Jones v. Packel

• Decision Date: 01 August 1975
• Citation: 342 A.2d 434,20 Pa.Cmwlth. 606
• Parties: Hayden C. JONES, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Israel PACKEL et al., Defendants.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

342 A.2d 434

20 Pa.Cmwlth. 606

Hayden C. JONES, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Israel PACKEL et al., Defendants.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

August 1, 1975

Argued June 2, 1975. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Frank Adam Woelfling, Frank P. Lawley, Jr. Department of the Auditor General, Harrisburg, for defendant Casey.

Allen C. Warshaw, Lawrence Silver, Dept. of Justice, Harrisburg for defendant Packel and Sloan.

A. Richard Gerber, Norristown, for codefendant.

H. David Spirt, Ambler, for plaintiff.

Before BOWMAN, President Judge, and CRUMLISH, Jr., KRAMER, WILKINSON, MENCER, ROGERS and BLATT, JJ.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

On June 8 1949, plaintiff, Hayden C. Jones, Jr., was convicted on numerous bills of indictment, and sentenced to a term of fifteen to thirty years. Nineteen years subsequent to his incarceration, plaintiff petitioned for post-conviction relief. The same was granted and plaintiff obtained his release from prison; the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County having found that plaintiff's conviction had resulted, at least in part, from perjered testimony.

On June 18, 1974, plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court, naming therein as defendants, the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, the Auditor General and Treasurer of the Commonwealth, as the 'Board of Claims,' and eleven members of the General Assembly. All of the named defendants responded by preliminary objections, essentially in the forms of demurrers, the dispositions of which are the subject of this opinion.

By this action, plaintiff seeks money damages arising from an alleged cause of action in tort, which cause of action may be most appropriately described as one for false imprisonment. In the alternative, plaintiff requests relief in mandamus and/or equity, which, if granted, is intended to ultimately provide plaintiff with financial compensation.

In seeking a monetary verdict against defendants, plaintiff recognizes the bar presented by the principle of sovereign immunity. ^[1] Plaintiff perceives two routes to overcome the barrier it represents, one direct, the other ambiguous.

First, plaintiff requests this Court to strike down sovereign immunity from the body of Pennsylvania law. Even assuming we were so disposed, we have repeatedly held that, as an inferior appellate court, we are bound by pronouncements of our Supreme Court. ^[2] The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the vitality of sovereign immunity, and has determined that the discretion to effectuate change in this area lies not with the judiciary, but with the legislature. See Brown, supra note 1, and Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 454 Pa. 179, 301 A.2d 849 (1973).

Article I, Section 11, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, P.S., in part reads:

'Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth In such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct.' (Emphasis added.)

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that, on several occasions, the legislature has allocated funds from the State Treasury to compensate individuals who had suffered the same injustice as that suffered by plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that these 'precedents' fashioned a permanent legislative waiver of sovereign immunity, as contemplated by the Constitution, in actions for false imprisonment pursued against the Commonwealth. We disagree. The Constitution and the Supreme Court's interpretation thereof demand, for purposes of such a waiver, explicit legislative recognition of the right to sue the Commonwealth in such causes of action as specified and delineath of the procedures to be followed in the prosecution of such causes of action. While plaintiff's allegation of prior legislative practice may be factually accurate, it fails to support a conclusion that the legislature 'by law' has consented to suits in false imprisonment against the sovereign. Alleged prior incidents of compensation merely reflect self-initiated legislative actions to correct what the members of a particular session of the General Assembly viewed as isolated instances of injustice; the General Assembly neither recognized a justiciable cause of action nor a court and manner in which to prosecute it. Thus, the demurrer as to plaintiff's claim in false imprisonment must be sustained.

Alternately, plaintiff would have us direct the various defendants to fulfill what plaintiff regards as their respective and clearly mandated duties, the performance of which arose upon defendants' receipt of notice of the facts supporting plaintiff's claim.

'(M)andamus is an extraordinary writ which lies to compel the performance of a ministerial act or a mandatory duty where there is a clear legal right in the plaintiff, a corresponding duty in the defendant, and a want of any other appropriate and adequate remedy.' ^[3]

Plaintiff asserts that the conditions precedent to the maintenance of an action in mandamus exist with respect to the Attorney General, the Auditor General and the Treasurer, as the 'Board of Claims,' and the eleven members of the General Assembly named as defendants herein.

The Attorney General, as head of the Department of Justice, is under a statutory duty '(a) (t)o investigate any violations, or alleged violations, of the laws of the Commonwealth which may come to its (the Department's) notice.' ^[4] In addition, section 905 of The Administrative Code, 71 P.S. § 295, imposes upon the Attorney General the duty 'to prepare, for submission to the General Assembly, from time to time, such revisions and codifications of the laws of this Commonwealth . . . As may be deemed advisable.' (Emphasis added.)

Applying section 904 to the facts here alleged, we can find no 'mandatory duty' upon the Attorney General to act on plaintiff's behalf. While section 904, on its face, appears to allow the Attorney General no discretion in his decision to 'investigate any violations . . . of the laws of the Commonwealth,' it imposes no investigative duty whatsoever where injustices are Not violative of the Commonwealth's laws. Under the current status of the law, the Commonwealth's allegedly wrongful incarceration of plaintiff, though abjectly distasteful, offers plaintiff no cognizable relief.

For a different reason, section 905 also provides plaintiff no solace. The duties set forth in that section are fully discretionary in nature ('as may be deemed advisable') and are, therefore, not the proper subjects of an action in mandamus. Valley Forge Racing Association, Inc., supra.

Plaintiff's prayer for relief in mandamus against the Auditor General and the Treasurer as the 'Board of Claims,' is...