Jones v. Kirchner

• Decision Date: 26 August 2016
• Docket Number: C/w 15–5088,No. 14–5257,14–5257
• Citation: 835 F.3d 74
• Parties: Antoine Jones, Appellant v. Steve Kirchner, D.C. MPD Detective, et al., Appellees
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

835 F.3d 74

Antoine Jones, Appellant

v.Steve Kirchner, D.C. MPD Detective, et al., Appellees

No. 14–5257

C/w 15–5088

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued March 21, 2016

Decided August 26, 2016

Anthony F. Shelley, Washington, DC, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Andrew T. Wise, Kathleen T. Wach, and Arthur B. Spitzer, Washington, DC. Adam W. Braskich, Washington, DC, entered an appearance.

Jeremy S. Simon, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney. Peter C. Pfaffenroth, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: Wilkins, Circuit Judge, and Ginsburg and Randolph, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment in part filed by Senior Circuit Judge Randolph.

Ginsburg

, Senior Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Antoine Jones appeals the district court's order dismissing his Bivens

and § 1983 claims against individual agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a Metropolitan Police Department detective arising out of a search of his home and his coinciding arrest in 2005.¹ For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part the order of the district court, and remand this matter to that court for further proceedings.

I. Background

During the course of a narcotics investigation, a federal magistrate judge in the District of Maryland signed a warrant to search Antoine Jones's home. The magistrate struck language in the warrant form that would have permitted its execution without time restrictions, causing the warrant to read, in relevant part:

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to search ... the ... place named above ... serving this warrant and making the search (in the daytime—6:00 A.M. to 10:00 P.M.)(at any time in the day or night as I find reasonable cause has been established).²

According to the allegations in Jones's complaint, at 4:45 AM on October 24, 2005, one MPD detective and 11 FBI agents executed the search warrant and arrested Jones at gunpoint in his bedroom. Jones v. Kirchner , 66 F.Supp.3d 237, 241 (D.D.C. 2014)

. During the course of the search, the officers seized 30 to 40 boxes of personal property. Id. Although Jones does not allege specifically what the boxes contained,³ he does allege the “Defendants found no evidence of any crime at the [home],” and that the seizure therefore “unlawfully exceeded the scope of the warrant.” Jones also alleges the officers broke into and entered his home “using an unauthorized key to gain entry,” “without knocking and announcing” their presence, and without the justification of “exigent circumstances.”

Jones has been incarcerated since his arrest. His first trial resulted in a hung jury and a mistrial. He was convicted after his second trial and sentenced to life in prison, but we overturned his conviction after concluding the Fourth Amendment prevented law enforcement officers from installing a GPS tracking device on Jones's car without a warrant and using it to monitor his movements for 28 days. United States v. Maynard , 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010)

, aff'd sub nom

United States v. Jones , ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 945, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012). Jones's third trial resulted in another hung jury, after which he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 15 years in prison.

In this case, Jones alleges, among other things, that the failure of the police to knock and announce before entering, their seizure of the property contained in the boxes, and their nighttime execution of the search violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 57–61. Jones sought damages from the FBI agents pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971)

, and from the MPD officer pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

for failure to state a claim, which motion the district court granted in full. Jones , 66 F.Supp.3d 237.

The district court held that under the standard set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)

, and Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), Jones had failed to “plead sufficient facts to raise his allegations” of a knock-and-announce violation and an unlawful seizure “from possibility to plausibility! [sic]” Id. at 245. Specifically, because the complaint asserted Jones was upstairs at the time of the entry, the district court said it “may infer that Mr. Jones did not hear a knock and announce, but no more.” Id. With respect to the seizure, the district court held the allegation was conclusory because the complaint “does not identify what property was seized, describe the scope of the [attached] warrant, nor allege how the seized items exceeded that scope.” Id. at 246. The district court also held the Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for their nighttime execution of the search warrant. Jones timely appealed.

II. Analysis

“We review de novo the district court's Rule 12(b)(6)

dismissal” of Jones's claims, accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true and drawing in Jones's favor all reasonable inferences from those allegations. Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham , 798 F.3d 1119, 1128–29 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

A. Plausibility of Allegations

The Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement officers, before entering the premises to be searched, to announce their presence and provide residents an opportunity to open the door, see Wilson v. Arkansas , 514 U.S. 927, 931–32, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995)

, except under exigent circumstances, see

Hudson v. Michigan , 547 U.S. 586, 589–90, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006). The Amendment also requires that warrants “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,” which operates to “prevent[ ] the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.” Marron v. United States , 275 U.S. 192, 195–96, 48 S.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927).

Jones's complaint alleges the Defendants violated both these limitations. A complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937

(internal quotations omitted). As required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, the pleadings must “give the defendants fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotations and alterations omitted), but the Rule “does not require detailed factual allegations,” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal quotations omitted). The amended complaint easily meets these minimum requirements. Taking Jones's allegations as true for the purpose of passing upon a motion to dismiss, see

Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, he has made a prima facie showing the Defendants violated the Fourth Amendment.

Jones can try to prove the knock-and-announce violation by testifying that he did not hear a knock. If the Defendants did, in fact, knock, then they can so testify to refute Jones's claim. The task of resolving the conflicting accounts would fall to the finder of fact—judge or jury—who could decide how much weight to assign Jones's testimony after considering all relevant evidence, such as the distance between the bedroom and the front door and the volume of the alleged knock. Credibility determinations are not for the district court, especially at the motion to dismiss stage, before evidence is available and before the Defendants have even denied the allegations against them. See Howard v. Office of Chief Admin. Officer of U.S. House of Representatives , 720 F.3d 939, 950 (D.C. Cir. 2013)

(explaining that, at the motion to dismiss stage, the “court must assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, but may not weigh the evidence that might be offered to support it”) (internal quotations and brackets omitted); Neitzke v. Williams , 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance ... dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations”); Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (The “plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement”) (internal quotations omitted).⁴

Jones's allegation of unlawful seizure is also plausible. Maybe all of the items in the 30 or more seized boxes fell within the scope of the search warrant, specified in Attachment A, Doc. No. 619–6 in Jones , 05–cr–386 (May 22, 2012). Maybe some or all of the items did not. The district court will ultimately make that determination. Cf. United States v. Geraldo , 271 F.3d 1112, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 2001)

. But Rule 8, which provides a complainant must make “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” did not require Jones, before discovery, to identify each seized item and document and to show that each fell outside the scope of the warrant.

B. Statute of Limitations

There is no federal limitations period or tolling rule for actions brought under § 1983

, so 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a companion statute that governs the rules of decision applicable to civil rights claims, directs federal courts to look to state law to fill the gap. See

Wilson v. Garcia , 471 U.S. 261, 266–68, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) ; see also

Hardin v. Straub , 490 U.S. 536, 539, 109 S.Ct. 1998, 104 L.Ed.2d 582 (1989) (applying state rule tolling the limitations period for inmates in a § 1983 action); Earle v. District of Columbia , 707 F.3d 299, 305 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (applying the D.C. statute of limitations in a § 1983 action brought in D.C.); Doe v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (applying the D.C. statute of limitations in a Bivens ac...