Jones v. Roszko
| Decision Date | 03 October 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:09-cv-03256-MCE-JFM,2:09-cv-03256-MCE-JFM |
| Parties | ANTHONY R. JONES, Plaintiff, v. LT. B. ROSZKO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect him in connection with a physical altercation plaintiff was involved in with three other inmates on August 2, 2008.1 This matter is before the court on defendants' motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 48. Plaintiff opposes the motion. ECF Nos. 49, 53. Moreover, plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint, ECF No. 17, is verified under penalty of perjury. See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 (9th Cir.1995) ().2 Plaintiff has also filed a motion styled as a "Money Judgment from Arthur, Brown, Fernandez, Rozsko, and Sisto," ECF No. 50, which the court construes as a cross-motion for summary judgment and addresses herein.3
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Under summary judgment practice, the moving party "initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." In re Oracle Corp. Securities Litigation, 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The moving party may accomplish this by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" or by showing that such materials "do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). When the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, "the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Oracle Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, afteradequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, . . ., is satisfied." Id. at 323.
If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).
In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citations omitted).
"In evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact," the court draws "all reasonable inferences supported by the evidence in favor of the non-moving party." Walls v. Central Costa County Transit Authority, 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011). It isthe opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).
On August 3, 2012, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. At all times relevant to this action plaintiff was a state prisoner confined at California State Prison, Solano (CSP-Solano) and defendants were employed by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) working at CSP-Solano. Plaintiff was an inmate at CSP-Solano from 1999 to 2009 and, during this time, was assigned to Facility 3, which houses inmates who make up the prison's general population. Deposition of Anthony Jones at deposition pages 10:17-22; 25:18-20 (hereinafter "Jones Deposition"). General population inmates housed in Facility 3 are subject to dormitory-style living arrangements and are assigned to bunks instead of cells. Id. at 25:18-22. Prior to April 2008, plaintiff was housed in Building 15 of Facility 3, worked as a barber for the other inmates, andhad been housed in Facility 3 without any altercations or other disciplinary issues for nine years. Id. at 11:19-22, 12:12-14, 67:15-20, 68:13-15.
On April 10, 2008, a lock-up order authored by Rozsco was issued against plaintiff regarding an investigation of a conspiracy to introduce contraband into the prison. As a result of this order, plaintiff was sent to the Administrative Segregation Unit (ASU) and remained there for five months while an investigation into the matter by the Office of Internal Affairs was pending. Decl. of B. Rozsko (ECF No. 48-6) at ¶4, Exhibit A; Decl. of Arthur (ECF No. 48-5) at ¶4, Exhibit A; Jones Deposition at 16:8-10. Plaintiff claims that while he was in the ASU, he received threats from correctional officers Chavez and Velasquez and other, unidentified officers. Jones Deposition at 21:10-20. Plaintiff filed grievances and sent correspondence to Warden Sisto regarding these alleged threats; he later received a response from Associate Warden Singh stating that an inquiry into his claims was conducted and his allegations were deemed unsubstantiated. Id. at 141:2-14, 144:11-19.
Once the investigation regarding the conspiracy was completed, CSP-Solano was informed by the Office of Internal Affairs that there was no evidence that plaintiff participated in the conspiracy. Decl. of Arthur at ¶¶5-6. As a result of these findings, plaintiff was assigned by an Institution Classification Committee (ICC) back into the general population in Facility 3 on July 31, 2008, and was released from the ASU on August 1, 2008. Id. Defendants state that plaintiff was in agreement with this decision to release him back into Facility 3; however, plaintiff contends that he did not agree with being released back onto Facility 3. Id. at ¶6, Exhibit B; Jones Deposition at 33:1-12. Plaintiff was initially assigned an upper bunk in Building 16 of Facility 3. Decl. of Rozsko at ¶5. However, plaintiff was re-housed in a lower bunk in Building 17 after he showed prison staff medical documents showing that he had medical need for a lower bunk. Id.; Jones Deposition at 35:21-36:2. Later that day, plaintiff approached prison staff and told them that he was having compatibility problems in Building 17 because the bunk he was assigned to had not been vacated by the inmate previously assigned to it. Decl. of Rozsko at ¶5; Jones Deposition at 42:19-25. Plaintiff claimed that a group of unidentified inmates were protesting his assignment to that bunk. Jones Deposition at 44:9-20. As a result of this, plaintiffwas again rehoused to a lower bunk in Building 16. Decl. of Rozsko at ¶5, Exhibit B; Jones Deposition at 49:5-11; 73:25-74:8.
On August 2, 2008, Correctional Officer G. Verbitskiy and other staff were working in Building 16 when they observed plaintiff fighting with three other inmates near his bunk. Decl. of Rozsko at ¶7, Exhibit C. Plaintiff claims that he had never seen these other...
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