Jones v. Patriot Midwest Holding, LLC
| Decision Date | 29 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | 14-0263 BLA,BRB 14-0250 BLA |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Black Lung Complaints |
| Parties | QUANG JONES (Widow of and o/b/o CHARLES E. JONES) Claimant-Respondent v. PATRIOT MIDWEST HOLDING, LLC Employer-Petitioner DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR Party-in-Interest |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal of the Decision and Order Awarding Benefits and Decision and Order Awarding Survivor's Benefits of Stephen M. Reilly Administrative Law Judge, United States Department of Labor.
Laura Metcoff Klaus (Greenberg Traurig LLP), Washington, D.C., for employer.
Jeffrey S. Goldberg (M. Patricia Smith, Solicitor of Labor Rae Ellen James, Associate Solicitor; Michael J. Rutledge Counsel for Administrative Litigation and Legal Advice), Washington, D.C., for the Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor.
Before: HALL, Chief Administrative Appeals Judge, BOGGS and GILLIGAN, Administrative Appeals Judges.
HALL, Chief Administrative Appeals Judge.
Employer appeals the Decision and Order Awarding Benefits in a subsequent miner's claim[1] (2010-BLA-05711), and the Decision and Order Awarding Survivor's Benefits (2013-BLA-05113) of Administrative Law Judge Stephen M. Reilly, rendered on claims filed pursuant to provisions of the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§901-944 (the Act).[2] In the miner's claim, the administrative law judge credited the miner with at least fifteen years of underground coal mine employment and determined that he had a totally disabling respiratory impairment at 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2). The administrative law judge concluded, therefore, that claimant invoked the rebuttable presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis at amended Section 411(c)(4) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. §921(c)(4).[3] The administrative law judge also concluded that employer did not rebut the presumption and awarded benefits accordingly. In the survivor's claim, the administrative law judge adopted his findings from the miner's claim and concluded that claimant invoked the presumption that the miner's death was due to pneumoconiosis at amended Section 411(c)(4). The administrative law judge further determined that employer did not rebut the presumption. Accordingly, the administrative law judge also awarded benefits in the survivor's claim.
On appeal, employer argues that the administrative law judge erred in finding that the miner was totally disabled under 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2). In addition, employer contends that, in evaluating rebuttal, the administrative law judge did not consider all relevant evidence and did not properly weigh the x-ray and medical opinion evidence, as to whether the miner had pneumoconiosis, and whether the miner's death was due to pneumoconiosis, Employer also asserts that, despite the fact that the miner's claim is a subsequent claim under 20 C.F.R. §725.309, the administrative law judge did not determine whether claimant established a change in an applicable condition of entitlement. Further, employer contends that the award of benefits in the survivor's claim cannot be affirmed, because the administrative law judge decided the case on the record, despite employer's timely request for a hearing. Claimant has not filed a response brief in this appeal. The Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (the Director), has filed a limited brief, asserting that the administrative law judge did not err in finding that there was no conflict between the pulmonary function study and blood gas study results. The Director also maintains that there was no material error in the administrative law judge's consideration of rebuttal of the presumed existence of legal pneumoconiosis and total disability due to pneumoconiosis.[4]
The Board's scope of review is defined by statute. The administrative law judge's Decision and Order must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence, rational, and in accordance with applicable law.[5] 33 U.S.C. §921(b)(3), as incorporated into the Act by 30 U.S.C. §932(a); O'Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Associates, Inc., 380 U.S. 359 (1965).
In his Decision and Order in the miner's claim, the administrative law judge stated that, at the hearing in the miner's claim on April 11, 2012, he admitted into evidence Miner's Claim (MC) Director's Exhibits 1-49, [6] MC Claimant's Exhibits 1-2, [7] and MC Employer's Exhibits 1-17. MC Decision and Order at 2. At the hearing, the record was left open for claimant and the employer to submit additional evidence. April 11, 2012 Hearing Transcript at 25, 29, 31-34.
