Jones v. Menard
Decision Date | 28 September 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 75-3806,75-3806 |
Citation | 559 F.2d 1282 |
Parties | Herman Wilson JONES, Plaintiff, v. Paul D. MENARD, Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff, v. ST. CHARLES STEEL FABRICATORS, INC., Third-Party Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GLAZER STEEL CORPORATION, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
William A. Porteous, III, New Orleans, La., Francis Dugas, Thibodaux, La., R. Lee McDaniel, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff.
Robert M. Contois, Jr., New Orleans, La., for Glazer Steel.
Dan C. Garner, R. Lee McDaniel, L. J. Lautenschlaeger, Jr., New Orleans, La., for Menard.
Patrick M. Reily, Cornelius G. Van Dalen, New Orleans, La., for Dixie Mill.
P. A. Bienvenu, New Orleans, La., for Gulf Ins. Co.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
Before THORNBERRY and GEE, Circuit Judges, and MARKEY, * Chief Judge.
Herman Jones, a crewman on the shrimp boat F/V LADY OF GOOD VOYAGE, received severe back injuries when the vessel's 38-foot steel boom broke and fell across his back as he sat on the deck repairing a net. Invoking the Jones Act, he sued the owner and operator of the vessel, Paul Menard, who in turn filed a third-party complaint for contribution and indemnity against St. Charles Steel Fabricators, Inc., the designers and builders of the LADY OF GOOD VOYAGE. St. Charles filed its own third-party complaint against Glazer Steel Corporation, which had furnished the 40-foot length of steel pipe from which the boom was fabricated. The skirmish before us involves only the latter two parties, with St. Charles appealing from the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Glazer. We reverse. 1
In its third-party complaint St. Charles initiated a breach of warranty action, alleging that Glazer had furnished it schedule 40 pipe 2 unfit for use in constructing the boom for LADY OF GOOD VOYAGE. Louisiana warranty law is contained in the state's redhibition statutes, La.Stat.Ann.Civil Code §§ 2475-76, 2520-48 (1952 & Supp.1977), which impose upon a seller the warranty that its goods are reasonably fit for the purpose intended by both parties to the sale. Media Production Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz, 262 La. 80, 88, 262 So.2d 377, 380 (1972); Knight v. Davenport, 71 So.2d 388, 391 (La.Ct.App.1954). Under Louisiana law manufacturers are presumed to know the vices in their products and for that reason are held strictly liable for damages caused by the use of their defective goods. See Rey v. Cuccia, 298 So.2d 840, 845 (La.1974). It appears that this presumption, however, does not extend to nonmanufacturing sellers, see Peltier v. Seabird Industries, Inc., 243 So.2d 112, 113 (La.Ct.App.1971), cert. denied, 309 So.2d 343 (1975); consequently, retailers, such as the appellee in this case, seem to be held liable for personal injuries resulting from breach of warranty only upon a showing of negligence, 3 see La.Stat.Ann.Civil Code arts. 2531, 2545 (Supp.1977); Ross v. John's Bargain Stores Corp., 464 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1972); McCauley v. Manda Brothers Provisions Co., 202 So.2d 492, 497 (La.Ct.App.1967); Robertson, Manufacturer's Liability for Defective Products in Louisiana Law,50 Tul.L.Rev. 50, 72-73, 103-04, 107-08, 113 (1975). These same distinctions between manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sellers also obtain in cases brought under tort rather than warranty theories. Compare Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Co., 259 La. 599, 250 So.2d 754 (1971) ( ) with Ross v. John's Bargain Stores Corp., supra, and Peltier v. Seabird Industries, Inc., supra ( ). See also Robertson,supra at 72-73.
Although I am in complete agreement with a reversal on the ground that summary judgment was improper, I have trouble with footnote 5 of Judge Gee's opinion, which intimates that the trial court's refusal to consider the Reineke Report and Captain Menard's affidavit was correct. Certainly this language is unnecessary to our disposition of this case.
The fact that the Reineke Reports was unsworn hardly seems to be an insurmountable problem. If the trial court was seriously concerned with determining if evidence did exist, it had the capability to "test this out" by requesting that the appellant submit a supplemental affidavit simply the same report, this time sworn. Rule 56(e), Fed.R.Civ.Proc. Such procedure is consistent with the purpose of summary judgment: to inquire and determine whether competent evidence exists. See C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 99, at 492 (3d ed. 1976).
Likewise, the rejection of Captain Menard's affidavit, submitted in proper form but on the day of the hearing, was perhaps not an abuse of discretion. Again, however, it seems the trial court seized upon an available technicality to exclude sound evidence, in contravention of the truism that courts should grant opponents all benefits of doubt in summary judgment proceedings. I cannot improve on the words of the eminent Judge Hutcheson, who remarked:
It is quite clear that technical rulings have no place in this (summary judgment) procedure and particularly that exclusionary rules will not be applied to strike, on grounds of formal defects in the proffer, evidence proffered on tendered issues.
* Of
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, sitting by designation.
1 We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the district court's order granting summary judgment contains an express finding, pursuant to Rule 54(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., that "there is no just reason for delay in entry of final judgment . . . ." Scott v. Board of Supervisors, 336 F.2d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 1964).
2 Schedule 40 pipe has a diameter of six inches and a wall thickness of .280 inches.
3 Negligence may be hard to prove in this case, since Glazer apparently had no obligation to search for hidden defects, "the duty of the vendor of such products (as a new boat or automobile) fulfilled if he performs the routine, normal inspections in the business upon receipt of the product, checking and discovering those defects which are patent and obvious." Peltier v. Seabird Industries, Inc., 304 So.2d 695, 700 (La.Ct.App.1974), cert. denied, 309 So.2d 343 (La.1975). Glazer, however, did not seek summary judgment on the ground that no issue of negligence was raised by the facts, and the judgment does not rest on any such consideration.
4 If St. Charles chose the wrong pipe for the job, it was...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liab. Lit.
...& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Piper v. United States, 392 F.2d 462 (5th Cir.1968); Jones v. Menard, 559 F.2d 1282, 1285 n. 5 (5th Cir.1977)). Because Linsner did not present the court with any competent summary judgment evidence showing that her prescribing......
-
Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc.
...of injury, Gangi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 33 Conn.Sup. 81, 360 A.2d 907, 909 (1976). The Fifth Circuit, in Jones v. Menard, 559 F.2d 1282, 1285 n. 4 (5th Cir.1977) (applying the law of Louisiana), defined misuse in the context of the three types of products cases. That court [i]n inadequate......
-
Hicks v. Bexar County, Tex.
...736 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir.1984), (holding that an unsworn letter is not proper summary judgment proof); and Jones v. Menard, 559 F.2d 1282, 1285 n. 5 (5th Cir.1977), (holding that a written report drafted by a person who is not properly qualified as an expert may not be considered as summa......
-
Cia. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc.
...Defendants' affidavits and attachments filed on December 19, the day of hearing, should not have been considered. Cf. Jones v. Mernard, 559 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir.1977) (moving party's affidavit could not be served during oral argument on motion instead of being served prior to the date of For ......