Jones v. Minner
| Decision Date | 02 October 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 17-1837-RGA |
| Parties | MATTHEW JONES, Plaintiff, v. RUTH ANN MINNER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
Matthew Jones, Greenwood, Delaware. Pro Se Plaintiff.
October 2, 2018
Wilmington, Delaware
Plaintiff Matthew Jones, who appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, filed this action in June 2017 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against Ruth Ann Minner, Jack Markell, John Carney and the Delaware Governor's Office. (D.I. 1). The matter was transferred to this Court in December 2017. (D.I. 5, 6). Jones asserts jurisdiction by reason of a federal question, diversity of citizenship, and the United States government as a defendant. (D.I. 1 at 2). The Court proceeds to screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In the Complaint, Jones provides his biography beginning in the first grade to the date of the Complaint. He alleges that "the events that initiated" this case occurred in the Fall of 2015, when for the third time that year, his roommate/mother contacted the police and mobile crisis intervention services. (D.I. 1 at 16). Plaintiff provided police and mobile crisis evidence, they interviewed the complainant, left, only to return the next day and forcefully hospitalize Plaintiff. (Id.). It was the third (or sixteenth, see id. at 8) time that Plaintiff was forcefully hospitalized. (Id. at 16). After he was released, Plaintiff filed an action in this Court, Jones v. Crisis Intervention, Civ. No. 16-410-RGA, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (Id. at 17). That judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals at No. 17-1585.
The Complaint alleges that Defendants are identity thieves. (Id. at 23). Plaintiff explains that they "are fully staffed by employees who are capable of doling out life-ending drugs but have not received the proper education, or any, and do not live in thenames and appearances of which they were born; therefore, they have no legal standing." (Id.). The Complaint goes on to allege, (Id. at 32).
Plaintiff alleges that as a child he contacted Defendants Ruth Ann Minner and Jack Markell. (Id. at 33). The Court takes judicial notice that Minner was the Governor of the State of Delaware from 2001 to 2009. See https://ballotpedia.org/Ruth_Ann_Minner (last visited Sept. 11, 2018). Plaintiff alleges that he was invited to Minner's inaugural ball. (D.I. 1 at 33). Plaintiff alleges that his first mental health detention occurred after a Milford, Delaware traffic stop. (Id.). He states that Governor Minner resides in Milford where the Minner Towing Company is located. (Id.).
Markell visited Plaintiff's home in the late 1990's and Plaintiff received birthday cards from his office from 1999 to 2012. (Id.). Plaintiff was invited to two of Markell's inaugurals and once to his Governor's banquet. (Id.). He alleges that Markell denied Plaintiff's pardon request when it reached his office in 2016. (Id.). The Court takes judicial notice that Markell was the State Treasurer of Delaware from 1999 to 2009, and the Governor of the State of Delaware from 2009 to 2017. See http://www.jag.org/board-of-directors/governor-jack-markell (last visited Sept. 11, 2018).
Plaintiff alleges that before he filed his lawsuits he "pled for an investigation into [his] life." (D.I. 1 at 34). Plaintiff alleges that he found all his evidence without any help from his "justice related government resources." (Id.). Even though he has shared the information, no action has been taken on his behalf. (Id.).
Plaintiff contacted "the Governor" (presumably current Governor John Carney) and former Governor Jack Markell. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that he "received many violent threats over the years and [has] been stalked online by Markell's profile name, Alan.Jackson@state.de.us." (Id. at 35). He alleges that he interviewed Carney last fall at the Apple Scrapple Festival in Bridgeville, Delaware. (Id. at 35). During the interview, Plaintiff told Carney, among other things, that he was kidnapped, removed from his parents at birth and conditioned for sexual slavery by the Delaware police. (Id.). The Court takes judicial notice that Carney served as Lieutenant Governor of the State of Delaware from 2001 to 2009, served as a representative for the United States House of Representatives from 2011 to 2017, and has served as governor of the State of Delaware since January 17, 2017. See https://governor.delaware.gov/about-governor-john-carney/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2018).
Plaintiff alleges that "someone lived in [his] identity in Delaware, [and the person was] ordered to pay [monies] by the Delaware Superior and Family Courts of New Castle County." (Id. at 34-35). The person was tried in Plaintiff's name using his address and social security number. (Id. at 35). Plaintiff called Defendant Governor's Office but could not learn any more about the cases. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges Defendants and their influence made sure that Plaintiff's nose and toes have stayed broken. (Id.). They have "shut [him] up to die" in mental health facilities and multiple times in prison. (Id.).
Jones alleges numerous violations of federal criminal law and amendments of the United States Constitution. (Id. at 12-15). He seeks two billion dollars in damages, to have his actual identity restored, justice to be served on his assailants, hisactual name and birth date to be authenticated, and his background history to be appropriately amended. (Id. at 40).
A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) if "the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (). The Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28; Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (). However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, theCourt must grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff proceeds pro se and, therefore, his pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court concludes that those allegations "could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). "Though 'detailed factual allegations' are not required, a complaint must do more than simply provide 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.'" Daw's v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In addition, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014). A complaint may not be dismissed, however, for imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See id. at 346.
When reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, a court should follow a three-step process: (1) consider the elements necessary to state a claim; (2) identify allegations that are merely conclusions are therefore are not well-pleaded factual allegations; and (3) accept any well-pleaded factual allegations as true and determine whether they plausibly state a claim. See Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016); Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 2014). Decidingwhether a claim is plausible will be a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.
The Court liberally construes the complaint as attempting to raise claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 given that Plaintiff refers to certain amendments of the United States Constitution. When bringing a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
The allegations in the complaint are legally and factually frivolous. As pled, there is no legal basis for Jones' claims against the named defendants for the following reasons. None of the factual allegations involving the named Defendants plausibly...
To continue reading
Request your trial