Jones v. Ramos

• Decision Date: 03 February 2020
• Docket Number: CAUSE NO. 3:19-CV-166 DRL-MGG
• Citation: Jones v. Ramos, CAUSE NO. 3:19-CV-166 DRL-MGG (N.D. Ind. Feb 03, 2020)
• Parties: KIRK CAMERON JONES, Plaintiff, v. KEVIN A. RAMOS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

KIRK CAMERON JONES, Plaintiff, v. KEVIN A. RAMOS, et al., Defendants.

CAUSE NO. 3:19-CV-166 DRL-MGG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

February 3, 2020

OPINION AND ORDER

Kirk Cameron Jones alleges he sustained injuries in an automobile accident in which he was the passenger of an Uber-assigned vehicle. This personal injury case originated in New Jersey federal court, where Mr. Jones was warned of an imminent dismissal if service was not perfected on the defendants. It was thereafter transferred to this court before any defendant had been served, some four months after the statute of limitations ran, and after the time for service afforded by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) had passed.

On June 10, 2019, now in this court, Defendant Daniel Waterhouse filed a motion to dismiss (ECF 12) that Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. joined on July 16 (ECF 30) and Defendant Jerilynn Langwith later joined on July 29 (ECF 33). Defendants Kevin and Mario Ramos filed their own motion to dismiss on August 12 (ECF 34), arguing similar positions. This presiding judge, being reassigned the case, held oral argument on the pending motions on January 24, 2020. The court now grants the motions to dismiss, thus terminating this action.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Jones claims he utilized Uber's ride service application on October 28, 2016. ECF 1 ¶ 9. The assigned driver was Mr. Waterhouse. Id. During the trip, Mr. Waterhouse's vehicle was struck by another vehicle driven by Mr. Kevin Ramos, and owned by Mr. Mario Ramos. As a result of the collision, Mr. Jones alleges he suffered permanent injuries. Id. ¶ 10.

The complaint for damages was originally filed in a federal district court in New Jersey on October 26, 2018. Id. That same day, Mr. Jones filed a single summons in the matter that lacked identifying information for the various defendants, including their individual names and addresses. ECF 2. It appears service was never attempted while the case sat in New Jersey. Proof of service was never filed in that court. Consequently, three months later on February 5, 2019, the New Jersey district court filed a notice of call for dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), stating the action would be dismissed for failure to effect service of the summons and complaint if Mr. Jones failed to serve the defendants by March 5, 2019. ECF 3.

On that date, instead of having served the defendants, Mr. Jones filed a motion to change venue to this court. ECF 4. Mr. Jones did not effectuate service on the defendants before March 5, 2019 as ordered by the New Jersey district court. See ECF 3. The case was transferred to this court and docketed on March 8, 2019.

New Indiana counsel appeared on June 19 and 20, 2019. Proposed summonses for each defendant were submitted on June 20, 2019. As established at oral argument, the various defendants were served between June 21 and June 27, 2019.

STANDARD

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar, Inc., 623 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 2010). Evaluating whether a claim is plausible enough to survive a motion to dismiss is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." McCauley v. City of Chi., 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). "While a statute of limitations defense is not normally apart of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), when the allegations of the complaint reveal that relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim." See Logan v. Wilkins, 664 F.3d 577, 583 (7th Cir. 2011); Small v. Chao, 398 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 2005) (courts may dismiss a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) if the claim is "indisputably time barred").

Under Rules 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5), a court may dismiss a complaint when a plaintiff provides insufficient process or service of process on a defendant. A defendant's objections to process or service "must be specific and must point out in what manner the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the service provision utilized." O'Brien v. R.J. O'Brien Assocs., 998 F.2d 1394, 1400 (7th Cir. 1993). The plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate that the district court has jurisdiction over each defendant through effective service. See Cardenas v. City of Chi., 646 F.3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir. 2011); Homer v. Jones-Bey, 415 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2005). Rule 4(m) requires service within 90 days except for good cause. An extension of the Rule 4(m) period for serving the defendants must be granted if the plaintiff shows good cause for the lack of timely service.

