Jones v. Merchants' Nat. Bank

• Citation: 76 F. 683
• Decision Date: 23 October 1896
• Docket Number: 181,185.,184
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
• Parties: JONES v. MERCHANTS NAT. BANK OF BOSTON et al. GREGORY v. SAME. GREGORY v. BOSTON SAFE-DEPOSIT & TRUST CO.

76 F. 683

JONES v. MERCHANTS NAT. BANK OF BOSTON et al. GREGORY v. SAME. GREGORY v. BOSTON SAFE-DEPOSIT & TRUST CO.

Nos. 181, 184, 185.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

October 23, 1896

Francis A. Brooks, for Jones and Gregory.

Lewis D. Dabney, for Merchants Nat. Bank of Boston.

John Lowell and Thos. H. Talbot, for Boston Safe-Deposit & Trust Co. and Mary H. Pike.

Before PUTNAM, Circuit Judge, and WEBB and ALDRICH, District Judges.

PUTNAM Circuit Judge.

These three appeals can be considered together. The Merchants National Bank of Boston is a place of deposit of moneys paid into the circuit court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts under a standing order, entered May 21 1868, of which the following is a copy:

'Ordered that the Merchants National Bank of Boston be, and the same is hereby, designated as the place of deposit of all moneys paid into the registry of the circuit court of the United States for this district; and that all the moneys paid into the registry of said court be deposited by the clerk in said bank, to the credit of the said circuit court; and that no moneys so deposited be drawn or paid out except by the court, and on the checks of the clerk of the said court, approved by one of the justices of the said court and that the clerk furnish said bank with a certified copy of this order.'

Being a general order, the circuit court was bound to take judicial notice of it, and we must therefore treat these appeals as though it had been put into the record. At the arguments some criticism was made of the expression it contains, 'moneys paid into the registry of the circuit court,' on the ground that it had peculiar, and indeed sole, reference to moneys paid in on the equity side; but section 995 of the Revised Statutes reads as follows:

'All moneys paid into any court of the United States, or received by the officers thereof, in any cause pending or adjudicated in such court, shall be forthwith deposited with the treasurer, an assistant treasurer, or a designated depositary of the United States, in the name and to the credit of such court: provided, that nothing herein shall be construed to prevent the delivery of any such money upon security, according to agreement of parties, under the direction of the court.'

This was enacted after the order was entered, but the order has been continuously recognized and acted on by the court as answering its full requirements, no other standing depositary having been designated. In view of this fact, there can be no doubt that the deposit made in that bank, and in controversy in two of these appeals, must be regarded as made under the direction of the circuit court, pursuant to the requirements of the statute, and that it must be treated as the fund of the court, as fully as though it were in the personal possession of its clerk, and therefore subject in all respects to its summary control and disposition, and entitled to protection in all particulars, in order that it may be free at all times for such disposition. Any interference with it, or with the bank where it is deposited, or attempt thereto, which would embarrass in any degree such control or disposition, or harass the bank, or put it to expense, by reason of its possessing the fund, unless the consent of the circuit court was first obtained, would amount, on plain principles of law, to an implied contempt, and, if persisted in understandingly, to an actual one.

The fund in the Merchants National Bank was originally paid into the common-law side of the circuit court, in satisfaction of a judgment recovered by the appellant Jones against one Swift on a note of $15,000; but by an order of the court on the equity side it was held to abide the result of an equity suit in which the appellant Gregory was the complainant. An order was entered in the latter suit as follows:

'Upon the petition of Mary H. Pike, executrix, filed in this cause, and with the consent of Swift and Butterfield, defendants in this cause, and of Thomas H. Talbot, attorney for Charles F. Jones in the suit at law of Jones v. Swift, No. 2,435 on the law docket of this court, it is ordered: (1) That defendant Stetson file the note of $15,000, referred to in the said petition, in the said action at law No. 2,435, of Jones v. Swift. (2) That upon the entry of judgment in the said action at law said Swift be directed to pay into the registry of this court the amount of said judgment (but without commissions, by consent of the parties herein named), and that said amount be held subject to the rights of the parties claiming said note, and to abide the decision of the court in this cause. (3) That upon the payment by said Swift into the registry of this court of the amount of said judgment, an order of satisfaction of said judgment be entered of record.'

It is claimed that Talbot, thus named, was not Jones' attorney for the purpose of the order, if at all, and that the order itself was irregular and ineffectual. But it is wholly immaterial in these appeals whether the fund went into the Merchants National Bank from the law side of the court or from the equity side. It got there from the United States circuit court for the district of Massachusetts as money which had been paid into court, and under the sanction of the statute we have cited, and of the order of court already set out; and it was held by the bank as the agent and representative of the court for that purpose. Nothing more was required.

The Boston Safe-Deposit & Trust Company was never a standing...