Jones v. Maywood
| Decision Date | 05 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 16-cv-09652 |
| Parties | CLEON JONES, Plaintiff, v. MAYWOOD, MELROSE PARK, BROADVIEW SCHOOL DISTRICT 89, BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 89, COOK, ILLINOIS, and DAVID BRUSAK, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Cleon Jones brings claims against Defendants Maywood, Melrose Park, Broadview School District 89, Board of Education of School District No. 89, and David Brusak under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. ("FMLA"). Before the Court are Defendants' motion for summary judgment [28] and Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [34]. For the reasons set forth below, both Defendants' motion for summary judgment [28] and Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [34] are denied. The denial of Defendants' motion as to Plaintiff's FMLA retaliation claim is without prejudice to renewal after the further exploration of the legal issues set out below. Both parties' motions for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's FMLA interference claim are denied. This case is set for further status on September 19, 2018 at 9:00 a.m.
The following facts are drawn primarily from the parties' Local Rule 56.1 statements of facts and supporting exhibits [30], [33], and [37]. These facts are undisputed except where a dispute is noted. The Court also addresses any of Defendants' relevant motions to strike portions of Plaintiff's Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts as necessary.
Plaintiff Cleon Jones ("Plaintiff") is a former employee of Defendant Maywood, Melrose Park, Broadview School District 89 ("School District"). Plaintiff began working for the School District in 2013 as a paraprofessional instructional assistant at Emerson Elementary School and remained in that position until he was terminated in June 2016. [30 (Defs.' Stmt. of Facts), ¶¶ 1-2]; [33 (Pl.'s Stmt. of Facts), ¶ 63.] The School District is overseen and controlled by Defendant Board of Education of School District No. 89 ("Board"). [25 (Answer), ¶ 8.] Defendant David Brusak ("Brusak") is the Assistant Superintendent of Human Resources for the School District. [30 (Defs.' Stmt. of Facts), ¶ 7.]
In 2015, the School District adopted a policy for its employees seeking to take FMLA-qualified leave. This policy was in effect during the relevant time period for this action. [30 (Defs.' Stmt. of Facts), ¶ 8.] According to this FMLA policy, an eligible employee "may take FMLA leave for up to a combined total of 12 weeks each 12-month period, beginning September 1 and ending August 31 of the next year." [Id. ¶ 9.] One instance in which this FMLA leave is available is in the event of a "serious health condition of an employee's spouse, child, or parent." [30 (Defs.' Stmt. of Facts), ¶ 10]; [Ex. 5 to Ex. 2 (FMLA Policy), at 1]. The policy also provides that, in calculating an employee's FMLA leave entitlement, "[a]ny full workweek period during which the employee would not have been required to work, including summer break, winter break and spring break, is not counted against the employee's FMLA leave entitlement." [30 (Defs.' Stmt. of Facts), ¶ 30]; [33 (Pl.'s Stmt. of Facts), ¶ 68]; [Ex. 5 to Ex. 2 (FMLA Policy), at 1].
As part of this FMLA Policy, an employee requesting FMLA leave must provide notice to the School District. The School District's FMLA Policy provides the following regarding the appropriate notice to request leave or to inform the School District of changed circumstances in connection with a leave request:
[30 (Defs.' Stmt. of Facts), ¶ 31]; [33 (Pl.'s Stmt. of Facts), ¶ 82]; [Ex. 5 to Ex. 2 (FMLA Policy), at 2-3].
The process for an employee of the School District to apply for FMLA leave is as follows. First, Human Resources sets up an appointment for the employee to meet with the Human Resources generalist. At this meeting, a Human Resources representative gives the prospective FMLA applicant a packet and reviews the necessary paperwork with the applicant. After this meeting, the applicant takes the FMLA paperwork, completes it as directed, and submits it to Human Resources. A generalist then reviews the paperwork to make sure it is complete before forwarding the completed paperwork to Brusak for a final review. If the paperwork meets the FMLA guidelines, Human Resources sends the paperwork to the Board for approval. If the Boardapproves an FMLA request, Human Resources sends a notice to the applicant. [30 (Defs.' Stmt. of Facts), ¶¶ 11-17.]
