Jones v. Muniz, 16-cv-8080 (JGK)

• Decision Date: 21 November 2018
• Docket Number: 16-cv-8080 (JGK)
• Parties: Matthew JONES, Plaintiff, v. Police Officer Adam MUNIZ et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

349 F.Supp.3d 377

Matthew JONES, Plaintiff,

v.Police Officer Adam MUNIZ et al., Defendants.

16-cv-8080 (JGK)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed November 21, 2018

David A. Zelman, The Law Office of Alexis G. Padilla, Brooklyn, NY, for Plaintiff

Ashley Rebecca Garman, New York City Department of Corrections, East Elmhurst, NY, Melanie Mary Speight, New York City Law Department, New York, NY, for Defendants

OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge:

A jury found the defendant,¹ Christopher Treubig, a Lieutenant² with the New York City Police Department, liable for using excessive force against the plaintiff, Matthew Jones, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendant used a taser twice, for a total of ten seconds, against the plaintiff in the course of arresting the plaintiff. While the jury found that the plaintiff suffered no compensatory damages, it awarded punitive damages against the defendant. The defendant now moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 for judgment as a matter of law on qualified immunity grounds. For the reasons below, the defendant's motion is granted.

I.

A.

The plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Lt. Treubig and other officers deprived him of his right under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to be free from excessive force. The case was tried to a jury from May 21, 2018, to May 24, 2018. The jury found Lt. Treubig liable to the plaintiff for having used excessive force. The jury awarded nominal damages of $0.25, no compensatory damages, and punitive damages of $30,000. The following facts are established by the trial record and are consistent with the jury verdict.

On April 7, 2015, Officers Vaccaro and Muniz conducted a vertical patrol³ of a building known as the AK Houses, which is located at 112 East 128th Street in New York City. Tr. 205. The officers understood the building to be a "drug prone location." Tr. 159. The officers heard the plaintiff and another individual speaking in a stairwell on the seventh floor. When the officers approached the plaintiff, Officer Muniz saw that the plaintiff was holding a sum of money and a pill bottle. Tr. 181. The officers suspected that the individuals were engaged in a drug transaction. Tr. 134, 182.

The officers moved the individuals into a narrow hallway and Officer Vaccaro frisked the plaintiff. During the frisk, Officer Vaccaro recovered a bottle of Oxycodone from the plaintiff. Tr. 161, 185. Officer Vaccaro then attempted to place the plaintiff under arrest. Tr. 162. The other individual fled into the stairwell. Tr. 140, 210.

When Officer Vaccaro told the plaintiff that the plaintiff was under arrest, Officer Vaccaro was able to handcuff only the plaintiff's right wrist. Tr. 135. The plaintiff refused to give up his left arm. At that point, the plaintiff and the officers got into a physical altercation. Tr. 135. The plaintiff testified that he is not sure how it happened, but that both the plaintiff and Officer Vaccaro "ended up on the floor," and Officer Muniz also fell to the ground. Tr. 53-55, 211. Once on the floor, the plaintiff tucked both arms under his body, which made his arms inaccessible to the officers. Tr. 228. The officers repeatedly told the plaintiff to give them his left arm. The plaintiff resisted the officer's efforts and was able to keep his left arm tucked under his body. Tr. 55-56, 211. Officer Muniz then used his asp⁴ in an unsuccessful attempt to lever the plaintiff's left arm out from under the plaintiff's body. Tr. 196, 214-15.

Officer Vaccaro then radioed for backup. Tr. 141. Undercover Officer 349 and her partner arrived first. The officers used their asps and pepper spray in further attempts to gain control of the plaintiff's left arm.⁵ The officers repeatedly told the plaintiff to "stop resisting" arrest. Tr. 147. Despite the officers' use of asps and pepper spray, the plaintiff was able to keep his left arm tucked underneath his body. Tr. 232-33.

The defendant, Lt. Treubig, and his partner arrived on the scene while the other officers continued to struggle to handcuff the plaintiff. Tr. 148, 197. The defendant could see that the plaintiff was resisting arrest, and that in addition to telling the plaintiff to give up his arm, the other officers were using various tactics to handcuff the plaintiff. Tr. 258. The defendant could also see that the plaintiff was a very large person,⁶ and that the other officers were likely exhausted from their attempts to handcuff the plaintiff. Tr. 259.