DISCUSSION

The defendants ask the court to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rules 4(m), 12(b)(4), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6). They argue that Mr. Jones insufficiently commenced his lawsuit before his claim expired under the applicable statute of limitations by filing an improper summons, which did not list the names and addresses of any named defendants. ECF 13 at 2. Further, after the New Jersey district court ordered Mr. Jones to effectuate service by March 5, 2019, Mr. Jones failed to provide any documentation to the court indicating that service of the summons and complaint complied with that court's order. Due to these inactions, the defendants contend that this lawsuit should be dismissed for failure to serve them within the appropriate time period, noting that any attempt to remedy this failure would be too late.

A. Indiana Law Governs Commencement of this Diversity Case for Purposes of the Statute of Limitations.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 provides that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." In diversity cases, however, state rules apply when the issue before the court involves commencement for purposes of a state's statute of limitations. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752-53 (1980). In determining the law applicable to a statute of limitations issue, the court must apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1983); Hollander v. Brown, 437 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 2006) (statute of limitations is substantive matter for purposes of the Erie doctrine). Substantive law includes statutes of limitations and "rules that are an 'integral part of the statute of limitations,' such as tolling and equitable estoppel." Hollander, 457 F.3d at 694 (quoting Walker, 446 U.S. at 751-53).

This case involves a transfer of venue, which means the court must decide which state's statute of limitations applies. According to Mr. Jones, the New Jersey district court transferred the case "so that all defendants would be subject to jurisdiction in the same venue." ECF 26 at 4. "If personal jurisdiction over the defendant was lacking in the original forum, the transferee court must apply the law of the state in which it sits, regardless of which party requested the transfer." Gonzalez v. Volvo of Am. Corp., 734 F.2d 1221, 1223 (7th Cir. 1984). The parties do not dispute the application of Indiana law. This court accordingly applies Indiana law.

The Indiana statute of limitations for personal injury claims requires that an action be commenced within two years of the date on which the action accrued. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a)(1) (2016). "It is well established in Indiana that a cause of action accrues at the time the injury is produced by wrongful acts for which the law allows damages susceptible of ascertainment." Tolen v. A.H. Robins Co., 570 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (N.D. Ind. 1983). In other words, under Indiana law, a cause of action in tort accrues when a plaintiff discovers or in the exercise of ordinary diligence could discover thathe sustained an injury caused by another person's tortious act. Wehling v. Citizen Nat'l Bank, 586 N.E.2d 840, 843 (Ind. 1992).

Here, no party disputes that the statute of limitations on Mr. Jones' claim required him to commence his lawsuit within two years from the date of the car accident in which he allegedly sustained serious injuries. In fact, the parties agree that the statute of limitations bars any action Mr. Jones may have sought to file, regarding any injuries he sustained in this incident, after October 28, 2018. ECF 13 at 6. Mr. Jones filed his lawsuit on October 26, 2018—two days before the statute of limitations would have barred any action involving this incident. ECF 26 at 2. The right issue then is not one based strictly on the statute of limitations deadline but whether Mr. Jones properly "commenced" his lawsuit on October 26, 2018, thus before the October 28 deadline.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were intended neither to toll state statutes of limitations nor to define when an action commences for purposes of the statute of limitations. Walker, 446 U.S. at 750-51; Robinson v. Willow Glen Acad., 895 F.2d 1168, 1169 (7th Cir. 1990) ("the time of the commencement of a diversity action is determined by the applicable state law"). Both sides in this case agree that commencement of Mr. Jones' lawsuit must be determined under Indiana law. See ECF 13 at 5; ECF 26 at 3.

Under Indiana Trial Rule 3, a civil action is commenced by filing: (1) a complaint or such equivalent pleading or document as may be specified by statute; (2) the filing fee or filing an order waiving the filing fee; and, (3) where service of process is required, a summons. In Ft. Wayne Int'l Airport v. Wilburn, 723 N.E.2d 967, 968-69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that failure to tender a summons to the clerk prevented the commencement of the civil action within the applicable statute of limitations. Actual service of the summons was not required because that would not take into account processing time at...