Jones v. Jones

Decision Date14 February 1950
Citation312 Ky. 240,227 S.W.2d 182
PartiesJONES v. JONES.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Shumate & Shumate, Richmond, for appellant.

Stoll, Keenon & Park, Lexington, George T. Ross, Richmond, for appellee.

HELM, Judge.

Appellant, J. D. Jones, sought damages from Madeline Jones because of injuries sustained in an automobile accident in Ohio. The trial court directed a verdict for appellee. Appellant appeals.

Appellee, Madeline Jones, is the wife of Chester Jones; Chester is a brother of appellant. Appellant and his daughter, Mrs. Lucille Cobb, lived near Richmond. Appellee and her husband, Chester, lived in Richmond. A day or two prior to December 12, 1947, appellant and his brother, Chester, received words that their aunt, Candice Adams, who lived at Amelia, Ohio, had died. Appellee invited appellant and his daughter to accompany her and husband in her automobile from Richmond to Amelia to attend the funeral of their aunt. Appellant and his daughter accepted the invitation, and on the morning of December 12, 1947, the four of them left for Ohio, going by way of Winchester and Maysville. Before leaving, Chester said there was no need to take both cars. Appellant and Chester agreed that they would go in appellee's car. Chester, the husband and agent of appellee, drove her car. There was no agreement or understanding 'regarding the expenses on this trip.' At Winchester they stopped and got some gas. Appellant says, 'The tank was on my side of the car. I went out and gave the attendant a $5 bill and he gave me $2.50 back.'

Appellant says, 'The sun was shining. There was some snow around. Seen ice in Ohio several times.' It was 'pretty chilly.' He did not say anything to his brother about the ice. Asked how fast his brother was driving, he replied, 'I wouldn't say.' Asked if he was driving at an ordinary rate of speed, he answered, 'I wasn't paying any attention.' Then asked if in his deposition he had stated that his brother was driving at an ordinary rate of speed, he answered, 'Yes, sir.' He then said there was nothing our of the ordinary about his brother's driving that attracted his attention. A few miles beyond Georgetown, Ohio, as they were driving along, he says, 'Don't know what happened. * * * Something happened to the car. * * * I was hit in the head and knocked unconscious.' When he 'woke up' he was in a hospital in Cincinnati. He admits that in a statement made later he said, 'The black top road was icy and Chester, who is a very good driver, was driving carefully because of the ice at a speed of about 35 to 40 miles per hour when all of a sudden the car started to skid and left the road on the right side and turned over. * * * In my opinion this accident was simply one where a car skidded out of control and Chester Jones was no way responsible for it.' Asked if he made that statement, he said, 'Yes, sir. I wouldn't blame the accident on nobody.'

Mrs. Cobb, daughter of appellant, was in the car on the trip to Ohio. She says the weather was 'very pretty but cold.' She did not notice any ice on the road until they got into Ohio; saw plenty of it in Georgetown, and then 'just spots of it on the road.' At that time she was riding on the front seat with Chester. At the time the car swerved she did not notice ice on the highway until the car was on it. She has ridden in automobiles for about 30 years. In her opinion Chester was driving about 50 miles an hour.

Appellee was called by appellant to testify as if under cross-examination. The car belonged to her. Chester, as her husband and agent, was driving her car. She was riding on the back seat with appellant at the time of the accident. She had noticed snow and ice on the road off and on as they got into Ohio. Asked how fast they were going, she said, 'We had been driving about 60 miles an hour.' Asked as to how fast Chester was driving at the point of accident, she said, 'He hadn's checked up very much.' The car skidded several times and went off the road and turned over about four or five miles beyond Georgetown. She did not say anything to her husband about his driving. No one complained about the ice or how her husband was driving at any time. Asked by her attorney, 'You don't mean to tell the jury how fast your husband was driving when the accident occurred?' she answered, 'No, sir.'

It appears that appellant sustained painful and permanent injuries. He sought damages in the sum of $15,000; pleads that the negligence and careless acts of appellee and her agent in operating the car 'is actionable negligence in the state of Ohio.' By amended petition appellant plead that the operation of appellee's automobile by her agent at the time and place of the accident 'constituted wilful and wanton negligence and wilful and wanton misconduct.'

The Guest Statute of Ohio is as follows: Section 6308-6, General Code. 'The owner, operator, or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a guest while being transported without payment therefor in or upon said moter vehicle, resulting from the operation thereof, unless said injuries or death are caused by the wilful or wanton misconduct of such operator, owner or person responsible for the operation of said motor vehicle.'

Appellant maintains:

'First, the Ohio Guest Statute has no application to the relationship of the parties in this case;

'Second, even though the Ohio Guest Statute is applicable, the agent of the appellee was operating her automobile at such excessive speed and dangerous rate of speed under the circumstances present when and where the car...

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4 cases
  • Workman v. Hargadon
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • December 2, 1960
    ...accident was regarded by the court as not showing it to have been caused by the driver's willful or wanton misconduct. See Jones v. Jones, 312 Ky. 240, 227 S.W.2d 182; Schulz v. Fible, 71 Ohio App. 353, 48 N.E.2d 899; Tighe v. Diamond, 149 Ohio St. 520, 80 N.E.2d 122; Helleren v. Dixon, 152......
  • Ansback v. Greenberg
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • December 5, 1952
    ...384(2): 'If no cause of action is created at the place of wrong, no recovery can be had in any other state.' Also see Jones v. Jones, 312 Ky. 240, 227 S.W.2d 182. We have no doubt the cause of action must be tested under the Georgia The only evidence of negligence in this case is that Green......
  • Douglas v. Wood
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • January 23, 1953
    ...of the state in which the accident occurs is controlling. Feck's Adm'r v. Bell Line, Inc., 284 Ky. 288, 144 S.W.2d 483; Jones v. Jones, 312 Ky. 240, 227 S.W.2d 182. Appellant in his brief, without fully analyzing the testimony on which he bases his ground that gross negligence was not shown......
  • Jones v. Jones
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • February 14, 1950

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