Jones v. Lowndes Cnty.

• Citation: 678 F.3d 344
• Decision Date: 18 April 2012
• Docket Number: No. 10–60941.,10–60941.
• Parties: Clifton H. JONES; Jerry Dwayne Nance, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. LOWNDES COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI; Lowndes County, Mississippi Sheriff's Department; Ivan Bryan, in his Individual and Official Capacity; C.B. (Butch) Howard, Lowndes County, Mississippi Sheriff, in his Individual and Official Capacity, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

678 F.3d 344

Clifton H. JONES; Jerry Dwayne Nance, Plaintiffs–Appellants,

v.LOWNDES COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI; Lowndes County, Mississippi Sheriff's Department; Ivan Bryan, in his Individual and Official Capacity; C.B. (Butch) Howard, Lowndes County, Mississippi Sheriff, in his Individual and Official Capacity, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 10–60941.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 18, 2012.

Jeffery M. Navarro (argued), Amory, MS, for Plaintiffs–Appellants.

Katherine Searcy Kerby (argued), Kerby Law Firm, L.L.C., Columbus, MS, for Defendants–Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi.

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

Clifton H. Jones and Jerry Dwayne Nance filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi against Lowndes County, Lowndes County Sheriff's Department, Sheriff C.B. “Butch” Howard in his individual and official capacity, and Deputy Sheriff Ivan Bryan in his individual and official capacity. They complained they were detained for more than 48 hours without a determination of probable cause or an initial appearance, in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Following discovery, the district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

I.

On Saturday April 5, 2008 the Lowndes County Sheriff's Department received a 911 call reporting a suspicious person purchasing pseudoephedrine pills, a precursor to the manufacture of methamphetamine. Defendant-appellee Ivan Bryan, a deputy sheriff, responded to the call and arrested plaintiffs-appellants Clifton Jones and Jerry Dwayne Nance at 5:33 P.M. With no Justice Court judges on duty on Saturday evening or Sunday, a determination of probable cause by a neutral magistrate was not sought over the remainder of the weekend. On Monday morning Bryan was off-duty and working at a second job for a different employer. He returned to the police station after his shift ended, and attempted to schedule an appearance beforea judge around 2:30 P.M. The chief judge had left for the day, however, and Bryan was told that no other judge was available.

The next morning Bryan appeared before a justice court judge who determined the arrests were justified by probable cause. The judge did not allow plaintiffs to make their initial appearance on the same day as the determination of probable cause, so Jones and Nance made their initial appearance on Wednesday and were released on bail. A grand jury subsequently indicted them for possession of precursors to the manufacture of methamphetamine.

II.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.¹ Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.² If that party shows that the non-moving party presented insufficient evidence in support of its allegations, “the non-movant must come forward with specific facts showing a genuine factual issue for trial.” ³ Such facts must consist of more than “[c]onclusional allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation.” ⁴ Finally, we “may affirm a summary judgment on any ground supported by the record, even if it is different from that relied on by the district court.” ⁵

III.

Jones and Nance appeal rejection of their Fourth Amendment claims, but do not challenge the district court's grant of summary judgment on their Fifth and Eighth Amendment claims.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed in Gerstein v. Pugh that a warrantless arrest supported by probable cause is constitutionally permissible. ⁶ To continue to detain the suspect, the state must obtain “a fair and reliable determination of probable cause” by a neutral magistrate “promptly after arrest.” ⁷ The Court elaborated on this in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin: “a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein.” ⁸

