Jones v. Ross

• Decision Date: 07 June 1893
• Citation: 13 So. 319,98 Ala. 448
• Parties: JONES v. ROSS.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

13 So. 319

98 Ala. 448

JONES v. ROSS.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 7, 1893

Appeal from circuit court, Etowah county; John B. Tally, Judge.

Action by W. A. Ross against L. G. Jones. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Amos E Goodhue, for appellant.

COLEMAN J.

The plaintiff, Ross, sued appellant, Jones, to recover damages for a breach of warranty and deceit in the sale of a horse. The damages claimed are based upon personal injuries, and destruction of buggy and harness, sustained by plaintiff caused by the running away of the horse on the day of and soon after the purchase. There is but one count in the complaint, and to this the defendant interposed a demurrer. The complaint avers that "defendant sold to plaintiff a horse, which defendant falsely represented to be gentle, and to work kind and gentle anywhere." After stating the fact that plaintiff made the purchase, and his reliance upon these representations, and the fact that the horse being hitched to his buggy ran away, the damage to the buggy and the personal injuries sustained, the complaint avers "that the defendant knew said horse was vicious, and unsafe, and falsely and intentionally represented him to plaintiff to be safe and gentle." In the case of Herring v. Skaggs, first reported in 62 Ala. 180, and afterwards in 73 Ala. 446, the extent and character of damages recoverable in an action for breach of warranty was considered and adjudicated. After reviewing the authorities, this court held that, in the absence of fraud or bad faith, the proper measure of damages, in a suit by the purchaser of a safe against the maker who warranted it "burglar proof," is the difference between the value of the safe as it was and what it would have been worth if it had been as represented and not the damages sustained in the loss of valuables taken out of it by burglars;" that to justify a recovery for the loss of valuables placed in the safe it was necessary to show bad faith on the part of the seller. "There must have been," says the court, "an assertion as fact of that which the seller knew to be false, or a reckless false affirmation that the safe was burglar proof, when the seller did not know whether the assertion was true or not, or a knowledge on the part of the seller that the safe was not burglar proof, and a failure to communicate that knowledge, when he knew the purchaser was contracting for the safe as burglar...