Jones v. Maclaren
| Decision Date | 31 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:14-cv-102 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
| Parties | CURTIS LEWIS JONES, Petitioner, v. DUNCAN MACLAREN, Respondent. |
Honorable Gordon J. Quist
This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine whether "it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." Rule 4, RULES GOVERNING § 2254 CASES; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual allegations that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1999). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court concludes that the petition must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner Curtis Lewis Jones presently is incarcerated at the Kinross Correctional Facility. In his pro se application for habeas corpus relief, Petitioner is challenging six juvenile adjudications that occurred between November 7, 1983 and January 6, 1988, because theynegatively impacted his 2014 parole decision on the grounds that he did not have the benefit of trial counsel and/or he was not notified of his right to appeal and his right to appellate counsel, in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.
In the following four juvenile cases in the Kent County Probate Court - Juvenile Division (Juvenile Court), Petitioner asserts that he never received the benefit of trial and appellate counsel nor was he notified of his right to appeal:
(See Pet., docket #1, Page ID#16.)
In the following two juvenile cases, Petitioner states that he was never informed of his right to appeal nor of his right to appellate counsel:
(See Pet., docket #1, Page ID##16-17.)
In 1991, Petitioner was convicted of six offenses in four separate criminal proceedings in Kent County Circuit Court: second-degree murder, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.317; two counts of felony-firearm, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.227b; attempted delivery/manufacture of a controlled substance, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); assault with a dangerous weapon, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.82; and breaking and entering a building, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.110. According to his Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) record, the sentences for the latter two convictions, and for one of the felony-firearm convictions, have expired. Petitioner's longest active sentence is his paroleable life sentence for the second-degree murder conviction. In 2004, Petitioner was also convicted of possessing contraband in prison, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 800.2814. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to one year and one day to five years. Petitioner's 2004 conviction is still listed as active on the MDOC website.1
Petitioner filed the instant action in May 2014. He contends that his juvenile convictions are invalid because (a) he pleaded guilty to four of his juvenile convictions without the assistance of trial counsel and (b) he was never informed of his right to appellate counsel or his right to appeal in all six of his juvenile convictions. He further contends that these invalid convictions extend the term of his present confinement because they are being used by the parole board to deny him parole. On February 5, 2014, the Michigan Department of Corrections Parole Board Notice ofDecision provided that Petitioner was denied parole. His next parole interview is scheduled for June 16, 2019. (See Ex. E to Pet., docket #1-1, Page ID#83.)
Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3) and 2254(a) require that a § 2254 habeas petition be filed when a person is "in custody" for that conviction "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." Id. The "in custody" requirement is a jurisdictional one; if a petitioner is not "in custody" at the time that the petition is filed, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider it. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989). Ordinarily, "once the sentence imposed for a conviction has completely expired, the collateral consequences of that conviction are not themselves sufficient to render an individual 'in custody' for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it." Id. at 492.
At the same time, however, the Supreme Court has held that an attack on a prior, expired conviction "can be read" as asserting a challenge to the sentence for which the petitioner is in custody, "as enhanced by the allegedly invalid prior conviction." Id. at 493. However, in Maleng the Court declined to express the extent to which a petitioner could question the legality of a prior, expired sentence in that fashion. See id. at 494.
In Lackawanna Cnty. Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 403-04 (2001), the Supreme Court squarely decided the question left open in Maleng. The Court held that "once a [prior] state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right . . . the defendant generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence through a petition under § 2254 on the ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained." Id. However, there is an exception to the foregoing rule "for petitions that challenge an enhanced sentence on the basis that the prior conviction used to enhance the sentence was obtained where there was a failure to appointcounsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, as set forth in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)." Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 404. In the latter circumstance, habeas relief with regard to the enhanced sentence may be appropriate. Id.
In the present case, the sentences arising from Petitioner's juvenile convictions have expired. Nevertheless, Petitioner apparently contends that his juvenile convictions are open to attack because they enhance his current sentence insofar as they are used by the parole board as a basis for denying him parole. In Ward v. Wolfenbarger, 323 F. Supp. 2d 818 (E.D. Mich. 2004), a court faced with a similar type of parole denial claim held that it had subject matter jurisdiction under the Lackawanna exception. Id. at 828. The court determined that the State deprived the petitioner of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in connection with his expired convictions because the trial court did not advise him of his right to appeal and his right to appellate counsel. Id. but see, Jones v. Hoffner, No. 1:12-cv-1376, 2013 WL 812064, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2013) ().
Notwithstanding the decision in Ward, it is not at all clear that the Lackawanna exception, which allows a petitioner to attack his judgment of sentence, applies to parole determinations. A denial of parole does not alter Petitioner's underlying sentence; it merely requires him to continue serving it. While Petitioner's life sentence allows for the possibility of parole, it does not require it. Moreover, under Michigan's parole scheme, Petitioner has no reasonable expectation of parole. In Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1164-165 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc), the Sixth Circuit, noting "the broad powers of the Michigan authorities to deny parole," held that the Michigan system does not create a liberty interest in parole. In a 2011 decision, the Sixth Circuit reiterated the continuing validity of Sweeton. See Crump v. Lafler, 657 F.3d 393, 404 (6th Cir. 2011). In Crump, the court held that the adoption of specific parole guidelines since Sweeton doesnot lead to the conclusion that parole release is mandated upon reaching a high probability of parole. See id.; see also Carnes v. Engler, 76 F. App'x 79, 80 (6th Cir. 2003).
In any event, assuming that the Lackawanna ex...
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