Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.

Decision Date23 June 1969
Docket NumberCiv. No. 68-33.
Citation300 F. Supp. 653
PartiesMarcus JONES, Willie B. Hodge, Clifton Nickles and Clarence L. Irving, Plaintiffs, v. LEE WAY MOTOR FREIGHT, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

E. Melvin Porter, Oklahoma City, Okl., William L. Wood, Houston, Tex., for plaintiffs.

Richard G. Taft and John B. Dudley, of McAfee, Dudley, Taft, Cates & Mark, Richard H. Champlin, Oklahoma City, Okl., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DAUGHERTY, District Judge.

Plaintiffs' action is based on Defendant's alleged commission of an unlawful employment practice prohibited by 42 U. S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) and (2) (Act). Plaintiffs, who are negroes, are employees of Defendant at Houston, Texas, as City Drivers. They allege that they sought a transfer from such job to that of Over-the-Road or Line Driver which was allegedly refused by Defendant because of their race and color. Defendant denies that the requested transfers from one job to another was refused because of race or color. It contends that the refusal was pursuant to a long established business policy of forbidding transfers between the two job classifications and that such Company policy has been consistently applied since 1957 to all employees, regardless of race or color. The case has been submitted for determination on a stipulation of facts and briefs.

Section 2000e-2, Title 42 U.S.C.A., provides in pertinent part as follows:

"(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer —
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
* * * * * *
(j) Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer, referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or other area."

The facts show that the Defendant has had a Company policy since 1957 of prohibiting all transfers from City Driver to Over-the-Road Driver and vice versa and that this policy has been uniformly applied by Defendant since that time, with one exception. The exception arose because of a mistake by the Defendant's Terminal Manager at San Antonio in failing to follow the Company's published no-transfer policy. Upon learning of this violation of Company policy, the Defendant ordered that the transferred employee be transferred back but Union grievance action interceded and prevented correction of the mistake. It further appears that there have been no deviations in the application of this policy for reasons of race and the same has been applied to whites and negroes alike; that whites as well as negroes have been denied such transfers under this policy. The reasons given by Defendant for the policy is the difficulty of adjustment to...

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3 cases
  • Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • 17 Agosto 1970
    ...was established for "rational and bona fide considerations" and was indiscriminately applied. Relief was denied, Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., W.D.Okl., 300 F.Supp. 653, and this appeal followed. Jurisdiction is found under 42 U.S.C. § The company has two categories of drivers, line......
  • Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 30414.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • 29 Junio 1971
    ...and to the said class * * *." In support of its conclusions the district court relied very heavily upon Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Incorporated, 300 F.Supp. 653 (W.D.Okl.1969), a case involving a fact situation almost identical to the instant controversy. Subsequent to the district cou......
  • Frockt v. Olin Corporation, NA 69-C-57.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana
    • 23 Mayo 1972
    ...particular sex employed by an employer in any particular job classification or training program. See also: Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 300 F.Supp. 653, 655 (W.D.Okl., 1969); United States by Clark v. H. K. Porter Company, 296 F. Supp. 40, 69 The plaintiff's wild, uncorroborated ac......

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