Jones v. Rommell, 84-431-M

• Decision Date: 24 February 1987
• Docket Number: No. 84-431-M,84-431-M
• Citation: 521 A.2d 543
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Parties: Hugh M. JONES, Jr. et al. v. Herbert F. ROMMELL, et al. P.

Page 543

521 A.2d 543

Hugh M. JONES, Jr. et al. v. Herbert F. ROMMELL, et al.

No. 84-431-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Feb. 24, 1987.

James Purcell, Tillinghast, Collins & Graham, Providence, for plaintiffs.

Kathleen Managhan, Corcoran, Peckham & Hayes, and Turner C. Scott, Kelly & Scott, Newport, for defendants.

OPINION

WEISBERGER, Justice.

This petition for certiorari was brought to review a judgment entered in the Superior Court reversing a decision of the Zoning Board of Review of the City of Newport. We granted review on January 10, 1985. The plaintiffs, Hugh M. Jones, Jr., and Jeffrey M. Farrar, individually and in their capacities as general partners of Mill Street Partners, a limited partnership, and the plaintiff Mill Street Partners, as the owner of property located at 75 Mill Street, Newport, Rhode Island, filed a complaint in Superior Court alleging that the defendants Herbert F. Rommell, John J. Greichen John J. Crowley, Jr., Betsy Ray, and Roland Chase, in their capacities as members of the Zoning Board of Review of the City of Newport, erred in revoking a building permit previously issued to the plaintiffs and further alleging that the defendant Ann B. Canole Twomey, an owner of property located in the mill's vicinity, had no standing to challenge the validity of the permit. The plaintiffs sought a stay of the zoning board's decision as well as an injunction to prevent the defendants, Roy B. Anderson, in his capacity as building official of the city of Newport, and Francis B. Edwards, in his capacity as zoning officer of the City of Newport, from revoking the building permit. The relevant facts are as follows.

On April 20, 1984 the Newport building inspector issued plaintiffs a building permit to convert property located at 75 Mill Street from a lumber mill into an inn. Prior to the issuance of the permit, plaintiffs sought city approval of their proposed parking plan for the twenty-three-unit inn and were advised that their plan was in accordance with the off-street parking requirements under § 1270.01 of the Newport City Code. The city reached this determination by applying the credit-parking formula utilized in its implementation of § 1270.01. ¹ The defendant Ann B. Canole Twomey filed an appeal from the issuance of the permit to the Newport Zoning Board of Review on May 9, 1984. Following a hearing, the zoning board rendered a decision sustaining Twomey's appeal and ordering revocation of the permit. The board made two findings of fact relevant to this petition: (1) the building inspector correctly concluded that under the 1977 zoning ordinance six parking spaces were required for former mill use and (2) prior to 1977 the mill had at least four valid parking spaces. ² The board further determined that application of the credit-parking formula was not permitted under § 1270.01.

In reversing the zoning board, the Superior Court held that § 1270.01, although somewhat ambiguous, allows application of the credit-parking formula. Finding no evidentiary support for the board's finding that four valid parking spaces existed on the premises prior to the 1977 amendment to § 1270.01, the trial justice reversed that finding as clearly erroneous. Further, the trial justice found that equitable principles militated against revocation of the building permit since plaintiffs incurred substantial obligations in good-faith reliance on the issuance of the permit.

This case presents for our determination the question of whether the credit-parking policy is allowable under § 1270.01. We hold that it is not. It is well settled that the rules governing statutory interpretation are equally applicable to the interpretation of an ordinance. Mongony v. Bevilacqua, 432 A.2d 661 (R.I.1981); Town of Warren v. Frost, 111 R.I. 217, 301 A.2d 572 (1973). An ordinance, therefore, must be construed in a manner consistent with its stated intent. Hydron Laboratories, Inc. v. Department of Attorney General, 492 A.2d 135 (R.I.1985); Valley Resources, Inc. v. South County Gas Co., 486 A.2d 1076 (R.I.1985); State v. Gonsalves, 476 A.2d 108 (R.I.1984).

Section 1270.01 provides as follows:

"It is the intent of this chapter to ensure that off-street parking and loading spaces are provided to accommodate the motor vehicles of all persons normally using or visiting a use or structure at any one time. For any permitted use hereafter established, such spaces shall be provided in accordance with the standards hereinafter specified. Any off-street parking and loading provision existing shall conform to these standards to the extent that they conform at the time of the adoption of this Zoning Code. All spaces required to be provided by this chapter shall be permanently maintained and made available for occupancy in connection with and for the full duration of the use of land or structures for which such spaces are herein required. If any existing use of land or a structure is changed to a use requiring additional spaces to comply with this chapter, such additional spaces shall be provided for the new use in accordance with the standards hereinafter specified." (Emphasis added.)

Since the intent underlying the enactment of § 1270.01 is patently clear, we must endeavor to effectuate that intent in interpreting the language on which the credit-parking policy is based.

The credit-parking policy was derived from the construction of the following sentence: "If any existing use of land or a structure is changed to a use requiring additional spaces to comply with this chapter, such additional spaces shall be provided for the new use in accordance with the standards hereinafter specified." The only reasonable interpretation of this sentence requires the provision of additional parking spaces in conformity with zoning code standards for the new use whenever the use of property is changed to a use that requires additional spaces. Any other construction of this provision would be contrary to the plain language of the ordinance and its stated intention. Further, such an interpretation is the only one consistent with basic principles of zoning law.

A change of use results when the proposed use is "substantially different from the nonconforming use to which the premises were previously put * * *." Souza v. Zoning Board of Review of Warren, 104 R.I. 697, 699, 248 A.2d 325, 327 (1968). A change of use eliminates the exemption of a nonconforming use from recently enacted zoning ordinances. Thus, although an established use may continue notwithstanding the subsequent enactment of a prohibitory zoning ordinance, any change of use mandates compliance with the zoning regulations in effect at the time the change is made. See 1 Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 6.36 at 558 (3d ed. 1986). The sentence in question refers only to changes of use. Therefore, under well-settled principles of zoning law, the change of use precludes exemption from compliance with effective zoning regulations. In other words, after a change in use, property owners should not be entitled to any "credit" representative of prior noncompliance.

The plaintiffs, however, assert that they incurred substantial expenses because of their good-faith...