Jones v. McDonough
| Decision Date | 15 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:19-cv-00310 |
| Parties | SUSAN H. JONES, Plaintiff, v. DENIS R. McDONOUGH, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM
Before the court is defendant Denis R. McDonough's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 33), seeking judgment in his favor on the plaintiff's claims under the Rehabilitation Act. For the reasons set forth herein, the motion will be granted.
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
In other words, even if genuine, a factual dispute that is irrelevant or unnecessary under applicable law is of no value in defeating a motion for summary judgment. On the other hand, "summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is 'genuine.'" Id. A genuine dispute of material fact exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Harris v. Klare, 902 F.3d 630, 634-35 (6th Cir. 2018). A fact is "material" within the meaning of Rule 56(a) "if its proof or disproof might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law." Reeves v. Swift Trans. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 640 (6th Cir. 2006). The court should view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Pittman v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 901 F.3d 619, 628 (6th Cir. 2018). Credibility judgments and weighing of evidence are improper. Hostettler v. Coll. of Wooster, 895 F.3d 844, 852 (6th Cir. 2018).
In this case, the plaintiff purports to "dispute" many of the facts set forth in the defendant's Statement of Undisputed Facts (Doc. No. 36) by asserting that the (Doc. No. 40 ¶¶ 16-20, 30, 32, 33, 35-44, 54, 81 (citations omitted).) The plaintiff is mistaken. Since December 1, 2010, Rule 56 has made it clear that a court is not limited to consideration only of sworn and certified documents in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Instead, a party may support assertions of fact by citing to "particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party may object to reliance upon cited material to support a fact on the basis that it "cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) (emphasis added). Consequently, with respect to the individual statements to which the plaintiff has responded only by asserting that the supporting material is not currently in admissible form, if the statements are adequately supported by the material cited by the defendant and could be presented in admissible form, the court deems them to be undisputed for purposes of his motion.
The facts set forth herein are undisputed for purposes of the defendant's motion, unless otherwise indicated.
Jones worked as a Financial Accounts Technician, grade GS-503-07, with the Department of Veterans Affairs Mid-South Consolidated Patient Account Center ("CPAC") in Smyrna, Tennessee from April 1998 until her retirement on December 31, 2014. She worked for the Department of Veterans Affairs ("Agency") in some capacity for twenty-five years.
Jones's direct supervisor for a period of several years preceding June 2014 was Tim Nave. (Nave Dep., Doc. No. 42-1, at 8.) In June 2014, Nave was promoted, and his supervisory position remained vacant for approximately two months before being filled by Teal Hatfield, who then became the plaintiff's direct supervisor. (Hatfield Dep., Doc. No. 42-2, at 11.) Nave was then Hatfield's manager. Greg Becker was the director of the Mid-South CPAC during the relevant period, and Cindy DeGrasse was the Chief Operating Officer.
Jones understood that her employment required a monthly productivity level of at least 90%, and she had difficulty meeting this level for several years prior to her departure from the Agency. Nave, her supervisor, discussed this with her several times, beginning in 2011 and again in the fall of 2013. (See Doc. No. 34-4, at 3-4, 33-39.). In November 2013, Nave notified Jones that her productivity level for October was 50%, "well below the 90% Fully Successful range as stated on [her] Performance Appraisal." (Id. at 34.) He reminded her that they had discussed that her productivity had been "up/down" throughout the preceding fiscal year and recommended that she utilize the "Huron Work Flow Tool" to better organize her time. (Id.) He also informed Jones that she would have a month to improve her productivity level to "at least the Fully Successful range" and that failure to do so would necessitate taking the matter to the "next level," likely requiring a performance improvement plan ("PIP"). (Id.)
In a follow-up email dated December 18, 2013, Nave notified Jones that her productivity scores for October, November, and the first two weeks of December averaged, respectively, 46%, 81%, and 74%, for an overall average of 67%, and she had failed to explain why her performance had "plummeted so far" below her average for fiscal year 2013. (Doc. No. 34-4, at 33.) Because she had indicated to him that additional training might help, he had set aside a morning to provide one-on-one training to her on the Huron Work Flow Tool, but he also believed the next step would likely be to put her on a PIP. (Id. at 34.)
As of January 9, 2014, due to Jones's continued failure to maintain a satisfactory level of productivity, which the Agency considered a "critical element" of her job performance, she was placed on a PIP. (Doc. No. 34-1, at 45.) The Memorandum from Nave to Jones formally notifying her of the initiation of the PIP informed her that she had a ninety-day period during which to improve her performance to an acceptable level and that she would be expected to maintain successful performance for an additional nine months, or a full year from the start of the PIP. The Memorandum also stated that failure to "demonstrate acceptable performance during this opportunity period [the ninety-day PIP] or . . . to sustain it for a one-year period" could result in demotion or termination. (Id.) In addition, the Memorandum "reminded" Jones that an Employee Assistance Program ("EAP") was available to assist her as needed and provided the telephone number for contacting the EAP. (Id. at 46.)
During the ninety days during which the PIP was in effect, Nave met with plaintiff weekly to provide additional one-one-one training, discuss her work, provide feedback, and offer assistance in how to organize, prioritize tasks, and use her time more wisely. Between January 9 and April 9, 2014, Jones increased her productivity to acceptable levels. She successfully completed the ninety-day PIP, bringing her productivity scores up to the desired level during that time frame. (See Doc. No. 34-1, at 47; Doc. No. 34-4, at 20-21.)
Immediately after the PIP terminated, however, the plaintiff's productivity levels once again dipped below the acceptable level. On April 29, 2014, Nave advised her that her performance score had fallen to well below 90% for each of the two weeks preceding that date, bringing her average for April to 84.5%. (See Doc. No. 34-4, at 25-26 ().)
On May 6, 2014, as a result of the plaintiff's failure to maintain her productivity after the expiration of the PIP, COO DeGrasse proposed the termination of Jones's employment, noting, "We don't have a different position to accommodate lack of productivity." (Doc. No. 34-4, at 23-24.) Nave advised Thomas Kareem, the division's CBO, of the recommendation to terminate Jones, but he also advised that he would "defer" to Kareem's "guidance and recommendation." (Doc. No. 34-4, at 28.) On May 7, 2014, Kareem's office requested the productivity reports documenting Jones's "less than fully successful performance" in the area of productivity since completing the PIP. (Doc. No. 34-4, at 27.) Nave provided the requested information (id. at 32), but apparently there was no follow up and no move to immediately terminate the plaintiff at that time.
On June 26, 2014, Nave notified Jones that her productivity score for the week of June 9, 2014 was 72% and advised her again that she needed to improve. (Doc. No. 34-4, at 59.) From May through September 2014, her productivity average was 75%. (Doc. No. 34-4, at 62.) Following Nave's June 26 email, however, there was a delay in the Agency's providing productivity scores to the plaintiff, due to the approximately two months between Nave's promotion and Teal Hatfield's appointment to replace him. On September 11, 12, and 15, 2014, Hatfield sent the plaintiff a series of emails informing her of her productivity numbers for the weeks of June 30 through the end of August 2014, showing a range of productivity during that time frame of 54% to 84%. (Doc. No. 34-1, at 31-44.)2 The hours that the plaintiff was on leave were not counted in the calculation of her productivity score. (DeGrasse Dep., Doc. No. 42-3, at 14 (...
To continue reading
Request your trial