Jones v. Laird Foundation, Inc.
Decision Date | 06 March 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 13196,13196 |
Citation | 195 S.E.2d 821,156 W.Va. 479 |
Parties | Lewis JONES and Ruth Jones, his wife, v. LAIRD FOUNDATION, INC., etc., et al. |
Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. To the extent that Makarenko v. Scott, 132 W.Va. 430, 55 S.E.2d 88 (1949) is inconsistent with this opinion, it is hereby overruled.
2. Where an employee entitled to Workmen's Compensation sustains a compensable personal injury and exercises reasonable carein selecting a physician and hospital to treat him for such injury, the employee may recover from the physician or hospital for an aggravation of the original injury, or for a separate injury caused by negligent or unskillful treatment by the physician or hospital.
3. Workmen's Compensation benefits for an original work related injury and for aggravation of an original injury, or for a care in selecting a physician and treatment administered for a work related injury, are within the 'Collateral Source Rule' in the same way as accident insurance, health insurance and life insurance, and, therefore, benefits from Workmen's Compensation cannot be applied to reduce damages in an action against a successive tort-feasor such as a physician or hospital for injury caused by negligent or unskillful treatment of a compensable injury.
Leon T. Copeland, Stephen P. Meyer, Charleston, for appellants.
Steptoe & Johnson, Wilson Anderson, Charleston, for appellees.
This case is an appeal by plaintiffs below from a final order of summary judgment by the Circuit Court of Fayette County entered in June 1971. The pleadings show that in April 1969, the plaintiff, Lewis Jones, was injured while working for the Cannelton Coal Co. and was hospitalized under the care of defendant physician, Segundo Sanchez, who was neither an agent nor employee of plaintiff's employer, the Cannelton Coal Co.
The plaintiff alleges that after he was released from care by Dr. Sanchez he returned to work in September 1969, but that the original injury had not been treated properly, causing discomfort and pain, and that corrective measures were advised by other physicians. Corrective measures, requiring hospitalization and bone graft surgery, were performed in 1970. The plaintiff received Workmen's Compensation benefits, including weekly compensation and payment for medical and hospital expenses, for treatment of both the original injury and the subsequent hospitalization and bone graft corrective surgery.
The facts of this case are almost identical to those presented in the landmark case of Makarenko v. Scott, 132 W.Va. 430, 55 S.E.2d 88 (1949) in which plaintiff, Alexander Makarenko, sought to recover damages from the defendants, Dr. W. W. Scott and Williamson Memorial Hospital, for personal injuries which he claimed were the result of Dr. Scott's negligent and unskillful treatment of an original, employment connected injury. In Makarenko, as in this case, the doctor was not a fellow employee of plaintiff. Also, as in this case, plaintiff was entitled to Workmen's Compensation benefits for both the original employment related injury and any later aggravations of the original injury.
In Makarenko this Court held that the common-law principle that a man is entitled to but one recovery for any wrong bars a separate action against a physician who negligently treats an injury covered under the Workmen's Compensation law. The Court reasoned that as both the original injury and the later aggravation are compensable, the claimant receives a full recovery from the Fund for both injuries. This bars an action in tort against the doctor or hospital for damages.
In Makarenko, this Court said in the syllabus, point 1:
Based upon the principle of Stare decisis and in accord with Makarenko, the Circuit Court of Fayette County granted summary judgment to the defendants in this case. We granted a writ of appeal and error for the purpose of reviewing the propositions of law enunciated in Makarenko, as review seemed justified under the persuasive dissenting opinions of two judges in the Makarenko case.
This Court is of the opinion that the holding of Makarenko was not the law of this State before its articulation in 1949, and further, that the holding in Makarenko is in dissonance with decisions in related areas of law written after 1949. Therefore, Makarenko is an aberration in the common-law of this State, and we hereby expressly overrule its holding in its entirety and commend even its lingering memory to oblivion.
The fundamental error in logic made in the Makarenko decision was to conceive of the employee's claim against the Workmen's Compensation Fund as a cause of action arising Ex delicto, rather than as a cause of action arising Ex contractu. The right of an employee to recover under Workmen's Compensation is based upon the status of the employee and not the negligence of the employer, Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 44 S.Ct. 153, 68 L.Ed. 366 (1923). Workmen's Compensation is contractual in nature, as the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act become an integral part of the contract of employment between the employer and employee. Lancaster v. Compensation Commissioner, 125 W.Va. 190, 23 S.E.2d 601 (1942). Common-law rules regulating the assessment of damages in actions Ex delicto do not apply to claims under Workmen's Compensation, as the compensation award depends entirely on the severity of the injury and the employee's wage at the time of the accident, and not upon the amount of common-law damage done to the employee or his dependents.
In Makarenko the Court apparently disregarded the long established principle in this State that Workmen's Compensation is to be regarded as a collateral source of benefits, and that compensation is therefore not to be considered in mitigation of damages in an action against a third party tort-feasor. We believe that the Court's distinction in Makarenko between joint tort-feasors and successive tort-feasors is without sufficient logical foundation. In the case of Merrill v. Marietta Torpedo Co., 79 W.Va. 669, 92 S.E. 112 (1917), decided long before Makarenko, the Court expressly placed Workmen's Compensation awards within the familiar 'Collateral Source Rule.' 25 C.J.S. Damages § 99(1--3). Therefore Workmen's Compensation is no more a proper consideration in mitigation of damages than health or accident insurance.
In Merrill the Court said at page 679, 92 S.E. at page 116:
This Court does not believe that Merrill can logically be distinguished from Makarenko on its facts, as the distinction between joint tort-feasors and successive tort-feasors is illusive.
The Makarenko opinion attempted to distinguish Tawney v. Kirkhart, 130 W.Va. 550, 44 S.E.2d 634 (1947), from the facts in the Makarenko case. In Tawney, plaintiff's decedent was an employee of a subscriber to the Fund. Plaintiff instituted an action for damages against a railroad company and plaintiff's decedent's fellow employee for wrongful death caused jointly by both defendants. Tawney involved the liability of a fellow employee, and this Court rejected the contention of the defendant fellow employee that because both he and the deceased were employees of the same employer, who was a subscriber to the Fund, that defendant was protected by the umbrella of the Fund from liability for his own negligence.
The Tawney case in turn, expressly overruled Hinkelman v. Wheeling Steel Corporation, 114 W.Va. 269, 171 S.E. 538 (1933), which had held that a company doctor was not liable for the aggravation of injuries to a fellow employee when both the doctor and the employee were employed by the same employer who was a subscriber to the Fund. The logic in Tawney which compelled the overruling of Hinkelman should also have dictated an opopsite result in Makarenko.
When the Tawney case expressly overruled Hinkelman, it established the law in this State that an employee covered by the Workmen's Compensation Fund can recover from a doctor for negligent aggravation of his injuries, even if that doctor is a fellow employee. However, in 1949, after the decision in Makarenko, the West Virginia Legislature amended the Workmen's Compensation Act to exempt from liability officers, managers, agents, representatives, and employees of subscribing employers. Chapter 23, Article 2, Section 6a. Code of West Virginia, 1931, as amended.
This amendment changed the application of Tawney with regard to fellow employees, but in so doing, it did not reinforce the general logic...
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