Jones v. Jones

Decision Date23 November 2021
Docket Number2020-CA-00923-COA
Parties LaDonna Murry JONES, Appellant v. Essie C. JONES, Jr., Appellee
CourtMississippi Court of Appeals

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: JEANINE M. CARAFELLO, PAMELA L. HANCOCK

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: LILLI ALICIA EVANS BASS

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., GREENLEE AND SMITH, JJ.

SMITH, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. In 2014, the Madison County Chancery Court granted LaDonna Jones and Essie Jones Jr. an irreconcilable differences divorce. On July 30, 2020, the chancellor modified the divorce judgment to award physical custody of the parties' son to Essie. The chancellor also reduced Essie's monthly child-support obligation from $600 to $300 and ordered LaDonna to begin paying Essie $175 a month in child support. On appeal, LaDonna challenges the chancellor's modification of custody and the parties' child-support obligations.

¶2. Upon review, we find no manifest error or abuse of discretion arising from the chancellor's modification of custody as to the parties' son. We therefore affirm that part of the chancellor's judgment. We further find, however, that the record contains insufficient evidence of the parties' incomes and expenses to support the chancellor's modification of their child-support obligations. We therefore reverse that part of the chancellor's judgment and remand this case to allow the parties to introduce evidence upon which the chancellor can base a decision regarding child support.

FACTS

¶3. Over the course of their relationship, the parties had two minor children: their son Ryan and their daughter Ruth.1 On November 6, 2014, the chancellor granted the parties an irreconcilable differences divorce. The chancellor fully incorporated the terms of the parties' child-custody and property-settlement agreement into the final judgment. The agreement provided for the following: joint legal custody of both children, physical custody to LaDonna, and reasonable visitation for Essie. The parties also agreed that Essie would pay LaDonna $600 a month in child support.

¶4. In October 2019, LaDonna filed a contempt petition against Essie, who responded and filed his own petition for contempt and for the modification of child custody and child support.2 The chancellor held a July 21, 2020 hearing on the parties' petitions. LaDonna, Essie, and Ryan each testified. The parties stated that while Essie still resided in the former marital home, LaDonna now lived in another school district. Due to this arrangement, the parties agreed at the time of their divorce to continue to use Essie's home address for the children's schools. The parties testified that LaDonna drove the children to Essie's home every morning during the school year so the children could catch the school bus there. At the end of each school day, the children returned to Essie's home, and after finishing their homework and eating dinner, either Essie or his wife would drive them back to LaDonna's home.

¶5. The parties further testified that from April to July 2019, both children lived solely with Essie. During most of that period, LaDonna lived in Texas and searched for a job. While LaDonna was in Texas, Essie fully cared for the children and paid for all their expenses. When LaDonna returned to Mississippi in July 2019, Ryan initially refused to return to her home. Ryan continued to live exclusively with Essie until November 2019, when he agreed to return to LaDonna's home. At the time of trial, Ryan still went to Essie's home every morning of the summer break except for those weekends when LaDonna had custody of him. Essie continued to drive Ryan back to LaDonna's home after dinner each night, where Ryan would sleep before returning to Essie's home the next morning.

¶6. Ryan, who was sixteen at the time of trial and about to begin his junior year of high school, testified that he already stayed at Essie's home on a regular basis and that he preferred to permanently live with Essie. When questioned by the chancellor, Ryan was able to recite Essie's home address but stated he did not know LaDonna's address. Ryan testified that LaDonna often yelled at him and that he argued with her several times a week. According to Ryan, LaDonna had told him that he would be "taking money out of [her pocket] and [his] sister's pocket" if he went to live with Essie. Ryan testified that he felt like LaDonna "always yelled at [him] for no reason at all over little things" while Essie took the time to explain to him "when [he was] doing wrong and why ... it's wrong."

¶7. Ryan stated that he felt LaDonna's home was not the safest place for him. In addition to the frequent yelling and fighting, Ryan testified he was scared of being locked outside by LaDonna. Both Ryan and LaDonna testified about an incident where an argument resulted in LaDonna locking Ryan outside her home. During the disagreement, Ryan walked outside. LaDonna testified that she looked outside but did not see Ryan, so she locked the door. LaDonna further testified that if Ryan had simply knocked on the door, she would have let him back into the house. Ryan claimed, however, that LaDonna had seen him outside but had not opened the door to let him back inside. According to Ryan, he had been forced to text his sister and to ask her to open the door for him.

