Jones v. Pacific Dredging Co.

Decision Date12 June 1903
Citation72 P. 956,9 Idaho 186
PartiesJONES v. PACIFIC DREDGING COMPANY
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

ACTION TO QUIET TITLE-APPLICATION FOR PATENT-ADVERSE CLAIM-SUIT IN SUPPORT THEREOF-SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT.

1. Jones and others, plaintiffs, commenced an action against the Pacific Dredging Company, a corporation, and one McNutt, to quiet their possession and title to certain placer mining ground. During the pending of the action the Pacific Dredging Company made application for a United States patent to said ground, and in opposition to such application Jones and others filed an adverse claim in the proper United States land office, and also filed a supplemental complaint in this action which showed the relationship of this suit to said application for patent and adverse claim. Held, that this suit may stand as a suit brought under the provisions of section 2326, Revised Statutes of the United States, in support of said adverse claim.

2. The following allegation held to be a sufficient allegation of the incorporation of defendant under the facts of this case to wit: "That the defendant, the Pacific Dredging Company, is a corporation, organized and existing by virtue of the law and doing business in Lemhi county."

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from District Court of Lemhi County. Honorable J. C. Rich Judge.

Action to quiet possession and title to certain placer mining ground. Judgment for plaintiffs. Affirmed.

Affirmed and costs of this appeal awarded to the respondents.

Redwine & Boyd, for Appellants.

The court erred in allowing the supplemental complaint to be filed for the reasons: (a) It does not state a cause of action; (b) It appears from same that the time had expired in which it could be filed; (c) No connection is shown between the supplemental and original complaint. The demurrers raise the same legal question, in addition, that of ambiguity and uncertainty. For this reason, the same argument applies to both errors of law relied upon. The original and supplemental complaint together, do not state a cause of action, in that there is no allegation that the Pacific Dredging Company is a corporation. The first allegation of the original complaint attempts to allege the incorporation, but it is insufficient in that it does not name the state in which the company is a corporation. (5 Ency. of Pl. & Pr. 75; 6 Thompson on Corporations, sec. 7661.) The allegation that it is a corporation is insufficient. Under the requirements of our laws the plaintiffs had only to examine the records to inform themselves of all the necessary facts. Without a statement of this nature in the complaint nothing might appear to show that any company sued was a corporation. In those states where it is held necessary to allege incorporation in all instances, the same particularity of pleading is required in actions against as in actions by corporations. It cannot be contended seriously that the allegation in paragraph 1 would be sufficient if a corporation was the plaintiff. The judgment cannot stand. (Miller v. Pine Min. Co., 3 Idaho 493 (2 Idaho 1206), 31 P. 803, and cases there cited.) So far as the statement in the complaint shows, the Pacific Dredging Company might be a foreign or domestic corporation or it might be a municipal corporation, the manner of service of summons upon each of which would be different. The allegation that the company was doing business as a corporation in Lemhi county, Idaho would not be a sufficient allegation of incorporation to sustain a complaint. (Brock et al. v. Northwestern Fuel Co., 130 U.S. 341, 9 S.Ct. 552, 32 L.Ed. 905.) If an action was pending between the parties for the property involved in the adverse proceedings, a supplemental complaint was unnecessary and should certainly not be allowed, unless same was filed within the time prescribed by law. (U.S. Rev. Stats., sec. 2326.) The supplemental complaint sets up an entirely new cause of action. The original action was an equitable action brought to quiet title, while the supplemental complaint alleges facts tending to show that the Pacific Dredging Company alone entered upon the premises and claimed rights under a location made. A new action would lie upon the facts alleged in the supplemental complaint, and for this reason the filing of it was error. (21 Ency. of Pl. & Pr. 22.)

R. P. Quarles and G. B. Quarles, for Respondent.

The court did not err in permitting the plaintiffs and respondents to file their supplemental complaint. Nothing in addition to what was alleged in the original complaint was alleged therein, except the doings of the defendants and appellants and what they had caused the plaintiffs and respondents to do after the filing of the original complaint, namely, the application of the defendant and appellant corporation, and the filing by plaintiffs and respondents of their adverse claim in the land office. (In re Northwestern Lode etc. Co., 8 L. D. 437, Secretary Chandler to Commissioner Stockslager, at page 438.) "While the proceedings in court were not initiated under section 2326 of the Revised Statutes, there was pending at the time application was made to enter the Northwestern Lode an action before the same tribunal for the same purpose as the action contemplated in said section; therefore it was not necessary for the adverse claimant to commence another action within thirty days after filing his affidavit, and the local officers should have suspended the proceedings in accordance with the spirit of said section, pending the decision of the court. The method pointed out in said section is not necessary to give the state court jurisdiction; and if the original locators preferred to commence action at once without waiting until the other party made application for patent they had a right to do so." (Morrison on Mining Rights, 10th ed., p. 424; 8 L. D. 437; 29 L. D. 194; Axion Co. v. Little, 6 S. Dak. 438, 61 N.W. 441.) The court correctly overruled the demurrer to the original complaint, and also the demurrer to the supplemental complaint. The only reason appellant's counsel assigns tending to show that the court erred in overruling the two demurrers is, that there was not, in his judgment, a sufficient allegation of incorporation of the defendant, Pacific Dredging Company. The Encyclopedia of Pleading and Practice, volume 5, page 75, does not bear out counsel's contention. Said authority holds it to be sufficient to allege the legal conclusion that the defendant is a corporation, and the same authority, paragraph 2. holds that it is not necessary to set forth the act by which the corporation was created, nor to allege whether such act was public or private, nor how, where, or for what purpose defendant was incorporated. (6 Thompson on Corporations, sec. 7661.)

SULLIVAN, C. J. Stockslager and Ailshie, JJ., concur.

OPINION

SULLIVAN, C. J.

This action was originally brought on July 17, 1901, to quiet the title to certain placer mining ground. The defendant McNutt filed his answer disclaiming any interest whatever in said mining ground. The appellant corporation filed a general demurrer to the complaint, which was overruled by the court. The cause was thereafter removed to the circuit court of the United States, and was thereafter remanded to the state court where the action was commenced.

On May 8, 1902, a supplemental complaint was filed to which a general and special demurrer were filed, both of which were overruled by the court. The defendant corporation refused to plead further, and the cause was heard upon the evidence introduced by plaintiffs, and judgment was entered in their favor as prayed for in the supplemental complaint.

Two errors are assigned; the first of which is the court erred in permitting the plaintiffs to file their supplemental complaint, and the second is the court erred in overruling the demurrers to the original and supplemental complaint.

The facts are substantially as follows: The respondents brought this action to quiet the title to certain placer mining claims on the seventeenth day of July, 1901. On October 8 1901, the defendant McNutt filed his disclaimer. On October 10, 1901, the trial court made an order removing this case to the United States circuit court on the petition of the appellant corporation. On the sixteenth day of April, 1902, said circuit court remanded the case back to the state court. Thereafter the court overruled the demurrer to the complaint. On May 8, 1902, the respondents by...

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