Jones v. Ludwick

Decision Date27 June 2012
Docket NumberCivil Action Number: 2:09-cv-14509
PartiesLONYE JONES, Petitioner, v. NICK LUDWICK, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III

OPINION AND ORDER

DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,

DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, GRANTING
PERMISSION FOR AN APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED ON APPEAL
IN FORMA PAUPERIS, AND DENYING AMENDED HABEAS PETITION AS MOOT
INTRODUCTION

Michigan prisoner Lonye Jones, currently incarcerated by the Michigan Department of Corrections at the St. Louis Correctional Facility in St. Louis, Michigan, filed this pro se habeas petition challenging the constitutionality of his guilty-plea convictions for assault with intent to murder and felony firearm, which occurred in the Circuit Court in Kalamazoo County, Michigan on December 13, 2006. Jones raises the following four claims: (1) whether appellate counsel was ineffective; (2) whether his due-process rights were violated when the trial court departed from the sentencing agreement and sentenced him outside the guidelines range; (3) whether his due-process rights were violated when the trial court erred in failing to appoint substitute counsel; and (4) whether the trial court erred by basing its substantial and compelling reasons for departure in sentencing on an offense characteristic already taken into account. In an amended petition filed May 4, 2012, Jonesraises a fifth claim that the trial court's upward departure at sentencing also violated his right to equal protection.1

The Court will deny the petition and will not issue Jones a certificate of appealability.

BACKGROUND

Jones's case arises from a shooting incident that occurred on September 12, 2006, in Kalamazoo County, Michigan. On September 26, 2006, Jones was charged with six felonies: (1) armed robbery, (2) assault with intent to commit murder, (3) felon in possession of a firearm, and (4) three counts of felony firearm. A supplemental information was also filed charging him as a third-offense, habitual offender.

Jones's jury trial began on December 12, 2006, but after a day and a half of trial, he accepted the prosecutor's plea agreement and pleaded guilty to assault with intent to murder, one count of felony firearm, and to the habitual-offender charge. He was sentenced to twenty-five to forty-five years in prison for the assault conviction, to be served consecutively to Michigan's mandatory two-year prison term for the felony-firearm conviction. The following colloquy took place at the plea hearing.

THE COURT: Beyond what's just been placed on the record, has anyone promised you anything else that's causing you to plead guilty?
[JONES]: No, sir.
THE COURT: Has anyone threatened you in any way to make you plead guilty?
[JONES]: No, sir.
THE COURT: Whose choice is it that you're pleading guilty?
[JONES]: Mine.
THE COURT: The name of the offense you're pleading guilty to in count three is known as assault with intent to commit murder. Do you understand that charge?
[JONES]: Yes, I do.
THE COURT: This is an offense that carries a maximum penalty of life or any number of years. Are you aware of that?
[JONES]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Count four charges felony firearm, which claims that you had in your possession a firearm at the time you committed or attempted to commit assault with intent to commit murder. Do you understand that charge?
[JONES]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: This is an offense that carries a penalty of two years and that two years must be served consecutively with and preceding any term of imprisonment imposed for the felony in count three. Do you understand that?
[JONES]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right. The claim is that on or about September 12, 2006, in Kalamazoo County, Michigan, these offenses occurred. Were you in Kalamazoo County, Michigan, on that date?
[JONES]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And on that date what did you do that makes you think you're guilty of count three, assault with intent to murder. The claim is you made an assault upon Mar[c] Lev[i] with intent to commit murder.
[JONES]: True.
THE COURT: Well, you have to tell me what you did, not just say it's true.
[JONES]: I shot him-
THE COURT: And-
[JONES]: -with the intent to kill him.
THE COURT: Okay. Shot him with what?
[JONES]: A gun.
THE COURT: Handgun?
[JONES]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. And you intended to kill him?
[JONES]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. Now count four claims that at the time you committed the offense you just pled to that you possessed a handgun. This may seem somewhat redundant, but at the time you committed the felony in count three, did you, in fact, possess a handgun?
[JONES]: Yes, sir.

Plea Hr'g Tr. 4-6 Dec. 13, 2006.

