Jones v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs

Decision Date11 December 2015
Docket Number5:14–cv–1014
Citation155 F.Supp.3d 191
Parties Randolph Jones, Plaintiff, v. International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO Local 158, 158c, 158s, and 158 RA, as Aider and Abettor; Daniel McGraw, Business Manager, as Aider and Abettor; Richard A. Ross, President, as Aider and Abettor; Jeremy Millson, Union Steward, as Aider and Abettor; and Thomas Schweizer, Business Representative, as Aider and Abettor, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

Randolph Jones, Syracuse, NY, pro se.

Robert S. Hite, John H. Beaumont, Hite, Beaumont Law Firm, Albany, NY, for Defendants.

DECISION & ORDER

Thomas J. McAvoy, Senior District Judge

Defendants move for summary judgment in this case involving claims that the Defendant union violated Plaintiff's rights under state and federal labor laws and discriminated against him on the basis of his race. The parties have briefed the issues and the Court has determined to resolve the issue on the submissions.

I. BACKGROUND

This case concerns Plaintiff's complaints of discrimination by the Defendants, the union that represented him and agents of that union. Plaintiff alleges Defendants refused to secure him training as a plant operator for which he was claims he was eligible under the collective bargaining agreement between his union and employer. The plant in question was the Ley Creek plant operated by the Onondaga County Resource Recovery Agency (“OCRRA”). Obtaining such training would have allowed him eventually to attain that position as plant operator. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' actions violated the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Plaintiff seeks relief under the National Labor Relations Act and the Equal Pay Act. He also alleges racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of Federal law and similar claims under New York law.

Plaintiff began working for OCRRA in April 1987.1 OCRRA is a public benefit corporation created under the laws of the State of New York. Defendants' Statement of Material Facts, dkt. # 29–10 (Defendants' Statement”) at ¶ 5. OCRRA is charged with operating solid waste and resource recovery facilities. Id. at ¶ 5. OCRRA operates two transfer stations, Ley Creek and Rock Cut Road. Id. ¶ 6. Id. at ¶ 2. He served as a tractor-trailer driver from 1987 until 2010. Id. at ¶ 3. Since 2010, Plaintiff has held the job title of Motor Equipment Operator III. Id. at ¶ 4. Plaintiff is an African American. Id. at ¶ 1.

Defendant Local 158 of the International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL–CIO (Local 158), is a recognized employee organization and the exclusive bargaining agent for employees of OCRRA who occupy the job titles of MEO III, Ley Creek Solid Waste Plant Operator and certain other non-management positions. Id. at ¶ 7.

At all relevant times, Defendant Daniel McGraw was the Business Manager of Defendant Local 158. Id. at ¶ 10. Defendant Richard A. Ross was the President of Local 158 and District Manager of District 852 of Local 158. Id. at ¶ 11. Defendant Thomas Schweizer was a Business Agent for Local 158. Id. at ¶ 12. Defendant Jeremy Millson was an OCRRA employee and a shop steward for Local 158 at the Ley Creek transfer station. Id. at ¶ 13.

Local 158 and OCRRA are parties to a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) that establishes terms and conditions of employment for those employees represented by Local 158. Id. at ¶ 15. Defendants claim that Millson, as shop steward, did not have the authority to file or process a contract grievance on behalf of the Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 14. Plaintiff disputes this claim, contending that the CBA provides that Millson is to sign such grievances. Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Statement of Material Facts (“Plaintiff's Response”), dkt. # 32–17, at ¶ 3.

The parties disagree about whether OCRRA and Local 158 properly entered into a “Side Letter Agreement” concerning training, and whether this alleged agreement altered the CBA. Defendants' Statement at ¶¶ 16–17; Plaintiff's Response at ¶ 4. Defendants contend that this “Side Letter Agreement” set up a “joint committee for the purpose of exploring mutually agreeable ways to increase training opportunities for members of the bargaining unit [.] Defendants' Statement at ¶ 17. After executing this alleged Side Letter Agreement, the members of the training committee met to discuss ways to increase training opportunities.2 Id. at ¶ 18. In late June 2012, Defendant Tom Schweizer received an invitation from OCRRA's Executive Director, Mark Donnelly, to attend a meeting of the Joint Training Committee to be held on June 29, 2012. Id. at ¶ 19. The meeting's purpose was further discussion of the training program. Id. The invitation discussed an order of training previously agreed upon by the Joint Training Committee. Id. The Committee agreed that in selecting workers for training [s]eniority will play the main role—BUT NOT always .” Id. (emphasis in original).

