Jones v. New York Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 December 1896
• Docket Number: 710
• Citation: 14 Utah 215,47 P. 74
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: RICY H. JONES, APPELLANT, v. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO., RESPONDENT

47 P. 74

14 Utah 215

RICY H. JONES, APPELLANT, v. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO., RESPONDENT

No. 710

Supreme Court of Utah

December 11, 1896

Appeal from the First judicial district court. Hon. C. H. Hart Judge.

Action by Ricy H. Jones against the New York Life Insurance Company. From various orders, and from judgment plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. This was the second appeal of this case. It was before the territorial supreme court at the June term of 1895. The opinion of the court is found in 11 Utah 401. The final order in this cause was made on the 4th day of March 1895.

The facts are recited in the opinion rendered by the supreme court of the territory. A long time after the opinion was rendered by the supreme court, the plaintiff made a motion to vacate the final order of the court, and have a new trial. This motion was filed and served February 3, 1896. Appellant appeals from the order entered March 4, 1895, dismissing this defendant from further liability. He also claims to have appealed from the order of the court entered February 21 1896, denying his motion to vacate and set aside the judgment and grant a new trial.

Affirmed.

John M. Zane, for appellant.

By a final judgment, it is to be understood, not a final determination of the rights of the parties in the subject matter of litigation, but merely of the particular suit." Syllabus in Belt v. Davis, 1 Cal., page 135, citing 13 cases. Enc. Pl. and Practice, vol. 2, p. 53-4, note 3.

A judgment on interpleader is final and appealable, before the determination of the main suit. 2 Enc. of Pl. and Practice, p. 74, note Interpleader; Weisenecker v. Kepler, 7 Mo. 52; Smith v. Sterret, 24 Mo. 260; Hutchinson v. McLaughlin, 15 Colo. 493.

The company denied their liability for interest. In support of the fundamental propositions, that there can be no interpleader when the "party liable" "has incurred an independent obligation," or "if not ignorant of the rights of either claimant," or has acknowledged the title of either, or is in collusion with either, or "admits liability for principal but denies interest." The following cases are cited; Phister v. Wade, 56 Cal. 46; Story Eq. Pl. p. 281; 35 Am. Dec. 708, n. 3; Pom. Rem. 2 Ed. p. 461; Budesburg Mfg. Co. App., 106 Pa. St. 275.

That the answer was sham and irrelevant; good in form, false in fact, and not pleaded in good faith, and should have been stricken out and judgment given plaintiff, see Sec. 323, p. 250 Code; Gorstorfs Toofe, 18 Cal. 386; Goldstein v. Krause, 13 P. 232; Felch v. Beaudrey, 40 Cal. 439; Humme v. Hays, 55 Cal. 337; Loveland v. Gomer, 74 Cal. 298; City et al. v. Straude et al., 28 P. 778.

The following cases are cited to show the plaintiff's absolute rights, not only against the company but against the whole world: Ashley v. Ashley, 3 Sim. 149; St. John v. Am. Nat. Life Ins. Co., 12 N.Y. 3; Clark v. Allen, 23 Am. Rep. 498; Rittler v. Smith, 2 L. R. A. 845; Page v. Burnstuce, 3 McArthur (U.S.) 194; Henick v. Butler, 9 West. Rep. 845; Ray on Contractual Limitations.

Frank Pierce, for respondent.

ZANE, C. J. BARTCH and MINER, JJ., concur.

OPINION

ZANE, C. J.:

The plaintiff brought this action upon an insurance policy executed by the defendant on the life of the late Lewis H Jones, to recover $ 1,500 and interest, and he alleged that the policy had been-assigned to him by the insured shortly before his death. The defendant filed a pleading designated an answer and interpleader duly verified. The answer admitted the material allegations of the complaint, except that it denied the assignment, and defendant's liability for interest and costs. It alleged by way of interpleader that one B. H. Jones claimed to be administrator of the estate of Lewis H. Jones, and that he claimed as such administrator the money due on the policy; that plaintiff also claimed the money; and that defendant was ignorant of the rights of the respective claimants, and denied collusion with either of them, and offered to bring the money into court, and deliver it to such person as the court might designate; and upon such delivery the defendant asked the court to discharge it from liability. The plaintiff moved the court to strike out the answer on the ground that it was sham and irrelevant, and for judgment for plaintiff, and for such other order as might be just, and for costs, and cited the defendant into court. The court fixed the 4th day of March, 1895, for the hearing. On that day the parties appeared, and the court, after reciting the cause came on regularly for hearing upon the motion of the plaintiff to strike out the answer from the files, and for judgment on the pleadings; that defendant's answer was duly verified, and was sufficient in law; ordered the same treated as an affidavit; and found, further, that B. H. Jones, as administrator of the estate of Lewis H. Jones, claimed the money sued for; and that the plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of the deceased, also claimed it; and that such claims were without collusion; and that defendant asked that such claimants be substituted, and that the case was a proper one for substitution. The court denied the motion for judgment on the pleadings, and ordered further that B. H. Jones, as administrator of the estate of L. H. Jones, and Ricy H. Jones, as administrator of the same estate, be substituted as parties defendants, and that defendant, the insurance company, on depositing with the clerk of the court $ 1,555 principal, and the interest thereon and costs to date, within ten days, should be dismissed from the case, and discharged from further liability. The denial in the answer of liability for interest and costs was waived by de...