Jones v. Nixon

• Decision Date: 15 March 1899
• Citation: 50 S.W. 740,102 Tenn. 95
• Parties: JONES et al. v. NIXON et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

50 S.W. 740

102 Tenn. 95

JONES et al. v. NIXON et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

March 15, 1899

Appeal from chancery court, Hickman county; A. J. Abernathey Chancellor.

Bill by S. G. Jones and others against Henry Nixon and others to prevent a cloud on the title of vendees in possession. There was a decree for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Bates & Clagette, Nixon & Knight, and James C. Bradford, for appellants.

John A Pitts and M. H. Meeks, for appellees.

CALDWELL J.

This cause comes up on bill and demurrer. For the purposes of this opinion, but one branch of the case need be stated, and as to that the statement will be brief, and in such form only as will be necessary to present the legal questions to be decided. Complainant S. G. Jones alleges that he was the true and unquestioned owner, in fee, of 1,600 acres of land in Hickman county; that he sold that land in parcels to different persons years ago, by absolute deeds, with full covenants of warranty, and put his vendees in possession that they have since been, and now are, in quiet, open notorious, and adverse possession of their respective portions of said land, as unconditional owners thereof, but that recently, by some mistake or oversight, without pleading, process, or jurisdiction in respect thereto, the said land has been sold under decree of the chancery court, as a part of the assets of the estate of O. A. Nixon, deceased, to whom no part of it ever belonged; that the defendant Henry Nixon became the purchaser at that sale of the whole 1,600 acres for the small sum of $130, and will soon have his purchase confirmed by the court, and a cloud thereby cast upon the title of complainant's vendees, unless he shall be prevented therefrom by appropriate decree in this cause. Demurrants deny that complainant shows such interest in the land as will entitle him to the relief sought. The chancellor and the court of chancery appeals, successively, overruled the demurrer, and the defendants have appealed the second time.

The bill, in its essence, is one brought by the rightful vendor of land and warrantor of its title to prevent a cloud upon the title of his vendees in possession. Can such a bill be maintained by such a person, he being without either title or possession? In some important particulars, a close kinship exists between what are known in the books as "bills of peace" and bills quia timet, and in others there is a wide difference between them. The points of similarity and dissimilarity will not be dwelt upon here, however, since the present bill is so plainly and exclusively of the latter kind. In case of Holland v. Challen, Mr. Justice Miller said: "A bill quia timet, or to remove a cloud upon the title of real estate, differed from a bill of peace, in that it did not seek so much to put an end to vexatious litigation respecting the property as to prevent future litigation by removing existing causes of controversy as to its title. It was brought in view of anticipated wrongs and mischiefs, and the jurisdiction of the court was invoked because the party feared injury to his rights and interests." 110 U.S. 20, 3 S.Ct. 497. Judge Story says bills quia timet "are in the nature of writs of prevention, to accomplish the ends of precautionary justice. They are, ordinarily, applied to prevent wrongs or anticipated mischiefs, and not merely to redress them when done. The party seeks the aid of a court of equity, because he fears (quia timet) some future probable injury to his rights and interests, and not because an injury has already occurred which requires any compensation or other relief." 2 Story Eq. Jur. § 826. It is through bills of this kind, then, that clouds are removed from title to real estate. 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1398; Holland v. Challen, 110 U.S. 16, 3 S.Ct. 495; Hayward v. Dimsdale, 17 Ves. 111; Almony v. Hicks, 3 Head, 39; Anderson v. Talbot, 1 Heisk. 408. Strictly speaking, the present bill is not brought to remove a cloud from title, but it is intended, rather, to prevent the consummation of a proceeding that would, unhindered, result in obscuring that title. The difference is not one of controlling importance, however, for the jurisdiction of courts of equity to grant the desired relief is as well established in the one case as in the other, and the principles authorizing the prevention of clouds are, generally, the same as those applied in removing clouds. Pettit v. Shepherd, 5 Paige, 492; Sanders v. Village of Yonkers, 63 N.Y. 489; Lyon v. Alley, 130 U.S. 177, 9 S.Ct. 480; O'Hare v. Downing, 130 Mass. 16; Shattuck v. Carson, 2 Cal. 588; Groves v. Webber, 72 Ill. 606; Norton v. Beaver, 5 Ohio, 178; Merriman v. Polk, 5 Heisk. 717. In the last four of those cases, the bill was filed, as in this instance, to prevent the completion of a judicial sale, which, if consummated, would cast a cloud upon the title of the complainant. The courts have been wide apart in their opinions and decisions in relation to the character of the instruments that may be canceled in equity as clouds upon title. Some have maintained the view that such deeds, contracts, and proceedings as appear upon their face to be void in law are not in fact clouds, and hence should not be interfered with by a court of equity, but left for judgment at law, and that equitable relief should be granted as to such instruments only as appear upon their face to be valid in law, and are shown by extrinsic evidence to be invalid. Others have thought and held that equitable relief was warranted alike in each class of cases, and that it should be granted with equal certainty, whether the basis of the challenged claim of the adverse party was absolutely void, or only voidable. This court is one of those that has spoken in favor of the latter view. Jones v. Perry, 10 Yerg. 59, 83; Almony v. Hicks, 3 Head, 41; Porter v. Jones, 6 Cold. 316. Chancellor Kent thought "the weight of authority and the reason of the thing," both, "in favor of the jurisdiction of the...