Jones v. Johnson

Decision Date02 January 1941
Docket Number6 Div. 698.
Citation199 So. 539,240 Ala. 357
PartiesJONES v. JOHNSON, TAX ASSESSOR.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; Leigh M. Clark, Judge.

Petition of Marie Walker Jones for declaratory judgment against Roy Johnson, as Tax Assessor of Jefferson County, with intervention by the State of Alabama, as to the Homestead Exemption Act approved February 20, 1937 (Gen.Acts 1936-7 Sp.Sess. p. 113) as applied to the petitioner. From an adverse judgment, petitioner appeals.

Affirmed.

An amendment to unit of assessment statute applicable in Jefferson county, requiring taxpayer to file special instrument claiming homestead exemption, and making no provision as to time for filing such claim, constituted legislative approval of administrative rule that taxpayer in Jefferson county must claim right to homestead exemption on or before third Monday in January of each tax year. Gen.Acts 1936, Ex.Sess., p. 207, § 6, as amended by Gen.Acts 1939, p 830; Gen.Acts 1936-37, Sp.Sess., p. 113.

It appears from the petition that petitioner is a citizen of Jefferson County, Alabama, is the owner of her home (described) in said county, in which she resides. It is further recited:

The facts are that in the year 1939, petitioner separately listed and valued her property at the office of the tax assessor of Jefferson County, and listed her homestead and gave the value of same to the tax assessor with the understanding that she was claiming her homestead exemption as provided by the Homestead Act. The homestead was valued not in excess of $2,000. In 1940, after the third Monday in January, the petitioner made an effort to claim her homestead as exempt under the Homestead Exemption Act, but was denied this right by the tax assessor, the respondent. Her homestead was not exempted from ad valorem taxes for the taxable year 1940, but only 1939. The respondent based his refusal to allow such claim for homestead exemption in the year 1940 on the ground that a party, otherwise entitled to such exemption, was not entitled thereto unless he claimed such exemption on or before the third Monday in January of each tax year, stating that this was the invariable construction which he had placed upon the applicable statutes, citing as his authority for such construction an opinion of the Attorney General rendered to Hon. Madison L. Smith, Tax Assessor, Washington County Chatom, Alabama, under date of October 5, 1937, Quarterly Report of Attorney General, Vol. IX, page 10, and more particularly an opinion rendered to Hon. Chas. W. Lee, State Comptroller, Capitol, under date of January 5, 1938, Quarterly Report of Attorney General, Vol. X, page 27, which specifically dealt with said question in Jefferson County, Alabama.

The petitioner alleges that, as applied to petitioner, said Homestead Exemption Act does not require the petitioner to claim her homestead as exempt under the Homestead Exemption Act each year, or, in the event it does require the petitioner to claim such exemption each year, such claim for exemption may be made at any time during the taxable year.

Wherefore, petitioner prays that this cause be set down for hearing after reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard to the respondent, and to the Attorney General of the State of Alabama; the petitioner prays further that this honorable court declare, determine and adjudge the following:

1. Whether it is necessary for a citizen of Jefferson County who owns a home which does not exceed $2,000 in assessed value and who has claimed her homestead as exempt under the Homestead Exemption Act approved February 20, 1937, for the taxable year of 1939, under said act to claim her homestead as exempt in 1940 for the tax year of 1940 and each year thereafter.

2. Whether under the Homestead Exemption Act, as applied to petitioner, she can claim her homestead exemption any time during the tax year of 1940 so as to entitle her to said exemption for the tax year of 1940.

Respondents joined in the prayer for a declaratory judgment upon the questions presented, and the trial court rendered the following judgment:

"This cause coming on to be heard upon the petition of Marie Walker Jones and the answer of the Respondent, Roy Johnson, Tax Assessor of Jefferson County. Alabama and the answer of the Intervenor, the State of Alabama, both the Respondent and the Intervenor in such answer joining with the petitioner in petitioner's prayer that a declaratory judgment be rendered in this cause and the same having been duly argued and submitted by the parties for a judgment and decree of the court, and the court being of the opinion that it should determine and adjudge the respective rights and status of the parties,
"It is ordered, adjudged and decreed by the court that the Respondent owes no duty to the Complainant to allow her an exemption of her homestead under the Homestead Act approved February 20, 1937 for the tax year of 1940 on the basis, and by virtue of the facts stated in the facts alleged in the petitioner's petition which include the allegation that the petitioner filed a claim to her homestead as exempt for the tax year 1939.
"That the petitioner cannot now file with the Respondent such a claim as would authorize the Respondent to allow her homestead exemption under the Homestead Act approved February 20, 1937, for the tax year 1940."

