Jones v. Jones

• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: HUSKEY, Judge
• Docket Number: 52992
• Decision Date: 20 April 2026
• Citation: Jones v. Jones, 52992 (Idaho App. Apr 20, 2026)
• Parties: CHRISTOPHER D. JONES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. JESSICA A. JONES, Respondent-Respondent on Appeal.

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CHRISTOPHER D. JONES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. JESSICA A. JONES, Respondent-Respondent on Appeal.

No. 52992

Court of Appeals of Idaho

April 20, 2026

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Gerald F. Schroeder District Judge. Hon. David Lorello, Magistrate.

Decision of the district court, on intermediate appeal from the magistrate court, affirmed.

Christopher D. Jones, Meridian, pro se appellant.

Leon Rothstein, Attorney at Law; Leon Rothstein, Boise, for respondent.

HUSKEY, Judge

Christopher D. Jones appeals from the decision of the district court, on intermediate appeal from the magistrate court, affirming the denial of his second motion for relief from judgment. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Christopher^[1] and Jessica A. Jones were a married couple. They filed a stipulation for the entry of a judgment and decree of divorce on October 25, 2021. During their marriage, Christopher owned a company--Burst Biologics. Based on the value of Burst Biologics at the time Christopher and Jessica executed the stipulation, they agreed that Christopher would make an equalization payment to Jessica in the amount of $1,150,000 for her share of their community property. They agreed Christopher would pay Jessica $200,000 upon entry of the judgment and the remaining balance, amortized over eight years with an interest rate of five percent, would be paid in monthly payments of $12,026.92. As security for the debt, Christopher agreed to execute a promissory note with the remaining balance and deliver the note to Jessica "commensurate with the entry of [the] Judgment." As further security, and until the balance is paid in full, Christopher agreed to maintain a life insurance policy equal to or more than the amount owed to Jessica; in the event Christopher dies before the balance is paid, the amount owed would be payable to Jessica. Christopher and Jessica also agreed Christopher could pre-pay the remaining balance at any time without penalty. The stipulated judgment and decree of divorce was entered by the magistrate court on October 29, 2021.

Several months before Christopher entered the stipulation with Jessica, the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) began investigating Burst Biologics. After the judgment was entered in the divorce proceeding, the FDA issued a warning letter which caused Burst Biologics to suffer a significant loss of business. Christopher chose not to challenge the FDA's findings and instead, closed Burst Biologics and declared bankruptcy.

On October 27, 2022, Jessica filed a motion for contempt after Christopher failed to make the monthly equalization payments. Christopher entered a not guilty plea, stating he was unable to comply with the judgment. On January 3, 2023, Christopher filed a motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Family Law Procedure 805, requesting the magistrate court modify the equalization payment to match the current value of Burst Biologics, which was now "valueless." In the alternative, Christopher requested that the magistrate court set aside the judgment. Jessica objected. Following a hearing, the magistrate court entered an order denying Christopher's motion. The magistrate court found that Christopher did not establish adequate grounds for relief from the judgment under I.R.F.L.P. 805. Jessica then petitioned the magistrate court for a money judgment.

Christopher filed a successive motion for relief on August 7, 2024, repeating the same arguments from his first motion. Jessica again objected and a hearing was held. The magistrate court denied Christopher's second motion, finding it was untimely pursuant to I.R.F.L.P. 805(c). Alternatively, the magistrate court found there was no basis for relief pursuant to I.R.F.L.P. 805(a) or (b)(1) through (6).

Christopher appealed to the district court. Sitting in its appellate capacity, the district court affirmed the denial of Christopher's motion, holding the magistrate court properly determined there were no grounds for relief. The district court awarded Jessica attorney fees and costs on appeal. Christopher appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

For an appeal from the district court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a case from the magistrate court, we review the record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate court's findings of fact and whether the magistrate court's conclusions of law follow from those findings. Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 858-59, 303 P.3d 214, 217-18 (2013). However, as a matter of appellate procedure, our disposition of the appeal will affirm or reverse the decision of the district court. Id. Thus, we review the magistrate court's findings and conclusions, whether the district court affirmed or reversed the magistrate court and the basis therefore, and either affirm or reverse the district court.

