Jones v. New Mexico State Racing Com'n
| Decision Date | 10 November 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 14708,14708 |
| Citation | 1983 NMSC 89,100 N.M. 434,671 P.2d 1145 |
| Parties | A. Dirk JONES, R.C. Jones, R.D. Hay and Jackie Wallace, Petitioners-Appellants, v. NEW MEXICO STATE RACING COMMISSION and Board of Stewards, Respondents-Appellees, Dee Hubbard and Robert (Bob) Walters, Respondents. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
This appeal is taken from the judgment of the district court affirming a decision of the New Mexico State Racing Commission (the Commission). This matter was heard by the district court pursuant to a writ of certiorari issued to the Commission commanding that the record of the proceeding before the Commission be submitted for judicial review.
We affirm the district court.
In the district court proceedings, the appellants contested the decision of the Racing Commission disqualifying their horse as the winner of the 1982 World's Championship Quarter Horse Classic horse race. The disqualification was due to an infraction occurring during the running of this race on Sunday, August 1, 1982, at Ruidoso Downs Race Track.
We discuss the following issues:
(1) Whether the proceedings before the Commission deprived the appellants of due process because they were given inadequate notice;
(2) Whether the proceedings before the Commission deprived the appellants of due process because the hearing board was not impartial; and
(3) Whether the decision of the Commission was supported by substantial evidence and therefore not arbitrary and capricious.
Notice. Appellants contend that they were not advised of the specific regulation of the Racing Commission warranting the disqualification of their horse, Rule The Deck, by the Board of Stewards (Stewards) of Ruidoso Downs Race Track who officiated the race in question. Appellants further argue that at the hearing on this matter, the refusal of the Racing Commissioner to specify, at the beginning of the hearing, a particular regulation governing the disqualification of Rule The Deck, prevented the appellants from preparing a "defense" for presentation to the Commission.
The record reveals, however, that appellants' claim is not supported by any factual showing of prejudice, nor is any authority cited which would require a greater degree of specificity with respect to the notice given than that which was provided to appellants. It is well settled that the fundamental requirements of due process in an administrative context are "reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard and present any claim or defense." McCoy v. New Mexico Real Estate Commission, 94 N.M. 602, 604, 614 P.2d 14, 16 (1980).
In the present case, appellants were in receipt of Stewards Ruling No. 184, dated August 4, 1982, which reflected the "post to finish" call by the Stewards with respect to the disqualification of Rule The Deck. Pursuant to Rule 42.05 of the Rules Governing Horse Racing in New Mexico, appellants next requested and were provided specification of the general grounds on which the Stewards' ruling was based. Specification of the general grounds for the ruling of the Board of Stewards was provided to the appellants by letter directed to the Executive Secretary of the Commission, dated August 11, 1982. In pertinent part, it states:
Approximately 75 yards out of the gate, the # 5 horse, Rule The Deck ducked in from right hand whipping, bumping the # 2 horse, Denim N Diamonds.
As a result, we the Board of Stewards ruled that for interference and causing the # 2 horse, Denim N Diamonds from being able to run her true race, we disqualified the # 5 horse, Rule The Deck and placed her 3rd.
We find the explanation given to the appellants in this case clearly satisfied the requirements of Rule 42.05, which requires that an aggrieved party, upon request, be furnished with a "specification of the general grounds on which the order, rule, decision, penalty or ruling is based." Rules Governing Horse Racing in New Mexico, Rule 42.05 (ed. 1981).
With respect to notice, in order to afford a party procedural due process, a reasonable identification of the issue to be considered in the administrative proceedings is required. See, e.g., McCoy; In re Buck's License, 192 Or. 66, 232 P.2d 791 (1951); Nolan v. Wisconsin Real Estate Brokers' Board, 3 Wis.2d 510, 89 N.W.2d 317 (1958). We find that the requirements of due process with respect to notice were satisfied in the present case. The appellants' claim of denial of due process with respect to notice and their ability to present their case before the Commission is therefore without merit.
Impartial Hearing. Appellants argue that the Racing Commission failed to afford them an impartial hearing because "four of the five commissioners believed their primary function was to uphold the stewards."
This Court has long recognized, as mandated by the Constitution, that a state cannot deprive any individual of personal or property rights except after a fair and impartial hearing. See In re Miller, 88 N.M. 492, 542 P.2d 1182,cert. denied, 89 N.M. 5, 546 P.2d 70 (1975). In Reid v. New Mexico Board of Examiners in Optometry, 92 N.M. 414, 416, 589 P.2d 198, 200 (1979), this Court stated:
At a minimum, a fair and impartial tribunal requires that the trier of fact be disinterested and free from any form of bias or predisposition regarding the outcome of the case.
It is also well settled that these principles apply to administrative proceedings. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975); Reid; In re Miller.
Contrary to the contentions of the appellants, the record in this case does not contain evidence of any commissioner expressing an opinion that his duty, or that the Commission's duty is to uphold the Board of Stewards. The appellants therefore failed to overcome the "presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as [administrative] adjudicators." Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47, 95 S.Ct. at 1464. Moreover, the record reflects the Commission's understanding that its purpose was to consider appellants' challenge to the ruling of the Board of Stewards and to render an independent judgment based on the evidence presented.
As an additional ground for the claimed bias of the Commission, appellants argue that counsel for the Commission acted as its legal adviser and prosecuted this case for the Stewards thereby affecting the Commission's ability to be impartial. Citing Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. v. New Mexico Environmental Improvement Board, 97 N.M. 88, 637 P.2d 38 (Ct.App.), cert. quashed, 97...
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