Jones v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
| Decision Date | 18 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-cv-07844-JSW |
| Parties | NADEZHDA JONES, Plaintiff, v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Now before the Court for consideration are the motions to dismiss filed by defendants the Regents of the University of California and Biana Roykh (“Regents”) and defendant California Department of Health Care Services (“DHCS”) (collectively “Defendants”). The Court has considered the parties' papers, relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, and it finds the motion suitable for disposition without oral argument. See N.D. Civ L.R. 7-1(b).
The Court GRANTS Defendants' motions to dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 31, 46); DENIES Plaintiff's motion to certify for interlocutory appeal (Dkt. No. 51); and DENIES Plaintiff's motions to stay as moot. (Dkt. Nos. 63, 74, 75.)
Plaintiff Nadezhda Jones (“Plaintiff”) is enrolled in Medi-Cal. (FAC ¶ 33.) In 2018, Plaintiff sought dental treatment at the UCSF School of Dentistry (“UCSF”), which accepts MediCal Dental (“Denti-Cal”) insurance. (Id. ¶ 35.) Plaintiff sought treatment from UCSF for pain related to permanent partial dentures, which are a bridge of permanent material anchored to living teeth that cannot removed absent surgical intervention. (Id. ¶¶ 35-36.) Plaintiff alleges that the pain from her permanent partial dentures prevented her from chewing hard food, meat, or vegetables, and limited her consumption to soft-cooked food and liquid. (Id. ¶ 37.) Plaintiff alleges that “the absence of molars and inability to chew food, necessitating full or partial dentures is a significant disability.” (Id. ¶ 38.)
In 2019, Plaintiff received an estimated bill from UCSF for dental treatment related to her partial dentures. Plaintiff complained to UCSF about the estimated bill because she believed the services, including charging for exams, X-Rays, crowns, extractions, and partial dentures, were covered by Denti-Cal. (Id. ¶ 39.) Plaintiff and her patient advocate disputed the allegedly improper billing practices with various entities including the UCSF Dental Clinic, UCSF staff, the dean of the school of dentistry and the Lieutenant Governor's office. (Id. ¶¶ 50-56.)
UCSF contacted Plaintiff to explain her eligibility for Denti-Cal coverage, but Plaintiff's advocate declined to meet with UCSF. (AR 45-46.)[1] UCSF decided to terminate Plaintiff as a patient based the disruptive behavior of Plaintiff and her advocate. (Id. at 46.) Plaintiff alleges that UCSF retaliated against her for complaining about the allegedly improper charges by terminating her as a patient. (Id. ¶ 39.) She further alleges that she contacted numerous dentists who were unwilling to accept Denti-Cal patients, and as a result, UCSF's decision to terminate her as a patient effectively terminated her Denti-Cal benefits. (Id. ¶ 60.)
Plaintiff brings this action alleging twenty-six causes of action against Defendants. Plaintiff also alleges that the Regents are enforcing an arbitrary and discriminatory policy regarding Denti-Cal benefits because the Regents treat Denti-Cal beneficiaries with some teeth differently than beneficiaries with no teeth. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants' conduct delayed her dental treatment, terminated her treatment, and caused her to suffer pain, emotional disturbance, and humiliation. Plaintiff further alleges that the Regents violated anti-discrimination provisions, choice of provider provisions, and right to access provisions of the Medicaid Act, the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), as well as her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Plaintiff originally filed this action in Alameda County Superior Court. (See Dkt. No. 1, Not. of Removal.) The Regents removed the case to federal court on October 7, 2021. (Id.) The Regents moved to dismiss, and shortly thereafter Defendant DHCS appeared. Plaintiff filed a motion to remand. The Court denied the motion to remand on January 4, 2022, and in that Order, set a briefing schedule on the motions to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 50.) Defendants filed motions to dismiss. (Dkt. Nos. 31, 46.) Plaintiff filed a combined opposition to Defendants' motions. (Dkt. No. 55.)
Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for interlocutory appeal of the order denying remand. (Dkt. No. 51.) Plaintiff then filed a motion to stay proceedings due to illness. (Dkt. No. 63.) On April 1, 2022, Plaintiff notified the Court of the death of her counsel and requested leave to proceed pro se. Plaintiff filed a motion to stay the proceedings to obtain alternate counsel and an ex parte motion to shorten time to hear the motion to stay. (Dkt. Nos. 74, 75.)
A motion to dismiss is proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where the pleadings fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A court's “inquiry is limited to the allegations in the complaint, which are accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008).
Even under the liberal pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Pursuant to Twombly, a plaintiff cannot merely allege conduct that is conceivable but must instead allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). However, a court “is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994).
If the allegations are insufficient to state a claim, a court should grant leave to amend unless amendment would be futile. See, e.g., Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990); Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990).
On January 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed a combined opposition to Defendants' motions to dismiss. Plaintiff's opposition fails to substantively address Defendants' arguments for dismissal and instead largely copies and pastes allegations from the FAC. The opposition fails to demonstrate why Plaintiff's claims are viable or explain how she could cure the defects in her pleading through amendment. The Court views Plaintiff's failure to oppose Defendants' arguments as a concession that those claims should be dismissed. Marziano v. Cty. of Marin, No. C-10-2740 EMC, 2010 WL 3895528, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2010); see also Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 892 (9th Cir. 2008) (); accord John-Charles v. California, 646 F.3d 1243, 1247 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (). For this reason alone, Plaintiff's complaint is subject to dismissal. See Allen v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 475 Fed. App'x 159, 159 (9th Cir. 2012) (district court properly dismissed claims where plaintiff's “opposition to the motion to dismiss failed to respond to [the defendant's argument”); Henry v. Napa Valley Unified, No. 16-cv-04021-MEJ, 2016 WL 7157670, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2016) ().
In any event, Plaintiff's complaint is deficient for other reasons, which require its dismissal. The Court discusses these issues below.
Plaintiff brings her federal claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (“Section 1983”).[2] In relevant part, Section 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured....
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff brings her Section 1983 claims against all defendants. The Supreme Court has held that “a State is not person within the meaning of § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 62 (1989). This holding extends to “governmental entities that are considered ‘arms of the State' for Eleventh Amendment purposes.” Id. at 70.
The Regents and DHCS are arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes and therefore are not persons defined by Section 1983. See Armstrong v. Meyers, 964 F.2d 948, 94950 (9th Cir. 1992) (). The same rule applies to suits against state officials sued in their official capacities, because “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a...
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