Jones v. Montgomery Cnty.
| Decision Date | 05 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 1910,1910 |
| Parties | DION JONES v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND, ET AL. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
UNREPORTED
Opinion by Graeff, J.
*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.
This case arises from a complaint filed in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County by Dion Jones, appellant, alleging that he was injured by "John Doe," an unnamed corrections officer, while incarcerated in the Montgomery County Detention Center (the "Detention Center"). Montgomery County (the "County"), appellee, which operates the Detention Center, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of governmental immunity, which the circuit court granted. Mr. Jones then filed an amended complaint, substituting Corporal Deborah Hendricks for John Doe, and the court subsequently dismissed the amended complaint.
On appeal, Mr. Jones raises two questions for our review, which we have rephrased slightly as follows:
For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
On June 28, 2013, Mr. Jones filed a complaint, naming the County and John Doe as defendants. The complaint alleged that, on July 12, 2010, Mr. Jones was incarcerated in the Detention Center, a.k.a., the "Seven Locks Detention Center," which was operated and controlled by the County. While Mr. Jones was in transit to the cell area of the facility, he passed through a double door security system known as a "Sally Port." A "Sally Port" consists of two doors with a holding area between them. After the first door is opened, theinmate enters the holding area until the first door is closed. The guard on duty then opens the second door to allow the inmate to pass into the next area. The complaint alleged that John Doe, an officer employed by the County and the guard on duty, either deliberately or with reckless disregard for Mr. Jones' safety, activated the closure mechanism as Mr. Jones was passing through the second door, trapping Mr. Jones between the sliding door and the door jamb. As a result, Mr. Jones suffered injuries to his neck, shoulder, and back.
Count I alleged that John Doe injured Mr. Jones with actual malice. Count II alleged that John Doe breached a duty of care, causing Mr. Jones' injuries. Count III alleged that the County was vicariously liable for John Doe's actions.
On August 26, 2013, the County filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that it was entitled to governmental immunity on Counts I and II, with respect to Count III, liability pursuant to the theory of respondeat superior could not attach to it in the absence of an identified employee or agent causing Mr. Jones harm. The County further asserted that Mr. Jones could not amend the complaint to include a specific defendant employee because the statute of limitations had expired on July 12, 2013, and any amendment would not relate back.
On September 18, 2013, the circuit court granted the County's motion to dismiss and ordered that all claims against the County be dismissed with prejudice. The court did not address the complaint as it related to John Doe.
On November 5, 2013, Mr. Jones filed a First Amended Complaint, in which he again named the County as a defendant. He also substituted Corporal Hendricks for John Doe. The County moved to strike the amended complaint, asserting that the court hadalready dismissed all claims against it, and the amended complaint, which alleged the same facts as in the initial complaint, was not filed with leave of court to amend and was filed after the expiration of the limitations period.
On March 11, 2014, the court held a hearing. The court granted the County's motion to strike the amended complaint as to the County.
On March 31, 2014, Corporal Hendricks filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, asserting that Mr. Jones did not have standing to file an amended complaint after the County was dismissed as the only defendant. Corporal Hendricks further argued that Mr. Jones' claims were barred by the statute of limitations because he did not name Corporal Hendricks before the expiration of the limitations period, and the amended complaint, which added a new party, did not relate back to the original complaint.
On May 21, 2014, the circuit court held a hearing on Corporal Hendricks' motion to dismiss. The court and counsel agreed that, if Mr. Jones could show that Corporal Hendricks had knowledge of the lawsuit prior to the expiration of the limitations period, relation back would apply and the motion to dismiss should be denied. Thus, the court allowed a limited deposition of Corporal Hendricks to determine when she was aware of the lawsuit.
During her deposition, Corporal Hendricks testified that her first knowledge of the lawsuit came when she was served in March 2014. Following Corporal Hendricks' deposition, the court granted her motion to dismiss, with prejudice. This appeal followed.
Mr. Jones contends that the circuit court erred in granting the County's motion to dismiss the claims against it based on governmental immunity. He asserts that the "distinction between a governmental function," which shields a county from tort actions, and "a proprietary function," which does not, "is not an easy one to draw and may well be an evolving one." Mr. Jones concludes that, because the operation of a prison can be delegated to a private entity, it is not a governmental function, and therefore, the County does not have governmental immunity from suit in this case, and the circuit court erred in dismissing the case against the County on that ground.
The County contends that "the circuit court properly determined that the County is entitled to governmental immunity, because the operation of a detention center is a governmental function." Although it acknowledges the difficulty in distinguishing between governmental and proprietary functions it asserts that the focus in making that determination is on "'whether the act performed is for the common good of all or for the special benefit or profit of a corporate entity.'" Tadjer v. Montgomery County, 300 Md. 539, 547 (1984)). Applying that focus, the County argues that the operation of a detention center is a governmental function because protecting the community from criminal acts benefits the community as a whole. It asserts that "the ability of a local government to use contractors to perform some services does not transform the operation of a detention center into a proprietary function," as long as the private facility performs ministerial tasks andthe County maintains its discretionary authority. Based on the applicable factors, the County contends that the circuit court properly determined that the operation of a detention center is a governmental function, and the County was entitled to dismissal from suit based on governmental immunity.
This Court has explained the standard of review of a trial court's order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted:
Advance Telecom Process LLC v. DSFederal, Inc., 224 Md. App. 164, 173-74 (2015).
Here, as the parties note, the issue whether governmental immunity from a tort action exists depends on whether the County was performing a governmental function, in which case it has immunity, or a proprietary function, in which case it does not have immunity. As this Court recently explained:
Under Maryland common law, a local government is immune from tort liability when it functions in a "governmental" capacity, but it enjoys nosuch immunity when it is engaged in activities that are "proprietary" or "private" in nature. See Mitchell v. Hous. Auth. of Baltimore City, 200 Md. App. 176, 186 (2011). "'[T]here is no universally accepted or all-inclusive test to determine whether a given act of a municipality is private or governmental in its nature, but the question is usually determined by the public policy recognized in the jurisdiction where it arises.'" Rios v. Montgomery Cnty., 386 Md. 104, 128 (2005) (quoting Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Blueford, 173 Md. 267, 275-76 (1937)). Guidelines from the Court of Appeals establish that the activity of a local government is considered governmental in nature "'[w]here the act in question...
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