¶8. In contrast to the circumstances at LaDonna's home, Ryan described the home environment Essie provided as "[v]ery calm [and] nice." Ryan testified that he went to his father whenever he had a problem and needed a parent's help. Ryan further stated that Essie always helped him, did not yell at him, and had never locked him out of the house. Ryan testified that Essie's home felt safer and less stressful than LaDonna's home and that he liked going to his father's home every day to get away from the arguments at his mother's home.

¶9. Following the hearing, the chancellor issued a bench ruling. The chancellor found that due to "what is occurring in the custodial parent's home[,]" Ryan had needed "to walk away from [the situation] to avoid a confrontation." She further found credible Ryan's testimony "that he ha[d] been locked out" of the custodial home and had needed "to text his little sister to get in ...." The chancellor determined these events were traumatic for Ryan and had "affected [Ryan's] peace and dignity in the home of the custodial parent." Based on these findings, the chancellor concluded that a substantial and material adverse change in circumstances had occurred in LaDonna's home with regard to Ryan.

¶10. The chancellor next conducted an Albright analysis.3 She found that none of the factors favored LaDonna and that only one factor—the parties' employment responsibilities—was neutral. The chancellor concluded that the following factors favored Essie: (1) Ryan's age, health, and sex; (2) Ryan's continuity of care since the divorce; (3) the parties' parenting skills; (4) the parties' willingness and capacity to provide primary child care for Ryan; (5) the parties' physical and mental health and age; (6) the emotional ties between the parties and Ryan; (7) the parties' moral fitness; (8) Ryan's home, school, and community records; (9) Ryan's preference; and (10) the stability of the parties' home environment and employment. The chancellor further concluded there were no other factors relevant to the parent-child relationship or Ryan's best interest that would affect her analysis.

¶11. After concluding that a modification of custody was in Ryan's best interest, the chancellor awarded Essie physical custody of Ryan and awarded LaDonna visitation with Ryan. As a result of the child-custody modification, the chancellor reduced Essie's monthly child-support payments from $600 to $300 and ordered LaDonna to begin paying Essie $175 a month in child support. The chancellor further ordered that all other provisions of the divorce judgment, including those regarding custody of Ruth, remain in full force and effect. On July 30, 2020, the chancellor entered an order in accordance with her bench ruling. Aggrieved by the chancellor's modification of child custody and child support, LaDonna appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶12. This Court narrowly reviews a chancellor's "ruling on a motion for modification of custody ‘based on a material change in circumstances’ ...." Smith v. Smith , 318 So. 3d 484, 490 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Page v. Graves , 283 So. 3d 269, 274 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) ). We "will not disturb a chancellor's judgment when it is supported by substantial credible evidence unless the chancellor abused her discretion, was manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal standard." Leverett v. Leverett , 309 So. 3d 116, 120 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Gilmer v. Gilmer , 297 So. 3d 324, 331 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) ). We review the chancellor's "interpretation and application of the law" de novo. Smith , 318 So. 3d at 491 (¶18) (quoting Taylor v. Timmons (In re C.T.) , 228 So. 3d 311, 315 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) ).

DISCUSSION

I. Modification of Child Custody

¶13. LaDonna asserts that insufficient evidence supported the chancellor's finding regarding an adverse material change of circumstances in the custodial home. LaDonna also contends that the chancellor misapplied the Albright factors in determining whether a custody modification was in Ryan's best interest. As a result, LaDonna argues the chancellor clearly erred by modifying custody of Ryan.

A. Adverse Material Change

¶14. To modify child custody, the noncustodial parent must prove that (1) "a material change of circumstances has occurred in the custodial home since the most recent custody decree"; (2) "the change adversely affects the child"; and (3) the modification is in the child's best interest. Stewart v. Stewart , 309 So. 3d 44, 83 (¶126) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Powell v. Powell , 976 So. 2d 358, 361 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) ). "Totality of the circumstances can serve as a basis for a material change." Munday v. McLendon ...

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