Jones v. Meat Packers Equipment Co.

Decision Date23 December 1983
Docket NumberNo. 82-1658,82-1658
Citation723 F.2d 370
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
PartiesVirginia I. JONES, Appellant, v. MEAT PACKERS EQUIPMENT CO., a California corporation; Chemetron Corporation; and Allegheny International, Inc., Appellees, v. ALLEN BRADLEY COMPANY, Third-Party Defendant.

Keith H. Bangel, Portsmouth, Va. (Bangel, Bangel & Bangel, Portsmouth, Va., Edward L. Wolf, Segal, Wolf, Berk & Gaines, Philadelphia, Pa., on brief), for appellant.

William L. Dudley, Robert A. Rapaport, Norfolk, Va. (Harlan, Knight, Dudley & Pincus, Norfolk, Va., on brief), for appellees.

Before HALL and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge:

Virginia Jones appeals from a judgment in favor of Meat Packers Equipment Company (MEPACO) and affiliated companies in an action seeking compensation for injuries alleged to have been caused by defective machinery. Jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship. Her complaint, relying on Virginia law, alleges breach of warranty and tort. We conclude that the district court erred by submitting the issue of contributory negligence to the jury, and we therefore vacate the judgment and remand the case for a new trial.

I

Virginia Jones, a sanitation worker at the Gwaltney meat packing plant in Smithfield, Virginia, was injured while cleaning a machine that was designed and manufactured by MEPACO. The machine is a 1000-pound capacity meat mixer-blender. It is a stainless steel tub containing two metal spiral ribbon agitators, which are operated by stop, start, reverse, and discharge buttons in a control box on the side of the machine. A positive disconnect switch, which cuts off the main power supply into the machine, is located on the right rear corner.

Jones was cleaning the inside of the mixer-blender with a scouring pad. Although the stop button was engaged, the machine suddenly activated. The agitators cut off part of her right hand.

Gwaltney had purchased the mixer-blender from MEPACO in 1971. The purchase order expressly warranted that the machine was "merchantable, fit for the purpose intended, of good workmanship and material, and free from patent and latent defects."

Around 1974, MEPACO learned that a mixer-blender at another meat packing plant had activated by itself and amputated the fingers of a sanitation worker who was cleaning it. Consequently, in June of 1974, MEPACO sent a letter and metal signs by certified mail to all mixer-blender owners, including Gwaltney. The letter stated that the company must instruct its employees to keep their hands out of the machine; that means for disconnecting power should be provided for use if it became necessary to enter the machine; and that the stop button was equipped with a safety locking device to prevent the machine from starting up accidently during cleaning operations. The metal signs which, like the plastic ones they were intended to replace, stated: "DANGER KEEP HANDS OUT OF DOOR OPENING." Neither the letter nor the metal signs expressly adverted to the danger of the machine starting even when the stop button was engaged.

According to Gwaltney's personnel, the machine began activating by itself shortly after its arrival in 1971, and it continued to do this periodically up to the time of Jones's accident in 1979. Gwaltney's maintenance team believed condensation created by the contrast between the room temperature and hot water used to clean the machine caused short-circuits in the control box. The maintenance team tried to fix the problem several times by repairing, and eventually replacing, the original control box.

Jones, who then was 18 years old, had been employed at Gwaltney for approximately two weeks. A sanitation crew leader had instructed her how to clean the mixer-blender. She was told to spray down the entire machine while the machine was running. Next, after pressing the stop button to turn the machine off, she was instructed to reach into it through the discharge doors or lid and scrub off any remaining meat particles with a scouring pad.

It is undisputed among Gwaltney's personnel that at the time of Jones's accident there were no warning signs or instructions affixed to or posted near the machine. There is no evidence that Jones was ever told that the machine could activate by itself. Finally, there is no evidence that she was ever told to turn the positive disconnect switch off before cleaning the inside of the machine.

II

A federal standard determines the sufficiency of the evidence for submission of an issue to a jury. In the absence of evidence, or reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence, disclosing that Jones was negligent, the issue of contributory negligence should not have been submitted to the jury. See Wratchford v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 405 F.2d 1061, 1066-67 (4th Cir.1969). The parties briefed this issue by citing Virginia, instead of federal, authorities. Their mistake, however, is of little consequence, for in the context of this case, the allocation of functions between a Virginia trial judge and a jury is essentially similar in a federal court. See Nehi Bottling Co. v. Lambert, 196 Va. 949, 955, 86 S.E.2d 156, 159 (1955).

The parties do not dispute that Jones was cleaning the mixer-blender precisely as she had been instructed. All of Gwaltney's personnel who had observed the machine around the time of the accident and during Jones's two-week employment testified that there were no warning signs of any kind on it. There was no evidence to suggest Jones had otherwise been informed of the danger that the machine would start even though the stop button had been pushed. This defect in the machine's mechanism was not apparent to her. Furthermore, an employee who is injured while performing a job in accordance with instructions provided by the employer is not guilty of contributory negligence unless the danger is so apparent that no reasonable person would encounter it. See Norfolk &amp Western R.R. v. Ward, 90 Va. 687, 692, 19 S.E. 849, 850 (1894).

We cannot accept MEPACO's argument that the jury could have found Jones contributorily negligent because common sense should have alerted her not to put her hand in the machine after the stop button caused it to cease operation. The evidence discloses that MEPACO's engineers who designed the machine initially failed to realize that it was likely...

To continue reading

Request your trial
24 cases
  • In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
    • 3 Enero 2017
    ...standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 applies to the claims at issue, they are clearly correct.12 See Jones v. Meat Packers Equip. Co ., 723 F.2d 370, 372 (4th Cir. 1983) ("A federal standard determines the sufficiency of the evidence for submission of an issue to a jury."); Fitzge......
  • Young v. U.S.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • 5 Octubre 2009
    ...at 3-5). At the same time, however, federal rules apply to the determination of sufficiency of the evidence.10 Jones v. Meat Packers Equip. Co., 723 F.2d 370, 372 (4th Cir.1983); see also Fitzgerald v. Manning, 679 F.2d 341, 346 (4th Cir.1982) (holding that whether there is sufficient evide......
  • Benedict v. Hankook Tire Co. Ltd.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
    • 6 Febrero 2018
    ...and, therefore, a plaintiff's own negligence may be "a complete bar to an action based on negligence." See Jones v. Meat Packers Equip. Co., 723 F.2d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 1983).1 Contributory negligence is thus available as an affirmative defense if "the plaintiff failed to act as a reasonabl......
  • Signature Flight Support Corp. v. Landow Aviation Ltd. P'ship
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
    • 17 Marzo 2010
    ...not require or cause Nathan Landow to testify at trial and that Landow had the exclusive ability to do so. Jones v. Meat Packers Equipment Co., 723 F.2d 370, 373 (4th Cir.1983); see also Neeley v. Johnson, 215 Va. 565, 573-74, 211 S.E.2d 100, 107-08 Dunlap v. G. & C. Towing, Inc., 613 F.2d ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT