Jones v. Price
| Decision Date | 11 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-CV-01212-AWI-SAB |
| Parties | CLAY JOSEPH JONES, Plaintiff v. BRANDON PRICE, Executive Director of Coalinga State Hospital in his individual capacity; PAM AHLIN, Executive Director in her individual capacity; ALDO MENDEZ; KEVIN ADAMS; CHANG LEE M.D.; DOES 1-10, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
CLAY JOSEPH JONES, Plaintiff
v.
BRANDON PRICE, Executive Director of Coalinga State Hospital in his individual capacity; PAM AHLIN, Executive Director in her individual capacity; ALDO MENDEZ; KEVIN ADAMS; CHANG LEE M.D.; DOES 1-10, Defendants
No. 1:21-CV-01212-AWI-SAB
United States District Court, E.D. California
January 11, 2023
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (DOC. NO. 16)
Plaintiff Clay Joseph Jones initiated this civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by filing a Complaint against Defendants Brandon Price, Pam Ahlin, Aldo Mendez, Kevin Adams, and Chang Lee. Doc. No. 1. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint, which the Court granted with leave to amend. Doc. Nos. 5, 13. Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) asserting a single cause of action for violation of rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Doc. No. 14. Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss the FAC. Doc. No. 16. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Defendants' motion with leave to amend.
BACKGROUND[1]
On or about August 2, 2004, Plaintiff was detained at a secure facility pursuant to California's Sexually Violent Predator Act (“SVPA”), Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600 et seq. At his probable cause hearing on July 24, 2006, probable cause was found to detain Plaintiff until adjudication could be had as to his status as a Sexually Violent Predator (“SVP”). In August 2006, Plaintiff was transferred from Sacramento County Jail to Coalinga State Hospital (“CSH”), a facility owned and operated by California's Department of State Hospitals (“DSH”). Plaintiff was brought to trial in 2017, and on June 6, 2018, the jury found that Plaintiff was a SVP.
Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, which the Sacramento County Superior Court granted on September 4, 2018. The Superior Court found that Plaintiff's approximately 14-year detention violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and vacated Plaintiff's detention and status as a SVP. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed but found that instead of a 14-year delay, Plaintiff suffered a 10-year delay for his trial. On August 8, 2019, the Superior Court issued an Order for Immediate Release, and on August 12, 2019, Plaintiff was released from custody.
During his detainment at CSH, Plaintiff filed several claims under the California Government Claims Program (“GCP”). On or about February 16, 2012, Plaintiff submitted Government Claim #602571 against Ahlin, Mendez, and Adams for denial of civil and constitutional rights, retaliation, infliction of emotional distress, and confiscation of property, including a leather strap, vibrato bar, and guitar tools. Doc. No. 18 at 41-59. The Claim referred to the “Date of Incident” as “10-31-2011 through the present and still on-going to-date.” Id. at 43.
On or about October 10, 2017, Plaintiff submitted Government Claim #17010147 against Price and Ahlin for denial of civil and constitutional rights, retaliation, infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy, and confiscation of property. Id. at 60-68. Specifically, the Claim alleged that they improperly enforced a new rule that prohibited Plaintiff from enrolling in an “Open Music Studio” program unless he first enrolled in an active “Treatment Class.” Id. at 65. The Claim referred to the “Date of Incident” as “On or about May 26, 2017 and still ongoing to date.” Id. at 60.
On or about August 17, 2018, Plaintiff submitted Government Claim #18007593 against Price and Ahlin for denial of civil and constitutional rights, retaliation, infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy, and confiscation of property. Id. at 71-102. This Claim specifically alleged that after he was temporarily transferred to Sacramento County Jail for a court appearance, the respondents placed him in unsafe housing with known enemies upon his return and refused to return all his property from storage in his prior unit. Id. at 76-78. The Claim referred to the “Date of Incident” as “July 2, 2018 and still ongoing to-date.” Id. at 71.
On or about January 30, 2020, after he had already been released from custody pursuant to the Superior Court's Order for Immediate Release, Plaintiff submitted Government Claim #20001587 against Price for denial of civil and constitutional rights, retaliation, infliction of emotional distress, and confiscation of property. Id. at 105-21. This Claim specifically alleged that after Plaintiff was released, Price refused to return to Plaintiff all the property he had accumulated during his detainment at CSH. Id. at 107. The Claim referred to the “Date of Incident” as “August 12, 2019 and months prior to on a continuing basis.” Id. at 105.
On June 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed the operative FAC alleging that he incurred the following injuries during his detainment at CSH: confiscation and destruction of personal and legal property; harassment and denial of privileges for refusing to submit to the SVP treatment program; housing in units detrimental to his health and safety; harassment and punishment for filing complaints about his conditions of confinement; involuntary subjection to psychotropic medication, assault, and battery; and denial of medical treatment, food, and water. See Doc. No. 14. On July 12, 2022, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's FAC. Doc. No. 16.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a cause of action may be dismissed where a plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Godecke ex rel. United States v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 937 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2019). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to allege sufficient facts, a complaint must include a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Compliance with this rule ensures that the defendant has “fair notice” of the claims against it. Williams v. Yamaha Motor Co., 851 F.3d 1015, 1025 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Under this standard, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Irving Firemen's Relief & Ret. Fund v. Uber Techs., Inc., 998 F.3d 397, 403 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 403 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Benavidez v. Cty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021). But the Court is “not ‘required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the Complaint or matters properly subject to judicial notice, or allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.'” Seven Arts Filmed Entm't, Ltd. v. Content Media Corp. PLC, 733 F.3d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoted source omitted). Complaints that offer no more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1145 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Rather, “[f]or a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,' and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Hernandez v. City of San Jose, 897 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
DISCUSSION
I. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Defendants move to dismiss the FAC on the grounds that (1) it fails to plead actionable conduct by Defendants, (2) the statute of limitations bars the FAC's claims, and (3) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The Court will address each of these grounds, as well as other pleading deficiencies, below. Cf. Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361-62 (9th Cir. 1981) (courts may raise issues sua sponte during the course of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion); see also Reed v. Lieurance, 863 F.3d 1196, 1207 (9th Cir. 2017).
A. Sufficiency of Pleadings as to Claims
The FAC asserts claims for retaliation, deprivation of property without due process, unsafe housing, involuntary subjection to psychotropic medication, deprivation of food and water, and denial of medical treatment. The Court will review whether the pleading standards are met for each claim.
1. Retaliation
Prisoners and pretrial detainees have a constitutional right to file grievances against prison officials and to be free from retaliation for doing so. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009)); Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1104 (9th Cir. 2011). Within the prison pretrial context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) an assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Rood v. Lockwood, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196801, *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2020); Chatman v. Vera, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186683, *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2018).
Here, the FAC makes vague and conclusory allegations that Defendants “retaliate[ed] in a...
To continue reading
Request your trial