Jones v. Montachusett Reg'l Transit Auth.
| Decision Date | 07 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION No. 4:19-cv-11093-TSH |
| Parties | PAUL JONES, Plaintiff v. MONTACHUSETT REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Hennessy, M.J.,
On May 10, 2019, pro se plaintiff Paul Jones brought claims against Montachusett Regional Transit Authority ("MART") and unidentified individual defendants. [Dkt. No. 1]. On June 14, 2019, Plaintiff amended his complaint asserting claims against MART, HB Software Solutions, Inc. ("HBSS"), thirteen individual defendants, and Jane and John Does (collectively "Defendants").1 [Dkt. No. 7 ("Am. Compl.")]. Plaintiff avers that Defendants violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") (Count I and Count II), violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Count III and Count VI), violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of1964 (Count VII), violated Massachusetts anti-discrimination law Chapter 151B (Count VIII), and committed the state law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.2 [Dkt. No. 7].
On August 5, 2019, MART and the individual defendants moved to dismiss all claims against them pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [Dkt. No. 32]. On August 13, 2019, HBSS moved to dismiss all claims against it. [Dkt. No. 35]. Plaintiff opposed both motions. [Dkt. Nos. 39-40]. The undersigned recommends that MART and the individual defendants' motions be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The undersigned recommends that HBSS's motion be GRANTED.
This court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Cooperman v. Individual, Inc., 171 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff is the proprietor and director of Commonwealth Community Recovery Division, Inc. ("CCRD"), a minority-owned livery service business. [Am. Compl. at ¶ 44]. MART is a public, nonprofit organization established under Chapter 161B of the Massachusetts General Laws to provide public transportation in Northern Massachusetts. [Am. Compl. at ¶ 14]; see also M.G.L. c. 161B, § 2. MART receives federal funding to provide public transportation and therefore is subject to Title VI. [Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 176-179]. The individual defendants are, or were at one point, employees of MART. [Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 16-29].
CCRD contracted with MART to provide non-emergency livery services on behalf of MART through MART's online portal system. [Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 44, 67]. HBSS, a software company, is the manufacturer of MART's portal system. [Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 15, 82, 158]. Despitebeing directly employed by CCRD, Plaintiff asserts that he was in an employee/employer relationship with MART. [Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 135-142]. As an employee of CCRD, Plaintiff drives participants in MART's programs and serves as a dispatcher for other CCRD drivers. [Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 44, 53, 60, 68]. MART required Plaintiff to use the portal system to receive driving assignments. [Am. Compl. at ¶ 68]. From as early as 2016, continuing to the present, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated state and federal law through, among other conduct, the improper manipulation of the portal system. [Am. Compl. at ¶ 42].
Though MART policy states that the portal system assigns work based on a "low bid system," Plaintiff contends that MART employees did not follow this policy. [Am. Compl. at ¶ 67]. Plaintiff contends that MART showed racial preference in assigning work. [Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 67, 146]. Plaintiff asserts that he was required to take jobs from MART through the portal system while other non-minority employees received direct job offers from MART. [Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 68, 146]. Plaintiff asserts that MART offered him less profitable work because of his race. [Am. Compl. at ¶ 91-92, 96-97]. Plaintiff's employees also underwent heightened scrutiny compared to non-minority livery service providers. [Am. Compl. at ¶ 93].
MART denied Plaintiff access to participate in a "low-bid" system, which would have granted CCRD access to daily and weekly jobs. [Am. Compl. at ¶ 51]. After Plaintiff complained on behalf of CCRD, MART employees intentionally restricted his portal system access, fined CCRD, altered CCRD's operating hours, provided deficient training, and generally interfered with CCRD's business. [Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 58, 60, 62, 72, 75, 119]. MART also failed to pay CCRD for services performed. [Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 59, 64; Ex. 7]. Plaintiff asserts that MART's treatment of him and CCRD has caused him mental and emotional injury. [Am. Compl. at ¶ 133].
