Jones v. Milwaukee County

• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: DAY; HEFFERNAN
• Citation: Jones v. Milwaukee County, 168 Wis.2d 892, 485 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 1992)
• Decision Date: 17 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-0817,91-0817
• Parties: , 61 USLW 2027 Vanessa and Kevin JONES, Plaintiffs-Respondents, Alex Gardner, Plaintiff-Intervenor, d v. MILWAUKEE COUNTY and Milwaukee County Department of Social Services, Defendants-Appellants.

Page 21

485 N.W.2d 21

168 Wis.2d 892, 61 USLW 2027

Vanessa and Kevin JONES, Plaintiffs-Respondents Alex Gardner, Plaintiff-Intervenor, ^d v. MILWAUKEE COUNTY and Milwaukee County Department of Social Services, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 91-0817.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued March 24, 1992.

Decided June 17, 1992.

For the defendants-appellants the cause was argued by James T. McClutchy, Milwaukee County Corp. Counsel with whom on the brief, in the Court of Appeals, was Robert G. Ott, Corp. Counsel, John F. Jorgensen, Principal Asst. Corp. Counsel.

For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief, in the Court of Appeals, by Patricia DeLessio, Anne L. DeLeo and Legal Action of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Patricia DeLessio.

Amicus curiae brief, in the Court of Appeals, was filed by David Prosser, Jr. and Christopher L. Wolle, Madison, for Representative David Prosser, Jr.

Amicus curiae brief was submitted by James H. McDermott, Asst. Atty. Gen., Donald P. Johns, Asst. Atty. Gen. and James E. Doyle, Atty. Gen.

DAY, Justice.

This is an appeal on bypass granted pursuant to sec. 809.60, Stats., 1989-90, from a decision by the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Patricia D. McMahon, Judge, holding sec. 49.015, Stats., 1985-86, which requires dependent persons to have resided in Wisconsin for at least 60 consecutive days to be eligible for general relief, to be unconstitutional under the equal protection clauses of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.

We hold that the 60 day waiting period requirement is constitutional under the equal protection clauses of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions. We therefore reverse the decision of the circuit court.

This case arises from an action filed by Vanessa and Kevin Jones on December 14, 1988 in the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of themselves and the class of persons living in Milwaukee County whose applications for general relief benefits have been, were being, or will be denied because they had not resided in Wisconsin for at least 60 consecutive days before applying for general relief under sec. 49.015, Stats.

Plaintiffs argued that the 60 day waiting period violated plaintiffs' right to travel as guaranteed by the United States Constitution, and plaintiffs' right to equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.

The circuit court certified the action as a class action, allowed Alex Gardner to intervene, and granted plaintiffs' motion for a temporary injunction prohibiting defendants from denying general relief benefits to members of the class solely because they failed to meet the 60 day durational residency requirement. Subsequently, both plaintiffs and defendants moved for summary judgment.

On May 2, 1990, the circuit court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and held that the challenged statute violated plaintiffs' constitutional right to travel and to equal protection of the law. ¹

The material facts are not in dispute. Defendant Milwaukee County is a municipal corporation in Wisconsin and is required by sec. 49.02(1m), Stats., to maintain a program that provides general relief to all eligible dependent persons within Milwaukee County.

Defendant Milwaukee County Department of Social Services is an administrative agency created pursuant to sec. 46.215(1)(a), Stats. Among its responsibilities is the administration of the general relief program in Milwaukee County.

Section 49.01(2), Stats., defines a dependent person as:

an individual without the presently available money, income, property or credit, or other means by which it can be presently obtained, excluding the exemptions set forth under s. 49.06, sufficient to provide the necessary commodities and services specified in sub. (5m).

Section 49.01(5m), Stats., defines general relief to mean:

such services, commodities or money as are reasonable and necessary under the circumstances to provide food, housing, clothing, fuel, light, water, medicine, medical, dental, and surgical treatment (including hospital care), optometrical services, nursing, transportation, and funeral expenses, and include wages for work relief. The food shall be of a kind and quantity sufficient to provide a nourishing diet. The housing provided shall be adequate to health and decency. Where there are children of school age the general relief furnished shall include necessities for which no other provision is made by law. The general relief furnished, whether by money or otherwise, shall be at such times and in such amounts, as will in the discretion of the general relief official or agency meet the needs of the recipient and protect the public.

