Jones v. Montgomery Cnty. Dep't of Jobs & Family Servs.

• Decision Date: 03 February 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:18-cv-37
• Parties: JEWELL EVETTE JONES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF JOBS AND FAMILY SERVICES, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

JEWELL EVETTE JONES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY DEPARTMENTOF JOBS AND FAMILY SERVICES, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:18-cv-37

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

February 3, 2020

District Judge Walter H. Rice

Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION¹ THAT: (1) DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS (DOCS. 37, 38) BE GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; (2) AND THIS CASE REMAIN PENDING ON THE COURT'S DOCKET WITH REGARD TO PLAINTIFF'S OFFICIAL CAPACITY TITLE VII CLAIMS ALLEGING RACE DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION

This civil case is before the Court on two motions to dismiss filed by Defendants: (1) the motion of Defendant Jane Hay; and (2) the combined motion filed by the remaining Defendants. Docs. 37, 38. Pro se Plaintiff Jewell Evette Jones filed a memorandum in opposition. Doc. 42. Defendants filed separate reply memoranda. Docs. 44, 47. The undersigned has carefully considered all of the foregoing, and Defendants' motions are ripe for decision.

I.

A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) operates to test the sufficiency of the complaint and permits dismissal for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." To show grounds for relief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires that the complaint contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."While Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 "does not require 'detailed factual allegations' . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Pleadings offering mere "'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

In determining a motion to dismiss, "courts 'are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Further, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. "[T]he factual allegations must be specific enough to justify 'drag[ging] a defendant past the pleading threshold.'" DM Research, Inc. v. Coll. of Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 1999).

In order "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In addition to well-pleaded allegations in the complaint, the Court may also consider "matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint," as well as documents attached to a defendant's motion to dismiss that are important to the plaintiff's claims or if referred to in the complaint. Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); Composite Tech., L.L.C. v. Inoplast Composites S.A. de C.V., 925 F. Supp. 2d 868, 873 (S.D. Ohio 2013).

A claim is plausible where "plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plausibility "is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do notpermit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged -- but it has not 'show[n]' -- 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (alteration in original) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

II.

The facts set forth herein are those alleged by pro se Plaintiff in her amended complaint. See doc. 34. The well-pled factual allegations asserted therein are accepted as true for purposes of deciding Defendants' motions to dismiss. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283 (1986) ("We are bound for the purposes of this review to take the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true").

Plaintiff is an African-American woman who worked as a probationary employee for the Montgomery County Department of Job and Family Services, Children Services Division, in Dayton, Ohio ("MCDJFS") until her termination from employment in early 2017. Doc. 34 at PageID 566. Defendant Jane Hay also works for MCDJFS, possesses extensive knowledge of Ohio's Statewide Automated Child Welfare Information System ("SACWIS"), and trains new MCDJFS employees on that system during their probationary period of employment. Id. at PageID 568-69. Hay also serves as President of the Professional Guild of Ohio ("PGO"), which is a trade union representing employees at MCDJFS. Id. at PageID 568.

According to pro se Plaintiff, Hay used her position as a trainer and her extensive knowledge of the SACWIS system to purposefully train African-American probationary employees improperly so that they would make mistakes with their work and be terminated at the conclusion of the probationary period. Id. Hay also allegedly altered Plaintiff's work in the SACWIS database so that it would appear Plaintiff was making mistakes, such as typographical errors. Id. at PageID 581. Finally, Plaintiff contends that Hay harassed, intimidated, cursed,belittled, and made racist statements to subordinate African-American employees, and used her position as PGO President to shield herself from repercussions. Id.

Hay's alleged conduct included:

• Telling Plaintiff to "stay away from the black girls" (doc. 2 at PageID 105);

• Reviewing Plaintiff's work product, marking it up, returning the work to Plaintiff for correction, and, after reviewing Plaintiff's corrected work -- which Plaintiff contends was to Hay's specifications -- Hay would continue to find errors and give revisions in contradiction to her initial revisions (id. at Pageid 572-73);

• Telling Plaintiff to no ask a more experienced Caucasian employee to assist her or to review her work product (id. at PageID 575);

• Loudly and obnoxiously insulting, belittling, and berating Plaintiff (id. at PageID 576);

• "[T]alk[ing] about black women's attire loudly while Plaintiff was walking with her" (id.);

• Calling African-American co-workers "those heifers" (id.);

• "[Making] sexual advances towards a black male employee and when he reciprocated the advances, [filing] a sexual harassment lawsuit against the black employee and [having] him terminated" (id. at PageID 577);

Plaintiff alleges that she reported Hay's conduct to her immediate supervisor, Defendant Sandra Mundy, who told her "she was worrying too much . . . and not concentrating on her work." Doc. 34 at PageID 569. Plaintiff alleged she also informed Mundy's supervisor, Defendant Debby Shaw, about "how much pressure . . . Hay was putting on [her][,]" but "Shaw dismissed [her] accusations and sent [her] back to work." Id. at PageID 585-87. She also alleges that she reported to the PGO vice president, Debra Robinson, that "Hay was sabotaging her work and . . . not training [her] to retain the job." Id. at PageID 582. Robinson, in turn, allegedly informed MCDJFS human resources employee Deansai Myers about Plaintiff's complaints. Id. at PageID 583.

Ultimately, MCDJFS terminated Plaintiff's employment on February 3, 2017. Doc. 37-1 at PageI 629. On March 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed an employment discrimination charge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission ("OCRC") alleging discrimination on the basis of race/color and age. Doc. 38 at PageID 655.² Plaintiff also asserted retaliation and hostile work environment allegations in her charge. Id. The OCRC dismissed the charge by letter issued on September 28, 2017. Doc. 38 at PageID 656-57. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") issued a right to sue letter to Plaintiff on November 3, 2017. Doc. 38 at PageID 654. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), Plaintiff was required to file any Title VII claims asserted in her OCRC charge in a federal court within 90 days after receipt of the right to sue letter.

On February 1, 2018 -- i.e., 90 days after the date of the right to sue letter -- Plaintiff filed this action by seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"). Doc. 1. After Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP was granted and service issued, Defendants moved to dismiss the original complaint. In response, Plaintiff moved for leave to file an amended complaint. Docs. 12, 13, 20. Judge Ovington issued a Report and Recommendation on December 10, 2018 recommending, among other findings, that Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend be granted. Doc. 29. Judge Rice ultimately granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint and declared Defendants' motions to dismiss moot as a result. Doc. 33. Plaintiff filed her amended complaint on April 9, 2019 (doc. 34), which Defendants now move to dismiss. Docs. 37, 38.

III.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's amended complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for several reasons that the Court will address in turn.

A. Claims in the Original Complaint

Initially, there appears to be confusion regarding the claims presently before the Court in the amended complaint. Defendants suggest that the claims Plaintiff asserts in the original complaint -- namely a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") under Ohio law -- are no longer before the Court.³ See doc. 37 at PageID 607; doc. 38 at PageID 638. Plaintiff argues that she incorporated these claims from her original complaint into the amended complaint and, therefore, they survive the filing of her amended complaint. Doc. 42.

While a plaintiff may incorporate by reference his or her original complaint in an amended complaint, Brown v. Voorhies, No. 1:07-CV-463, 2009 WL 2730522, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 2009) ("Although in most circumstances the amended complaint supersedes the original...