Jones v. Jones

• Decision Date: 19 December 1917
• Docket Number: No. 11359.,11359.
• Citation: 117 N.E. 1013,281 Ill. 595
• Parties: JONES v. JONES et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

281 Ill. 595

117 N.E. 1013

JONES

v.JONES et al.

No. 11359.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 19, 1917.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Frederick A. Smith, Judge.

Bill by Mary A. Jones against Ernest H. Jones and others. From a decree awarding partial relief, complainant appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.F. L. Salisbury and M. Marso, both of Chicago, for appellant.

Joseph G. Sheldon, of Chicago, for appellees.

DUNN, J.

The appellant, Mary A. Jones, and the appellee Ernest H. Jones were married on February 8, 1915, having been engaged since the previous September. He was a widower, living with his daughter, Edith I. Carey, and her husband, in a house in Chicago in which he and his former wife had lived, the legal title to which was in them as joint tenants. The daughter, who was living at home unmarried at the time of the purchase of the premises, contributed from her own means $1,200 to the purchase price, $4,200, and it had been agreed that she should have one-fourth interest in the property. After the death of his first wife Jones gave the furniture in the house to his daughter, and they continued to occupy the house together. On February 2, 1915, Jones conveyed the property to his daughter without consideration. After their marriage the appellant and Jones occupied the premises as their residence, together with the daughter and her husband, until early in April, 1915. Mrs. Carey at the time of the conveyance to her knew of the approaching marriage of her father and the appellant, but the appellant knew nothing of the conveyance to Mrs. Carey until long after the marriage, though she knew that her intended husband had title to the property and that his daughter had contributed $1,200 to the purchase price. Mr. and Mrs. Carey having arranged to move to De Kalb, Jones proposed to his wife to rent the house and live at a hotel, and she at first consented to this proposition, not knowing of the conveyance to Mrs. Carey. Afterward she withdrew her consent and said she would not go to the hotel, but intended to remain in the house. He then engaged a room in a hotel and went there to stay. At the same time Mr. and Mrs. Carey moved out, taking with them all the furniture except a dresser and a wardrobe in the appellant's bedroom. In the meantime the daughter had leased the premises to the appellee Arthur J. Francis, who moved into a part of the house, but the appellant continued to occupy her room, though without bed or bedding, and had her meals sent in, hauling them up to her bedroom window in a basket by a rope. Mrs. Carey brought an action of forcible entry and detainer against the appellant, and on April 15th obtained a judgment against her for the possession of the premises. Thereupon, the appellant's attorney having advised her that it would be only a few days until she would have to get out, and that as she was very uncomfortable she had better leave then, the appellant went to the hotel where her husband was staying and has ever since lived there with him. On August 6, 1915, she filed a bill in the circuit court of Cook county, seeking to have the deed of February 2d set aside as to her, to have the premises decreed to be her homestead as well as to be subject to her inchoate right of dower, and asking to be restored to the possession of the premises. The cause was heard, and a decree was rendered declaring that the appellant had an inchoate right of dower in the undivided three-fourths of the premises, but was not entitled to an estate of homestead or to the possession, and adjudging three-fourths of the costs against her. She has appealed from this decree, and insists that she should have been awarded an estate of homestead in the premises and the possession of them, together with the rents collected or the reasonable rental value of the premises from the time she was dispossessed, and that the court erred in limiting her inchoate right of dower to an undivided three-fourths of the premises, and in taxing three-fourths of the costs against her.

The appellees contend that a freehold is not involved, and therefore this court has no jurisdiction of the appeal. The appellant by her bill claims an estate of homestead and the right to occupy the premises until her husband provides her another homestead. If she is entitled to such estate it will continue for her life, unless she abandons it or her husband provides her another homestead. An estate which is measured by the life of the tenant is a freehold, though it may be liable to determine upon a future contingency before such life expires. A freehold is therefore involved, and the appeal was properly brought to this court.

A voluntary conveyance made prior to a contemplated marriage by either party without the knowledge of...