While Plaintiff was employed by the School District, he was also subject to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement entitled "The Board of Education, School District 89, Service Employees' International Union" (the "CBA"). [30 (Defs.' Stmt. of Facts), ¶ 51.] The CBA contains a section entitled "Reporting Absences." This section provides that "[e]mployees must inform the district office of any absences by calling or entering information into AESOP by 7:00 a.m. Absence from work for three or more consecutive days without notifying the district, except in an emergency, will constitute a basis for dismissal." [Id. ¶ 52]; [Ex. C to Ex. 7 (CBA), § 5.04.]
According to School District practice regarding the reporting of absences, a "no call-no show" occurs when an employee does not show up for work and does not call into work to explain that they are not coming into work. [30 (Defs.' Stmt. of Facts), ¶ 41.] The School District asserts that "no call-no shows" by an employee may be grounds for termination, although Plaintiff maintains that progressive discipline is required prior to termination on this basis. [Id. ¶ 42]; [Ex. C to Ex. 7 (CBA), at 22-24.]
In early 2016, Plaintiff learned that his mother had been diagnosed with cancer. [30 (Defs.' Stmt. of Facts), ¶ 3]; [33 (Pl.'s Stmt. of Facts), ¶ 64.] Plaintiff submitted an FMLA request form to the School District on February 22, 2016 in order to request FMLA leave to care for his mother (the "February FMLA Request"). On this form, Plaintiff requested leave from February 23, 2016 through May 15, 2016. [30 (Defs.' Stmt. of Facts), ¶¶ 4-5]; [33 (Pl.'s Stmt. of Facts), ¶ 66.] Plaintiff filled out this form himself, although he disputes that he was the sole person who selectedthe period of leave time requested. [30 (Defs.' Stmt. of Facts), ¶ 6]; [33 (Pl.'s Stmt. of Facts), ¶ 6.] The Board approved Plaintiff's FMLA request for this time period at its March 10, 2016 meeting. Defendant Brusak thereafter signed an official letter to Plaintiff on March 11, 2016, notifying Plaintiff that his request was approved. [30 (Defs.' Stmt. of Facts), ¶¶ 18-21.] Based on the Board's approval of his February FMLA Request, Plaintiff took FMLA leave for the period of February 23, 2016 through May 15, 2016. [Id. ¶ 22]; [33 (Pl.'s Stmt. of Facts), ¶ 65.]
The period encompassed by Plaintiff's February FMLA Request lasted for twelve calendar weeks. [30 (Defs.' Stmt. of Facts), ¶ 28.] However, the School District's 2016 spring break took place from March 25, 2016 through April 1, 2016, and thus fell within that twelve-week time frame. [Id. ¶ 29]; [33 (Pl.'s Stmt. of Facts), ¶ 69.] Because this week of spring break did not count against Plaintiff's FMLA entitlement, Plaintiff only used eleven weeks of his twelve-week allotment during the period approved by his February FMLA Request. However, at the time, the School District's Human Resources Department failed to account for this week of spring break in calculating Plaintiff's FMLA leave. Defendants characterize this as an inadvertent miscalculation. [30, (Defs.' Stmt. of Facts), ¶ 32.] Plaintiff disputes this characterization but, in any event, it is undisputed that in May 2016, Defendants considered Plaintiff's FMLA leave time for the 2015-2016 school year to be exhausted as of May 15, 2016, even though Plaintiff had one week of leave time remaining. [Id. ¶¶ 32, 62.]
In May 2016, Plaintiff spoke to William Bush, a Human Resources employee for the School District, about extending his FMLA leave during a meeting at the Human Resources office. No one else was present in the office during this conversation. [30 (Defs.' Stmt. of Facts), ¶¶ 23-25.] At this meeting, Bush told Plaintiff that Plaintiff was only entitled to twelve weeks of FMLAleave and that his period of approved leave would end on May 16, 2016. Bush did not tell Plaintiff at any point during this meeting that Plaintiff had exhausted his available FMLA leave. [Id. ¶¶ 26-27]; [Ex. 8 (Bush May 9 E-mail)].
During Plaintiff's May meeting with...
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