Jones v. Knappen
| Decision Date | 28 July 1891 |
| Citation | 22 A. 630,63 Vt. 391 |
| Parties | HORTON W. JONES, ADM'R OF LOYAL C. REMELE v. ASHMUN A. KNAPPEN, ET AL |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
FEBRUARY TERM, 1891
Judgment affirmed, with costs to the appellant in this court, ordered to be certified to the Probate Court.
Bliss & Royce, for the appellants.
Hiram Alden died before the testator. The legacy was to him alone, and not to him or his heirs. It lapsed by his decease antedating the testator. It is not otherwise contended. Cureton v. Massey, 34 S.C. Eq 104, 94 Am. Dec. 152 and note.
2. The testator, in addition to a specific devise to his wife, gave her the use and income of his estate during her natural life. He then proceeds. "At her decease I give, devise and bequeath all my estate that may be remaining as follows." He then gives certain sums to individual legatees, and the residue to the next of kin of himself, and of his wife, to be divided onehalf to the next of kin of each. The next of kin of each were ascertainable at the decease of the testator. The contention is whether the estate vested at the death of the testator, or at the decease of the taker for life. The language used is as consistent with an intention to postpone the enjoyment only, as to postpone the vesting of the remainder. Unless the language of the testator when applied to the circumstances of the case clearly indicates a contrary intention, the law favors the vesting of remainders on the death of the testators when the will becomes operative. Such is presumed to be the testator's intention unless the contrary appears. In re Tucker's Will, 21 A. 272, 63 Vt. 104. Nodine v. Greenfield, 7 Paige Ch. 544, ; De Peyster v Clendining, 7 Paige Ch. 421, 434 and note. (8 Paige's Ch. 295.) If the language of the will imports a present bequest of property to be distributed at a period subsequent to the death of testator, the persons in esse at the time of his death, will as a rule take a vested interest. Collins v. Collins, 5 Law. Ed. N. Y. Ch. R. 523 and note. (2 Paige's Ch. 9.)
So, where the benefit of a legacy is given for life to one, and after his decease to another, the interest of the second legatee is generally vested, and passes to the heirs of the second legatee, though he die during the existence of the life of the first taker. Barker v. Woods, 7 Law. Ed. N. Y. Ch. R. 265 and note. (1 Sandf. Ch. 129.) We think the language used by the testator was intended only to postpone the enjoyment of the estate, the life use of which was given to his wife; and that the legatees, including the next of kin, took a vested interest in the estate, if the estate was sufficiently large to reach the next of kin, under the clause disposing of the residue.
3. The widow waived the provisions of the will, and took the share of the estate allowed by law. The contention is whether this waiver accelerated the time when the special legatees and next of kin are to come into the enjoyment of the respective proportions of the estate. Generally the termination of the life estate before the decease of the life tenant, lets the reversioner into immediate enjoyment of the estate. When the widow waives the provisions of the will, and takes under the law, such action usually diminishes the amount of the estate available for the other legatees or devisees pro rata, and it is equitable that they should come earlier into the enjoyment of their diminished legacies to compensate them for the diminution caused by such action. Such waiver blots out all the provisions of will for the widow, and leaves the remaining provisions of the will in force, to be accommodated equitably to the state of the testator's property as left by such action. The testator in the present case left about $ 15,000 in property. He gave his wife $ 1,000 of this, and the use and income of all of his estate during life. In specific pecuniary legacies to be paid at her decease, he disposes of $ 7,500 of the estate of which she was given the use for life, and the residue he gave to be divided half and half between his next of kin, and her next of kin. The action of the widow in waiving the provisions of the will, and taking what the law allows operated to diminish largely the residue of the estate given to the next of kin of the testator and of his wife, if distribution is to be made at once. There is enough of the estate remaining to pay the specific pecuniary legacies in full. But these legatees will receive just what the testator set apart for them if the payment of their legacies is postponed until the decease of the widow. Such postponement would to some extent, and perhaps wholly compensate the next of kin, for the diminution caused by the action of the widow, of that part of the estate given by the testator to them. I have found very few decided cases where the action of the widow has affected the relative rights of the specific and residuary legatees as it does in the case. It is the first time this precise question has been considered by this court. Firth v. Denny, 84 Mass. 468, presented this identical question. Without any discussion of the question of acceleration of payment of specific pecuniary legacies, it was held that the estate should be held to accumulate for the benefit of the residuary legatees, until the decease of the widow. This question is raised and decided In re Ferguson's Estate, 138 Pa. 208 . It is there held that the election of the widow to take under the law, was equivalent to her death, and that what remained of the estate...
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