The eligibility section at issue, sec. 49.015, Stats., provides:

(1) In this section, "close relative" means the person's parent, grandparent, brother, sister, spouse or child.

(2) No person is eligible for general relief under this chapter unless the person has resided in this state for at least 60 consecutive days before applying for general relief. This requirement does not apply if the person resides in this state and meets any of the following conditions:

(a) The person was born in this state.

(b) The person has, in the past, resided in this state for at least 365 consecutive days.

(c) The person came to this state to join a close relative who has resided in this state for at least 180 days before the arrival of the person.

(d) The person came to this state to accept a bona fide offer of employment and the person was eligible to accept the employment.

(e) The person came to this state for a lawful purpose without intent to seek benefits under this chapter.

(3) Prior to January 1, 1987, a county or municipality may waive the requirement under sub. (2) in a medical emergency or in case of unusual misfortune or hardship. Each waiver shall be reported to the department. The department may deny reimbursement under s. 49.035 and s. 49.04, 1983 stats., for any case in which a waiver is inappropriately granted.

(4) After December 31, 1986, a general relief agency may waive the requirement under sub. (2) in a medical emergency or in case of unusual misfortune or hardship. Each waiver shall be reported to the department. The department may deny reimbursement under s. 49.035 for any case in which a waiver is inappropriately granted.

During the 1986-87 legislative session, section 49.015(2)(e), Stats., was repealed, thus eliminating the exception for those who "came to this state for a lawful purpose without intent to seek benefits." ²

Defendants amended their policies to conform with the changes in section 49.015, Stats., and, as a matter of policy and practice, deny general relief benefits to persons that have not resided in Wisconsin for 60 consecutive days prior to application unless they satisfy one of the exceptions.

Milwaukee County routinely verifies all eligibility factors, including residence in Milwaukee County, in determining the eligibility of applicants for general relief. In so doing, Milwaukee County utilizes its limited resources to the best of its ability.

Plaintiffs Vanessa and Kevin Jones are adults who reside in Milwaukee County and were denied general relief benefits because they had not resided in Wisconsin for 60 consecutive days. They arrived in Wisconsin with their three children on November 22, 1988, intending to spend the Thanksgiving holidays with the family of a friend. They applied for general relief on December 6, 1988 because they were without available money, income, property, or credit or any other means to obtain such resources sufficient to provide for basic necessities.

Plaintiff Alex Gardner is an adult resident of Milwaukee County who previously lived with his parents in Waukegan, Illinois, and supported himself with sporadic employment in the building trades industry. When his parents moved to Texas, he moved to Milwaukee. He stayed at the Guest House, a temporary shelter for homeless persons, where he was told he could remain for only 30 days. Having no funds, he applied for general relief on January 17, 1989.

Plaintiffs Vanessa Jones, Kevin Jones, and Alex Gardner were denied general relief benefits solely because they had not resided in Wisconsin for 60 days. In addition to these named plaintiffs, at least 20 persons each month are denied general relief benefits by defendants solely because they fail to satisfy the 60 day residency requirement.

The circuit court relied ostensibly on Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), as the basis for its decision. Shapiro held that Connecticut's, Pennsylvania's, and the District of Columbia's public assistance statutes, which imposed one year residency eligibility requirements, were unconstitutional under the equal protection clause.

The Court in Shapiro found that the one year waiting period created two classifications of persons; namely, those who had resided in the jurisdiction for one year, and those who had not. Id. at 627, 89 S.Ct. at 1327. The Court stated that the right to travel has long been recognized as fundamental, id. at 629-30, 89 S.Ct. at 1329, and reviewed the statutes under the "strict scrutiny" standard because, it concluded, "any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." Id. at 634, 89 S.Ct. at 1331.

The Court discussed the states' and District's purposes in enacting the one year waiting requirement and concluded that, "[t]he interests which appellants assert are promoted by the classification either may not constitutionally be promoted by government or are not compelling governmental interests." Id. at 627, 89 S.Ct. at 1327.

Initially, the Court addressed the "constitutionally impermissible" governmental objectives. First, the Court concluded that it was...