Jones v. Joyner
Decision Date | 21 September 2015 |
Docket Number | 3:14cv420-FDW |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
Parties | RODNEY JONES, Petitioner, v. CARLTON B. JOYNER, Respondent. |
THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Rodney Jones's amended pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) Also before the Court are Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 5) and Petitioner's motions for an evidentiary hearing (Doc. No. 9) and for discovery (Doc. Nos. 10, 15).
Petitioner is a prisoner of the State of North Carolina, who, on March 13, 2012, was convicted after a jury trial in Mecklenburg County Superior Court of first-degree burglary and larceny after breaking and entering.1 He subsequently admitted attaining habitual felon status. Judgement was consolidated for sentencing, and Petitioner was sentenced to 151-191 months imprisonment. The North Carolina Court of Appeals summarized the State's evidence:
State v. Jones, 750 S.E.2d 920, 2013 WL 5231986 at *1-2 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2013).
The North Carolina Court of Appeals found no error on direct review. See id. at *7. It does not appear from the record or the amended Petition and its attachments that Petitioner sought further review in the North Carolina Supreme Court.
On or about April 7, 2014, Petitioner filed a pro se motion for appropriate relief ("MAR") in the Mecklenburg County Superior Court. (Resp't's Ex. 5, Doc. Nos. 6-6 & 6-7.) The state court summarily denied the MAR, stating that it "fail[ed] to show an entitlement to relief upon any of the grounds set forth in N.C.G.S. 15A-1415(b)." (Order Den. MAR, Resp't's Ex. 6, Doc. No. 6-8.) On or about June 9, 2014, Petitioner filed a pro se certiorari petition in the North Carolina Court of Appeals (Resp't's Ex. 7, Doc. No. 6-9), which was denied on June 17, 2014 ( .) On or about June 13, 2014, Petitioner filed a pro se MAR in the North Carolina Court of Appeals (Resp't's Ex. 10, Doc. No. 6-12), which was dismissed on July 2, 2014 (Order Den. MAR, Resp't's Ex. 11, Doc. No. 6-13.)
On July 31, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition, with exhibits, in federal district court. (Doc. Nos. 1, 1-1, & 1-2.) On August 14, 2014, Petitioner filed an amendment to his Petition to add an equal protection claim. (Doc. No. 2.) After conducting an initial review required by Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, this Court ordered Respondent to file a response to the amended Petition. Respondent filed a Response (Doc. No. 4) and a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 5). Petitioner subsequently filed a response to the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 11), a Memorandum of Support (Doc. No. 13), and an affidavit (Doc. No. 17). Additionally, he filed the instant motion for an evidentiary hearing (Doc. No. 9) and motions for discovery (Doc. Nos. 10. 15).
On October 22, 2014, Petitioner through counsel from N.C. Prisoner Legal Services Inc., filed an MAR in the Mecklenburg County Superior Court, raising a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for stipulating to an incorrect prior record level at sentencing. (Resp't's Exhibit 12, Doc. No. 6-14.) On August 6, 2015, Respondent filed a notice in this Court that Petitioner, through counsel, had withdrawn the MAR. (Doc. No. 18.) These matters are now ripe for review.
Summary judgment is appropriate in those cases where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and it appears that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); United States v. Lee, 943 F.2d 366, 368 (4th Cir. 1991). Any permissible inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith RadioCorp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986). Where, however, the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, disposition by summary judgment is appropriate. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986).
Review of Petitioner's claims that were adjudicated on their merits by the state courts is limited by the deferential standard set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. § 2254(d), as construed by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 374-91 (2000). This Court may grant habeas relief on claims of constitutional error adjudicated on their merits in state court only if that adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," § 2254(d)(1), or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," § 2254(d)(2).
A decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent if "the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases" or "confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at [an opposite result]." Williams, 529 U.S. at 405. A state court unreasonably applies federal law when it "identifies the correct governing legal rule from th[e Supreme] Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . . case." Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. A state court's determination that a claim fails on its merits cannot be overturned by a federal habeas court "so long as 'fairminded...
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