Plaintiff avers that the first instance of racial discrimination occurred on or about March 15, 2016 when he appeared at a MART facility. [Am. Compl. at ¶ 69]. After his visit, Plaintiff did not receive job offers for six months. [Am. Compl. at ¶ 69]. Plaintiff received less work despite bidding lower than ninety-seven percent of other livery service providers. [Am. Compl. at ¶ 108]. Despite his low bids, Plaintiff received approximately ninety-eight percent less work than similarly situated non-minority livery service providers. [Am. Compl. at ¶ 71]. On or about August 24, 2016, Plaintiff emailed MART manager Rebecca Badgley claiming racial discrimination. [Am. Compl. at ¶ 78; Ex. 12]. Plaintiff avers that MART did not investigate his claim and instead, Ms. Badgley requested Plaintiff work elsewhere. [Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 79-80].
On or about October 15, 2016, Plaintiff began to receive automated phone calls to his personal cellular phone from MART in his capacity as director of CCRD. [Am. Compl. at ¶ 83]. These calls would offer Plaintiff work which Plaintiff did not accept because the opportunities were not cost-effective. [Am. Compl. at ¶ 83]. This development relates to Plaintiff's claims against HBSS because, in addition to managing the portal system, HBSS controls the automatic dialing system that called Plaintiff's cellular phone. [Am. Compl. at ¶ 160]. Plaintiff immediately asked MART to no longer call his cellular phone. [Am. Compl. at ¶ 84]. Plaintiff later sent written requests to stop the calls. [Am. Compl. at ¶ 87; Exs. 1, 23]. However, Plaintiff continued to receive automated calls, sometimes as often as seventy times per day. [Am. Compl. at ¶ 84]. Plaintiff asserts that he received a heightened volume of calls because of Defendants' racial animus. [Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 76, 160-61].
On or about March 22, 2017, Plaintiff sent MART a letter alleging a Title VI racial discrimination complaint. [Am. Compl. at ¶ 52; Exs. 2-3]. On or about September 1, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission("EEOC") against MART. [Am. Compl. at ¶ 120; Ex. 18]. On or about December 27, 2018, after alleged improper conduct, Plaintiff informed MART that its employees were violating Chapter 151B, Title VI, and Title VII. [Am. Compl. at ¶ 127; Ex. 20]. After each complaint, MART limited Plaintiff's access to the portal system. [Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 128-29]. Plaintiff believes that by restricting his access, MART and its employees retaliated against him. [Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 109-100, 121, 174].
On or about February 11, 2019, Plaintiff received a right to sue letter from the EEOC and timely filed his complaint. [Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 120, 151].
Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure test the sufficiency of the pleadings. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must "'state a claim [for] relief that is plausible on its face,' accepting the plaintiff's factual allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Maloy v. Ballori-Lage, 744 F.3d 250, 252 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it must recite facts to at least "raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. When deciding a motion to dismiss, the First Circuit has "emphasize[d] that the complaint must be read as a whole," and that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to surpass the plausibility threshold. Garcia-Catalan v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 103 (1st Cir. 2013). At a minimum, however, a complaint must include sufficient factual matter that, when accepted as true, would allow the court to draw "the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citations omitted).
Though many of his claims relate to the relationship between CCRD and MART, Plaintiff asserts only personal claims against Defendants. The undersigned's discussion does not address whether the allegations within Plaintiff's amended complaint state claims which could entitle the entity CCRD to relief.
Plaintiff brings five claims against Defendants: (1) violations of the TCPA, (2) violations of Title VII, (3) violations of Title VI, (4) violations of Chapter 151B, and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants move to dismiss the TCPA claims on the grounds that Plaintiff is not a "consumer" with standing to bring suit under the statute. [Dkt. No. 33, at pp. 6-8; Dkt. No. 36, at pp. 7-10]. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Title VII and Chapter 151B claims on the grounds that Plaintiff is not an employee of MART or HBSS. [Dkt. No. 33, at pp. 8-10; Dkt. No. 36, at pp. 5-7]. As to the Title VI claims, Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not aver facts that Defendants discriminated against him in connection with the specific program or activity for which federal financial assistance has been provided. [Dkt. No. 33, at p. 10; Dkt. No. 36, at pp. 10-11]. Lastly, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's state law tort claim on the ground that Plaintiff failed to plead all necessary elements. [Dkt. No. 33, at pp. 11-12; Dkt. No. 36, at...
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