Jones v. Rahilly

• Decision Date: 01 January 1871
• Citation: 16 Minn. 283
• Parties: RICHARD A. JONES v. JOHN RAHILLY.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

16 Minn. 283

RICHARD A. JONES

v.JOHN RAHILLY.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Appeal by defendant from an order denying a new trial by the district court, Olmsted county.

The action was to recover for the conversion of four horses and a buggy. Both parties claimed by purchase from one Reynolds.

Charles C. Willson, for appellant.

Stearns & Start, for respondent.

BERRY, J.

The complaint in this action alleges plaintiff's ownership and right of immediate possession of the personal property therein described, its value, defendant's possession of it, a demand thereof by plaintiff of defendant, and defendant's refusal to deliver up the same, to plaintiff's damage in the sum of $1,000.

Though not in the best form, we think this is a sufficient statement of a cause of action for a conversion of the property.

The complaint further alleges that "defendant willfully, maliciously, and fraudulently keeps and conceals said property, so that the same cannot be replevied or found by the plaintiff, whereby the plaintiff has been caused great care labor, and expense in searching for said property, and has been and is deprived of the use of the same, to his further damage in the sum of $500."

These latter allegations do not have the effect of making this an action for detaining the property, rather than for converting it, as contended by the defendant.

As the case contains a full report of the testimony introduced, it appears that no evidence was offered under them except such as might tend to show the character and manner of the conversion.They possess, then, no practical importance in the case, except so far as concerns the question whether this animus and manner can affect the measure of damages, and this question may best be considered hereafter.

This being an action for the conversion of the property, it follows that the objections made by defendant to evidence of its value were properly overruled.

The other, and the principal, questions in the case arise upon the following state of facts:

Both parties claim title to the property in controversy from and under one James Reynolds.Two bills of parcels were introduced in evidence by defendant, running from Reynolds to him, and tending upon their faces to show a sale of the property by Reynolds to defendant.

A bill of parcels executed subsequently to those first mentioned, and running from Reynolds to plaintiff, was introduced by plaintiff, tending upon its face to show a sale of the property by Reynolds to plaintiff.

The plaintiff claimed that the sale to the defendant was not absolute, but that the property was conveyed to defendant by way of security merely, for certain indebtedness of Reynolds to him, defendant.

Plaintiff further claimed that after the sale to himself he tendered to defendant the amount of said indebtedness, to-wit, $145, and demanded the property, and that defendant declined to accept the tender or deliver up the property demanded.

Plaintiff was permitted to offer evidence tending to show that the bills of parcels to defendant were executed by way of security merely, as above stated; to which defendant objected upon the ground that the bills themselves were the best evidence of the bargain between the parties; that parol evidence could not be received to contradict them; and that under the pleadings the plaintiff could not prove that the property was conveyed to defendant by way of security merely.Had the bills of parcels been regular and formal bills of sale, the weight of authority is that parol testimony might properly be received to show that the sale evidenced by them was not absolute, but by way of security or pledge; the same rule applying to conveyances of personal property as to deeds of real estate.3 Smith, Lead.Cas. 626, and cases cited;Belote v. Morrison,8 Minn. 93, (Gil. 62;)Phœnix v. Gardner,13 Minn. 432, (Gil. 391;)Russell v. Southard,12 How. 139;Hodges v. Tennessee M. & F. Ins. Co.8 N. Y. 419;Chester v. Bank of Kingston,16 N. Y. 343;Smith v. Beattie,31 N. Y. 542.And under our system of practice, blending law and equity, there would be no objection to the reception of such evidence in an action at law.Despard v. Walbridge,15 N. Y. 378.

But there is another and sufficient answer to the defendant's objection.The documents offered were not formal bills of sale, but bills of parcels, "not used or designed to embody and set out the terms and conditions of a contract of bargain and sale.They are in the nature of receipts, and are always open to evidence which proves the real terms upon which the agreement of sale was made between the parties."Hazard v. Loring,10 Cush. 268;Harris v. Johnston,3 Cranch, 311;Filkins v. Whyland,24 N. Y. 338;2 Greenl. Ev. § 305a.And, as is expressly held in Hazard v. Loring, the transfer may properly be shown to have been by way of pledge or security.The defendant's objection was, then, rightly overruled.

The case further shows that the plaintiff introduced evidence tending to prove that, after his alleged purchase of the property from Reynolds, he tendered to the defendant the amount for which, as plaintiff claimed, the property was pledged to defendant by Reynolds.Defendant objected to the evidence on the ground that no foundation for evidence of any tender was laid in the pleadings.But we think that the objection was properly overruled.

The complaint alleged the plaintiff's ownership of the property, and his right to its immediate possession.

These allegations authorized the plaintiff to prove his ownership, and his right to possession, by showing how he became owner and entitled to possession; and if it was through a purchase from a former owner who had pledged the property, it was certainly competent, under his pleading, for plaintiff to show that he had redeemed the property by tendering to the pledgee the amount secured by the pledge of the same.

This is but to furnish evidence of his ownership and right to possession, and it is facts, not evidence of facts, which are required to be pleaded.

The defendant, on the other hand, offered evidence tending to show that the tender was insufficient in amount to discharge his lien.

Plaintiff objected, because no lien was pleaded in defendant's answer, and the testimony offered was rejected.The answer denied the plaintiff's ownership and right to possession, and if, as we have endeavored to show, it was proper for plaintiff, under his general...