The overarching constraint upon the state imposed by the Fourth Amendment is its demand of reasonableness. Applying this fundamental precept the Court provided the 48–hour mark, but cautionedthat “we hesitate to announce that the Constitution compels a specific time limit.” ⁹ It observed that a determination of probable cause within 48 hours could still violate an arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights if delayed unreasonably, such as “for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay's sake.” ¹⁰ This standard, however, accepts that police must “cope with the everyday problems of processing suspects through an overly burdened criminal justice system,” including “delays in transporting arrested persons,” “handling late-night bookings where no magistrate is readily available, obtaining the presence of an arresting officer who may be busy processing other suspects or securing the premises of the arrest, and other practical realities.” ¹¹ That said, 48 hours is a significant marker. If the determination of probable cause is delayed by more than 48 hours the burden shifts to the government, and its showing of reasonableness will, virtually by definition, demand “a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance,” which does not include “intervening weekends” or efforts to “consolidate [additional] pre-trial proceedings.” ¹² Thus, a plaintiff challenging a delay of less than 48 hours has the burden of proving it was unreasonable. Beyond the 48–hour mark, the burden falls to the defense to show extraordinary circumstances.¹³

It is undisputed that more than 48 hours lapsed before Jones and Nance received a determination of probable cause. They contend the defendants did not show this delay was justified by extraordinary circumstances and were not entitled to summary judgment. We do not reach the merits of this argument because Jones and Nance failed to show that any defendant is liable for the alleged deprivation of their Fourth Amendment rights.¹⁴

A Section 1983 claimant must “establish that the defendant was either personally involved in the deprivation or that his wrongful actions were causally connected to the deprivation.” ¹⁵ If the defendant is a municipality or other body of local government, the alleged deprivation must be connected to “a governmental custom,” “policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by the body's officers.” ¹⁶ Although municipalities are not vicariously liable for violations committed by their employees, they are liable whenever “their official policies cause their employees to violate another person's constitutional rights,” ¹⁷ and for actions taken by an official with “final policymaking authority” in that area.¹⁸ “A supervisor is not personally liable for his subordinate's actions in which he had no involvement.” ¹⁹

Jones and Nance identify only one policy they claim caused the deprivation of their Fourth Amendment rights. Sheriff Howard explained in an interrogatory response that “the general policy is a target to take the detainee to a Judge within 48 hours but no later than 72 hours and as soon as reasonably possible and without any unnecessary delay.” This policy violates McLaughlin, Jones and Nance maintain, by allowing determinations of probable cause or initial appearances 48 hours after arrest. Plaintiffs ask too much of that decision. McLaughlin provides the 48–hour timeline as a useful benchmark, but does not hold that determinations of probable cause made after the lapse of 48 hours are always unreasonable. The policy in question, in accordance with McLaughlin, makes unreasonable delay the standard that officers should apply,²⁰ and provides the 48–hour timeline as a benchmark.²¹ That the policy recognizes that determinations of probable cause may sometimes occur after the 48–hour benchmark does not, in of itself, violate McLaughlin, and has not been shown in this case to have been a moving force behind the delay. It therefore cannot serve as the basis for plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim.

No other policy or custom to which the alleged deprivation could be traced is identified by plaintiffs. Instead, Jones and Nance agree with defendants that the delay was due to the lack of available judges on Saturday evening, Sunday, and Monday afternoon.²² Defendants have repeatedly contended that the county, sheriff's department, sheriff, and deputy sheriff have no authority to set the judges' schedule. They therefore cannot be held liable either for the judges' decision to be unavailable that weekend or that Monday afternoon, or for a judge's decision to refuse to conduct plaintiffs' determination of probable cause and initial appearance on the same day. Plaintiffs do not contest this. They do not allege, much less present evidence, that these judges were policymakers whose every decision is policy for which the county is liable, or that the county could and should have required the judges to be available at certain times. Because the judges' actions caused the complained-of delay and plaintiffs failed to show that defendants were liable for those judges' actions, summary judgment was appropriate.²³

The Fourth Amendment allegations against Deputy Sheriff Ivan Bryan are also unavailing. As the arresting officer, Bryan was responsible for ensuring the arrestees were promptly brought before a magistrate.²⁴ He maintains that even if his actions are ultimately determined to have created unreasonable delay, he is entitled to qualified immunity. We agree.

“Qualified immunity protects officers from suit unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right.” ²⁵ Once a defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity it...