Jones v. Ray

• Decision Date: 01 November 2001
• Docket Number: 0110973,11
• Parties: LARRY JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WALTER S. RAY, Chairman, BOBBY K. WHITWORTH, et al., Defendants-Appellees.Non-Argument Calendar UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

LARRY JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant v WALTER S. RAY, Chairman, BOBBY K. WHITWORTH, et al., Defendants-Appellees

No. 01-10973

Non-Argument Calendar

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

November 1, 2001

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

Before CARNES, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Larry Jones, a Georgia prisoner serving a life sentence and proceeding pro se, appeals the 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissal of his due process claims and the grant of summary judgment on his equal protection and ex post facto claims in favor of defendant members of the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles ("the Board") in this 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. Jones asserts several claims. First, he asserts that the Board's failure to grant face-to-face meetings as part of his parole procedure and its use of false information in his file constituted a due process violation. Second, he appears to assert that the Board discriminated against him on the basis of poverty in violation of the Equal Protection Clause by failing to adhere to its own rules and procedures. Finally, Jones alleges that the 1986 amendments to the Parole Board Rules and Regulations governing the frequency of reconsideration hearings for inmates serving a life sentence constitute a violation of the ex post facto clause and are thus invalid. The amended rules provide, "Reconsideration of those inmates serving life sentences who have been denied parole shall take place at least every eight years." Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 475-3-.05(2).

We review "a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo." Harris v. Hammonds, 217 F.3d 1346, 1347 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). A dismissal for frivolity under 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001). In Bilal, we held that a "claim is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or fact." Id.

Jones's due process claim is foreclosed by our holding in Sultenfuss v. Snow, 35 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc), that a Georgia inmate has no liberty interest in parole. It also is well-settled that there is no federal constitutional right to parole. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Only when a state maintains a parole system that creates a legitimate expectation of parole does it establish a liberty interest in parole that is subject to the protections of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 12.

While we have held that the use of false information in a parole file can be a due process violation, prisoners cannot make a conclusory allegation regarding the use of such information as the basis of a due process claim. Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d 1437, 1442 (11th Cir. 1991). Without evidence of the Board's reliance on false information, a prisoner cannot succeed. As Jones did not come forward with any false information...