“Availability of equipment, work demands, skill of person involved, absenteeism, OT costs, etc. will also be decision criteria.” Id. Local 158 was to be made aware of that decision. Id. The agreement emphasized that selectors would [c]onsider those most likely and SENIOR to be entitled or asked to move into a higher slot when needed and they should be trained earlier.” Id. (emphasis in original). Because the agreement contemplated “much training[,] the parties also agreed that “the positions and/or equipment chosen for training will first be decided based on Management requirements for maximum flexibility.” Id.

The Training Committee met on June 29, 2012. Id. at ¶ 20. They “discuss[ed] training opportunities and confirmed their agreement that seniority would play the main role in determining the order in which training opportunities were offered to members of the bargaining unit.” Id. The terms of this agreement were reduced to writing and a draft document was circulated among the members of the Joint Training Committee. Id. at ¶ 21. Paragraph (D) of that document provided that [d]ecisions on” the order of Training” would be “NOT always be determined by seniority. Id. (emphasis in original). Others factors considered included [a]vailability of equipment, work demands, skill of person involved, absenteeism, OT costs, etc.” Id. The amount of training likely performed, the positions and equipment chosen for training would depend on the needs of management for “maximum flexibility.” Id.

Members of the Joint Training Committee prepared and circulated a second joint training document in early July 2012. Id. at ¶ 22. This document also discussed the order of training, emphasizing the importance of seniority, but emphasizing that seniority was not the only factor to be considered. Id. Management agreed to “first consider those SENIOR with sufficient knowledge to be entitled or asked to move inot [sic] a higher slot when needed and they should be trained first.” Id. (emphasis in original). Management's decision to disregard seniority was an “irrefutable” decision, but management was required to “disclose the reason to the employee and steward at interest.” Id. The agreement required management to “disclose the reason” for disregarding seniority “to the employee and steward at interest.” Id. Again, the parties agreed that the amount of training contemplated required “maximum flexibility” for management. Id.

Finally, on September 28, 2012, Local 158 and OCRRA “executed and entered into a Side Letter Agreement.” Id. at ¶ 23. The Side Letter “detailed the manner in which the training program would be implemented.” Id. As with the draft proposals, the Side Letter Agreement emphasized that seniority would not always determine the order of training. Id. Management agreed to consider those with seniority and “sufficient knowledge to be entitled or asked to move into a higher slot when needed[.] Id. Those employees would “be trained first.” Id. Though management's decision on training order was “irrefutable,” management also agreed to disclose the reason for that decision to the “employee and steward at interest.” Id.

Defendants contend that seniority is defined by Article 17 of the CBA. Id. at ¶ 24. That Article provides that [s]eniority shall start from the last date of hiring. Agency-wide seniority will apply to layoff, rehire and bidding on jobs posted by the Agency when the Agency assigns or reassigns employees to fill a scheduled vacancy of more than two (2) consecutive weeks.” Id. Plaintiff disputes that this Article applies to the events at issue in this case. Plaintiff's Response at ¶ 5. Plaintiff contends that the proper Article for consideration is Article 20.2b of the CBA, which provides that [w]henever such temporary openings or vacancies occur, OCRRA may fill these positions by assignment or reassignment of such assignments or reassignments shall be made on seniority and qualifications.” Id. Plaintiff contends that the Side Letter described above was “illegal and unlawful” and “not part of the contract.” Id. He does not offer any explanation for why the Union and OCRRA could not negotiate such an agreement, but simply offers a legal conclusion that the agreement was improper.

Ronald Boardway was an OCRRA employee and a member of the bargaining union represented by Local 158. Defendants' Statement at ¶ 25. On or about August 7, 2012, Defendant Tom Schweizer, a union business representative, was informed that the permanent Ley Creek plant operator would be absent from work on August 10, 2012. Id. at ¶ 26. OCRRA intended to assign a non-bargaining unit employee as a temporary replacement for the operator. Id. OCRRA made the temporary assignment on August 10, 2012, the fact of which Schweizer was made aware. Id. at ¶ 27. Schweizer contacted OCRRA Director Mark Donnelly to object to the assignment of a non-bargaining unit employee to perform bargaining-unit work. Id. Donnelly suggested that the union and OCRAA should implement the training program that the Joint Training...

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