The standard of review for asserting whether a trial court erred in denying an I.R.F.L.P. 805 motion is an abuse of discretion. See Robirds v. Robirds, 169 Idaho 596, 604, 499 P.3d 431, 439 (2021) (noting I.R.F.L.P. 805 is patterned after Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)), the standards for reviewing decisions under I.R.C.P. 60(b) are well-established, and the decision to grant or deny a motion under I.R.C.P. 60(b) is committed to the discretion of the trial court). Before applying its discretion, a determination under I.R.C.P. 60(b), and therefore also I.R.F.L.P. 805, turns largely on questions of fact to be determined by the trial court. Robirds, 169 Idaho at 604, 499 P.3d at 439. Those factual findings will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).

III. ANALYSIS

Christopher argues the magistrate court erred in denying his "renewed" motion for relief and the district court erred in affirming the magistrate court's denial. Christopher raises four issues on appeal: (1) the magistrate court's first denial rested on Chevron^[2] deference that "Loper Bright^[3] declared unconstitutional" and the district court erred by refusing to apply Loper Bright because it is "current law" governing this case; (2) his renewed motion for relief was timely under I.R.F.L.P. 805; (3) the enforcement of the judgment violates I.R.F.L.P. 805(b)(5) and (6) because performance is "mathematically impossible"; and (4) federal law prohibits state courts from "treating reliance on federal procedural rights as 'unreasonable' and finding post-judgment procedural departures 'foreseeable.'"

Jessica argues: (1) the magistrate court's denial did not rest on Chevron deference and the district court did not err by refusing to apply Loper Bright; (2) Christopher's initial motion for relief was untimely and his renewed motion did not present new controlling law; (3) the enforcement remains equitable; and (4) there are no federal law issues relevant to, nor preserved for, this appeal.

A. Federal Law Does Not Apply

Christopher argues that state courts must apply federal law in state family law cases and "federal law governs the central question" in this case. Christopher argues Loper Bright is relevant as to why he no longer has the current ability to make the equalization payment and thus, the magistrate court erred in denying his motion and refusing to consider the impact of Loper Bright. Christopher is incorrect.

Actions for divorce are entirely statutory, and courts are bound to follow the scheme enacted by the legislature, without adding or deleting requirements to conform to judicial notions of fairness. Such actions were unknown to the common law. Marital dissolutions are thus statutory proceedings. Jurisdiction to decide such cases is conferred on the courts by the legislature.

24 AM. JUR. 2d Divorce and Separation § 7 (2025).

The magistrate court found that what the FDA did or did not do, and thus, the application of Loper Bright, was irrelevant to this divorce case.^[4] We agree. Whether the FDA engaged in improper regulatory practices (a claim Christopher supports only by his statements as he has failed to challenge the FDA's procedures or rulings in federal court) and whether Loper Bright applies to the FDA's rulings is irrelevant as to whether Jessica is entitled to the equalization payment ordered in an Idaho family law case, in an amount and structure to which Christopher willingly stipulated. We agree with the magistrate court that the FDA's actions against Christopher's business and whether those actions were justified, are not relevant to whether Christopher is required to pay Jessica the share of their community property they agreed upon. Accordingly, the district court did not err in affirming the magistrate court's finding that Loper Bright does not apply in this case.

B. Timeliness of the Motion for Relief

Christopher argues his renewed motion for relief was timely under I.R.F.L.P. 805 because he filed his first motion approximately eleven months after the post-judgment FDA actions and filed his second motion approximately forty days after Loper Bright was issued. More specifically Christopher argues the magistrate court and district court erred in measuring the timeliness of his motion from the entry of the judgment rather than from the...