Exum & Whitmire, of Birmingham, for appellant.

Clarence Mullins, Co. Atty., of Birmingham, Thos. S. Lawson, Atty. Gen., and Silas C. Garrett, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

BOULDIN Justice.

The legal questions presented in this cause are these:

First. To obtain the benefit of the exemption of the homestead from State ad valorem taxes, must the taxpayer, in his return, disclose the realty constituting the homestead, or otherwise make claim to his tax exemption thereon?

Second. If so, within what time shall such exemption be claimed?

Third. Does the same rule apply to taxpayers in Jefferson County, where the Unit Rule of Assessment is operative?

The homestead tax exemption statute is quite brief. The pertinent section reads: "Homesteads, as herein defined, are hereby exempted from all State ad valorem taxes beginning October 1, 1937." General Acts Special Session, 1936-7, p. 113. Approved February 20, 1937.

The homestead therein defined, the same as the homestead exempt by law from the payment of debts, save that the assessed value, rather than the full value, shall not exceed $2,000. Such homestead may consist of one tract or parcel within the limits of area and value exempt; but may be, and often is, a part of a larger tract in area or value, or may be a part of the value of residence property in city or town. In any case it must be the place of residence of the taxpayer. Clearly to get the benefit of such exemption without losing the revenue from ad valorem taxes on real estate not exempt, requires administrative procedure to identify the homestead and segregate it from taxable real estate. The law making body must be taken to have been fully informed of these conditions. But no administrative provisions whatever were incorporated in the exemption statute involved. This leads to the natural inference that the Legislature deemed the existing system of administrative law touching properties exempt from taxes to be adequate.

Certain classes of personal property had long been exempt. The law required the taxpayer's return of his property to the tax assessor to show the items claimed as exempt, and declared "that no property omitted from said return shall be exempted." General Revenue Law, 1935, section 33, Gen.Acts 1935, pp. 275, 276.

The same law provides: "The land and improvements thereon must be separately listed." General Revenue Law, 1935, section 31.

At the Extra Session of 1936, the same legislators who later passed the homestead tax exemption statute, amended the above clause of Section 31 so as to read: "The land and improvements thereon, and homesteads, must be separately listed and valued." Acts Extra Session 1936, p. 4. (Italics supplied.)

The insertion of "Homesteads" seems to have been in anticipation of the homestead exemption statute. Any other reason for requiring it to be separately listed does not appear. In any event, the general law in force when the exemption statute was enacted provided for a separate listing and valuation of the homestead in the taxpayer's return to the assessor. Moreover, this court had recently considered a statute exempting property, including real estate, from taxation where the income therefrom was devoted exclusively to specified school purposes. State v. Alabama Educational Foundation,...

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6 cases
  • State v. Wertheimer Bag Co.
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 13 d4 Outubro d4 1949
    ...restricted to farmers, is entitled to favorable consideration by the court, Cole v. Gullatt, 241 Ala. 669, 4 So.2d 412; Jones v. Johnson, 240 Ala. 357, 199 So. 539; State v. Tuscaloosa Building & Loan Association, 230 Ala. 476, 161 So. 530, 99 A.L.R. 1019. Yet this rule of construction is t......
  • Cole v. Gullatt
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 30 d4 Outubro d4 1941
    ...v. State, 20 Ala. 54. In the oral argument and brief the administrative construction of the statute is discussed. In Jones v. Johnson, 240 Ala. 357, 199 So. 539, 542, is declared: "It is to be observed this administrative interpretation of the law concerns the tax burden of every taxpayer i......
  • State v. Ross Grady Ins. Agency, Inc.
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • 13 d3 Setembro d3 1972
    ...an exemption in order for his property to be tax exempt has been held to apply to other tax statutes in this state. In Jones v. Johnson, 240 Ala. 357, 199 So. 539, the Supreme Court held that the homestead exemption from ad valorem property taxes must be claimed annually within the time pre......
  • Dunn v. Sequa Corp.
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • 24 d5 Junho d5 2011
    ...Tax Assessor, 978 So.2d 737, 741 (Ala.Civ.App.2006), aff'd, 978 So.2d 745 (Ala.2007). The taxing authorities rely on Jones v. Johnson, 240 Ala. 357, 199 So. 539 (1941), but we find that case distinguishable from the present case. In Jones, our supreme court wrote that “the law requires the ......
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