states in meeting the current and future needs of handicapped individuals, so that such individuals may prepare for and engage in gainful employment to the extent of their capabilities. Section 100(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 720(a).¹⁹ Under part A of title I each state is required to submit to the Commissioner of the Rehabilitation Services Administration (the "Commissioner") a state plan for vocational rehabilitation services for a three-year period in order to be eligible to participate in programs under title I. Section 101 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 721(a).²⁰ Part A of title I also specifies the contents of each state plan (section 101(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 721(a))²¹ and requires the Commissioner to insure that the individualized written rehabilitation program for each handicapped individual developed jointly by the vocational rehabilitation counselor or coordinator and the handicapped individual meets certain enumerated requirements (section 102(a)-(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 722(a)-(b)).²² Finally, part A of title I defines the scope of vocational rehabilitation services provided to individuals under title I as any goods or services necessary to render a handicapped individual employable and gives a noninclusive list of such goods or services. Section 103(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 723(a).²³

Any discussion of whether a private cause of action is implied under a statute must begin with the factors identified in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2088, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975):

In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted," ...—that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? ... Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? ... And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?

The Supreme Court has decided that each of these factors is not entitled to equal weight and has indicated that in appropriate cases it is necessary to consider only the first two or three factors. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 2489, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979); Davis v. Ball Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 640 F.2d 30, at 44, (7th Cir. 1980).

The first question, whether the statute was enacted for the benefit of a special class of which plaintiff is a member, is answered by looking to the language of the statute itself. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1953, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Language in the statute which expressly identifies the class Congress intended to benefit and which confers a right directly on a class of persons that includes the plaintiff or creates a duty in favor of the plaintiff is generally the most accurate indicator of the propriety of implication of a cause of action. Id. at 690 & n.13, 99 S.Ct. at 1954 & n.13; Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., Inc., 629 F.2d 1226, 1239 (7th Cir. 1980). The purpose of title I

is to authorize grants to assist States to meet the current and future needs of handicapped individuals, so that such individuals may prepare for and engage in gainful employment to the extent of their capabilities. Section 100 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 720.

There is thus no doubt that plaintiff is among the class for whose especial benefit this legislation was enacted. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 61, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1678, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978). While handicapped individuals are the class for whose especial benefit title I was enacted, by its terms, the language of title I does not manifestly endow any handicapped individual with a private judicial remedy. Simpson v....