At sentencing, the prosecution requested that offense variable six, which speaks to the fact that the offender premeditated intent to kill, be increased to fifty points. The trial judge agreed. Sentencing Hr'g Tr. 17-18 Jan. 8, 2007. That change increased the minimum sentence range from 135 months to 225 months. Id. at 19.

The prosecutor also reminded the trial judge of letters that Jones sent to his sister, asking her to get a witness to testify for him. In the letters, Jones specified the type of witness he wanted: a witness with no criminal record, who had a real job, and was female, white, and older. Sentencing Hr'g Tr. 21 Jan. 8, 2007. He wanted the witness to be able to answer questions about how the shooting occurred. Jones also asked the witness to drive by the scene so she would know how it looked. On that basis, the prosecutor askedthe court to deviate from the sentencing guidelines and sentence Jones to twenty-five to fifty years in prison. Id.

After reviewing the letters, the judge agreed, and stated that there were substantial and compelling reasons to deviate from the guidelines. Sentencing Hr'g Tr. 34-35 Jan. 8, 2007. The trial judge then sentenced Jones as described.

Following his sentencing, Jones filed a motion to withdraw his plea, claiming that his plea was not voluntarily or knowingly made. The trial court denied the motion because the transcript showed Jones understood the plea agreement and his sentencing options. People v. Jones, No. C06-1947 FC (Kalamazoo Cnty. Cir. Ct. July 19, 2007).

Subsequently, Jones filed a delayed application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals, raising claims concerning trial-court error in sentencing him and in denying his motion to withdraw his plea. The Court of Appeals denied Jones's delayed application. People v. Jones, No. 279886 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2007). His application for leave to appeal that decision was denied on January 8, 2008. People v. Jones, 480 Mich. 1011, 743 N.W.2d 40 (2008) (Table).

On May 16, 2008, Jones filed a motion for relief from judgement with the state trial court, raising several of the same claims raised in his habeas petition, plus a claim concerning a wrongful assessment of attorney's fees. The trial court denied the motion. People v. Jones, No. C06-1947 FC (Kalamazoo Cnty. Cir. Ct. May 27, 2008). Both state appellate courts denied his applications for leave to appeal the trial court's decision for failure "to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D)." People v. Jones, No. 286604 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2008); People v. Jones, 483 Mich. 894, 760 N.W.2d 483 (2009) (table). Jones signed his habeas petition on November 4,2009. It was filed with this Court on November 18, 2009.

Respondent filed an answer, arguing that Jones's petition should be denied because Jones's second and third claims were procedurally defaulted under state law and Jones failed to show cause and prejudice for the default, and because Jones's fourth habeas claim is based only on an alleged violation of Michigan law and is therefore not cognizable on federal habeas review. Respondent did not file an answer to Jones's amended petition. The Court will first address the procedural default issue.

I. Procedural Default

The procedural default doctrine bars federal habeas review when a state court declined to address a petitioner's claims because of a failure to satisfy state procedural requirements. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). Review is barred because the state-court judgment rests on an independent and adequate state ground precluding review by a federal court. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51 (citations omitted). If a claim has been procedurally defaulted, habeas review is available only if the petitioner can establish "cause for [his] default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that the failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; see also Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 966 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750).

A habeas petitioner procedurally defaults a claim if:

(1) the petitioner fails to comply with a state procedural rule; (2) the state courts enforce the state procedural rule; (3) the state procedural rule is an "independent and adequate" state ground for denying review of a federal constitutional claim; and (4) the petitioner cannot demonstrate cause and prejudice excusing the default.

See Tolliver v. Sheets, 594 F.3d 900, 927 n.11 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

Respondent contends that Jones's first three claims are procedurally defaulted because the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court both declined to review the merits of Jones's post-conviction motion for relief from judgment, stating that he "failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D)." Jones, No. 286604; Jones, 483 Mich. 894, 760 N.W.2d 483. The Sixth Circuit has held that such form orders invoking Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D) do not make sufficiently clear whether the petitioner has failed to establish entitlement to relief on the merits or on procedural grounds. Guilmette v. Howes, 624 F.3d 286, 289-90 (6th Cir. 2010)....

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT