Jones v. Jenkins
Decision Date | 21 February 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 876S250,876S250 |
Citation | 267 Ind. 619,372 N.E.2d 1163 |
Parties | Samuel JONES, Jr., Appellant, v. Leo D. JENKINS, Warden, Indiana State Prison, Appellee. |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, Kyle M. Payne, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., David A. Arthur, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Appellant Jones was sentenced from the Grant County Circuit Court in November 1963, to life imprisonment for the crime of second-degree murder. He challenges the constitutionality of Ind.Code § 11-7-6.1-2 (Burns Supp.1976) (Acts 1974, P.L. 43, § 1, p. 181 (repealed 1975)), and the construction of the statute which it replaced, Ind.Code § 11-7-6-1 (Burns 1973) ( ). Both of these statutes deal with the granting of "good time" credits to decrease the amount of time served on criminal sentences. Appellant has never earned good time credits, since he has a sentence of imprisonment for life.
The former statute on the granting of good time credits to inmates, Ind.Code § 11-7-6-1 (Burns 1973), provided in part:
"Every inmate who is now or hereafter may be confined in the Indiana State Prison, Indiana Reformatory, or Indiana Women's Prison, for a determinate term of imprisonment, and who, while an inmate in such institution, shall have no infractions of the rules and regulations of the institution, nor infractions of the laws of the state of Indiana or laws of the United States recorded against him or her, and who performs in a faithful manner the duties assigned to him or her while an inmate, shall be entitled to a diminution of time from his or her sentence as indicated in the following table for the respective years of his or her sentence, including time being served for unpaid fine or costs, and pro rata for any part of a year when the sentence is for more or less than a year." (emphasis supplied)
Thus, only inmates with determinate sentences received good time credits under this law. Those serving life sentences under the old law, including appellant Jones, never received good time credits. Jones argues that a life sentence is determinate since it possesses an inherent certainty of time based on the fixed life span of an inmate. However, a determinate sentence has been defined as one for a definite or certain number of years fixed by a court. Hinkle v. Dowd (1944), 223 Ind. 91, 58 N.E.2d 342. Further, a life sentence is neither determinate nor indeterminate. Brown v. State (1975), 262 Ind. 629, 322 N.E.2d 708. There is thus no merit to appellant's argument that Ind.Code § 11-7-6-1 (Burns 1973) should be construed to allow the granting of good time credits to lifers.
The constitutionality of the more recent good time statute, Ind.Code § 11-7-6.1-2 (Burns Supp.1977), is next challenged by appellant. This statute provided that:
(emphasis supplied)
Appellant's argument is that this explicit exclusion of lifers from the benefit of good time credits is a violation of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. A fundamental right, the right to be at liberty, is said to be at stake, necessitating the strict scrutiny test and putting the burden on the state to identify a compelling state interest behind the classification scheme. Alternatively, if the rational basis test for equal protection is to be applied, appellant argues that all inmates, lifers as well as non-lifers, are part of a single class since they all are subject to the same institutional environment and regulations. The purpose of the good time law is said to be the regulation of conduct within the prison institution, and its use to regulate the conduct of some inmates and not others is asserted to have no rational basis.
In McGinnis v. Royster, (1973), 410 U.S. 263, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 35 L.Ed.2d 282, the United States Supreme Court dealt with an equal protection challenge to a New York statute which denied good time credits to certain state prisoners during presentence incarceration in county jails. Holding the rational basis test applicable to a challenge in this area, the court stated, at 410 U.S. 269-70, 93 S.Ct. 1059, 35 L.Ed.2d 288-89:
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White v. Indiana Parole Bd.
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