The administrative law judge initially found that claimant established total disability at 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(i), based on the newly submitted pulmonary function studies of record, dated September 1, 2009 and December 15, 2009, which produced qualifying values.[8] MC Decision and Order at 6-7. The administrative law judge further found that claimant did not establish total disability at 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(ii), as neither of the newly submitted blood gas studies, dated August 21, 2009 and December 15, 2009, was qualifying. Id. at 7. The administrative law judge stated, however, that this was not “sufficient contrary evidence” to refute his finding at 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(i), as pulmonary function studies and blood gas studies measure different aspects of pulmonary function. Id. at 7-8. In evaluating the newly submitted medical opinion evidence at 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2)(iv), [9] the administrative law judge noted that all of the physicians diagnosed the miner with a respiratory impairment, and that Dr. Sanjabi indicated that the impairment was severe enough to prevent the miner from performing his previous coal mine employment. Id. at 11-13. The administrative law judge concluded that claimant established that the miner had a totally disabling respiratory impairment at 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2), based on the newly submitted pulmonary function studies and medical opinions. Id. at 18.
Employer argues that, in weighing the evidence as a whole, the administrative law judge “seemed to dismiss the arterial blood gas tests as essentially irrelevant rather than weigh the evidence together.” Employer's Brief in Support of Petition for Review at 25. Additionally, employer contends that the administrative law judge did not set forth any findings concerning whether the medical opinions relevant to total disability were reasoned and documented, and did not address these opinions in the context of the exertional requirements of the miner's last coal mine employment.[10] The Director responds, asserting that the administrative law judge properly found that the qualifying pulmonary function study evidence could support a finding of total disability, despite the presence of non-qualifying blood gas studies.
Contrary to employer's contention, and as the administrative law judge noted, because pulmonary function studies and blood gas studies measure different types of impairments, differing results are not necessarily conflicting. See Sheranko v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 6 BLR 1-797, 1-798 (1984); MC Decision and Order at 8. Therefore, the administrative law judge acted rationally in finding that the non-qualifying blood gas studies did not constitute probative evidence contrary to the qualifying pulmonary function studies, when weighing the relevant evidence as a whole. See Tussey v. Island Creek Coal Co., 982 F.2d 1036, 1040-41, 17 BLR 2-16, 2-22 (6th Cir. 1993).
However, there is merit in employer's assertion concerning the administrative law judge's weighing of the medical opinion evidence. Although the administrative law judge summarized the medical opinion evidence in detail, see MC Decision and Order at 11-13, he did not identify the opinions he relied on to find total disability established, and did not render findings as to whether they were reasoned and documented on the issue of total disability. Accordingly, the administrative law judge's finding was not in compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).[11] See Wojtowicz v. Duquesne Light Co., 12 BLR 1-162, 1-165 (1989); MC Decision and Order at 15, 18. In addition, the administrative law judge did not set forth, as required by the APA, the rationale underlying his determination that the medical opinions were sufficient to establish total disability. See Wojtowicz, 12 BLR at 1-165. Further, the administrative law judge discussed the exertional requirements of the miner's last coal mine employment as a face boss, and concluded that the miner “performed heavy manual labor, ” but, as employer argues, he did not consider whether the physicians understood the nature of the miner's job. MC Decision and Order at 3-4; see Killman v. Director, OWCP, 415 F.3d 716, 722, 23 BLR 2-250, 2-260 (7th Cir. 2005). Consequently, we vacate the administrative law judge's finding that claimant established total disability at 20 C.F.R. §718.204(b)(2) and, therefore, also vacate his finding that the amended Section 411(c)(4) presumption was invoked in the miner's claim. See Stalcup v. Peabody Coal Co., 477 F.3d 482, 484, 24 BLR 2-33, 2-37 (7th Cir. 2007).
On remand, the administrative law judge must initially reconsider whether the medical opinion evidence is sufficient to establish total disability at 20 C.F.R §718.204(b)(2)(iv). The administrative law judge must make a finding as to whether each opinion is adequately reasoned and documented, including a determination of whether each physician had an accurate understanding of the nature of the miner's usual coal mine job as a face boss. See Killman, 415 F.3d at 721, 23 BLR at 2-258-59. The...
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