The defendant instructed the plaintiff to put his arms behind his back. The plaintiff did not comply with the defendant's instruction. Tr. 149-50. Because of his observations of the plaintiff's resistance to arrest and the struggle between the plaintiff and the other officers, the defendant believed that it would be reasonable to use a taser. Tr. 259, 276-277. The defendant warned the plaintiff that if the plaintiff did not give the officers his arm, the defendant would discharge his taser. Tr. 198, 234, 259. The plaintiff continued to resist arrest and responded by stating, "I'm not going to jail." Tr. 145, 198, 259. The defendant then deployed his taser, hitting the plaintiff in the back. Tr. 201.

The parties agree that despite being tased, the plaintiff was not incapacitated. The taser did not stabilize the plaintiff enough for the officers to be able to grab his hands. Tr. 262. The plaintiff continued to try to pull his right arm away from the officers and under his body after the first taser cycle. Tr. 154. The plaintiff maintained control of his arms and began pushing himself off the ground. The defendant reassessed the situation and believed that the plaintiff was still resisting arrest. Tr. 262. The defendant then recycled the taser.⁷ Tr. 154. The defendant believed that it was necessary to recycle the taser to get the plaintiff into handcuffs. Tr. 262. Each taser cycle lasted for five seconds, and the time between the first and second taser cycles unfolded so rapidly that it was not clear to everyone on the scene that the plaintiff had been tased twice.⁸ Tr. 262.

After the second taser cycle, the officers were able to complete handcuffing the plaintiff. Tr. 172-73, 202, 263. Because of the plaintiff's large size, the officers had to use two pairs of handcuffs to handcuff the plaintiff. Tr. 173. Lt. Treubig called an ambulance to take the plaintiff to a hospital to have the taser's metal probes removed from the plaintiff's back. Tr. 218, 277. The plaintiff walked down the stairs to the ambulance. Tr. 218.

The time that elapsed from Officer Vaccaro's request for backup until the defendant called for an ambulance was only three minutes. Tr. 278.

B.

At the close of evidence at trial, the defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law on qualified immunity grounds. The Court reserved decision on the defendants' motion and submitted the case to the jury. The jury returned its verdict on May 23, 2018, finding that the plaintiff had not proved his excessive force claims against any defendant other than Lt. Treubig. The jury awarded nominal damages of $0.25 and punitive damages of $30,000.⁹ The jury did not award any compensatory damages.

Following the jury verdict, the parties sought to clarify the factual record in order for the Court to determine as a matter of law whether Lt. Treubig is entitled to qualified immunity. Tr. 419-28. The parties stipulated that Lt. Treubig did not use any force other than his use of the taser against the plaintiff and that the plaintiff was pushing off the ground at the time Lt. Treubig used the taser. Tr. 421-22. The defendants then requested that a series of questions be posed to the jury to resolve factual issues regarding Lt. Treubig's use of the taser against the plaintiff. On May 24, 2018, the jury answered a series of special interrogatories as follows:

1. Did Lieutenant Treubig say he would use the taser before he used it? A: Yes.

2. Was a second taser cycle needed to gain control of the plaintiff's arms? A: No.

3. Did Lieutenant Treubig believe that a second taser cycle was needed to gain control of the plaintiff's arms? A: Yes.

4. Was the plaintiff resisting arrest when Lieutenant Treubig used the taser the first time? A: Yes.

5. Did Lieutenant Treubig believe that the plaintiff was resisting arrest when Lieutenant Treubig used the taser the first time? A: Yes.

6. Was the plaintiff resisting arrest when Lieutenant Treubig used the taser the second time? A: No.

7. Did Lieutenant Treubig believe that the plaintiff was resisting arrest when Lieutenant Treubig used the taser the second time? A: Yes.

May 24, 2018, Tr. 18-19. In short, the jury found that the plaintiff was resisting arrest when the defendant first used the taser, that the defendant warned the plaintiff before using the taser, and that the defendant believed that a second taser cycle was needed to gain control of the plaintiff's arms. However, the jury also found that a second taser cycle was not in fact necessary to gain control of the plaintiff's arms, and that even though the defendant believed the plaintiff was resisting arrest when he used the taser a second time, the plaintiff was not actually resisting arrest at that time.

When, as here, "the [C]ourt does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law" made during trial and submits the case to the jury, "the movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law ... no later than 28 days after the jury [is] discharged." Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). The defendant timely renewed his motion for judgment as a matter of law on qualified immunity grounds.

II.

A.

"Qualified immunity balances two important interests -- the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). Qualified...