Jones v. Salt Lake City Corp., 20020941-CA.

• Decision Date: 17 October 2003
• Docket Number: No. 20020941-CA.,20020941-CA.
• Parties: Bradley D. JONES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, et al., Defendants and Appellees.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

78 P.3d 988

2003 UT App 355

Bradley D. JONES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, et al., Defendants and Appellees.

No. 20020941-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

October 17, 2003.

Rehearing Denied November 7, 2003.

Scott B. Mitchell, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.

J. Wesley Robinson, Salt Lake City Law Department, Salt Lake City, for Appellees.

Before BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge, and BENCH and DAVIS, JJ.

OPINION

BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:

¶ 1 Bradley Jones appeals the trial court's order denying his motion for partial summary judgment and granting Salt Lake City's motion for summary judgment. Jones also appeals the trial court's order denying Jones's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 In March 1997, Defendant Salt Lake City (the City) seized a number of firearms in connection with Jones's arrest on an explosives charge. Jones pleaded guilty to a third degree felony of Recklessness—Incendiary Device Parts in August 1997. On October 24, 1997, the Honorable Glenn Iwasaki issued an order as follows: "It is hereby ordered that the firearms seized at the time of [Jones's] arrest be turned over to a licensed firearms dealer, to be sold at current market value, and the proceeds to be returned to [Jones] through his counsel." Notwithstanding this order, on February 9, 1998, pursuant to the authorization of Officer Kelly Kent of the Salt Lake City Police Department, the City destroyed the firearms.¹

¶ 3 Jones's former attorney made considerable efforts to obtain compliance with Judge Iwasaki's order. In December 1998, Jones's former attorney instructed his law clerk, Jeff Tachiki, to look into the matter of Jones's firearms. Tachiki made several calls to the Salt Lake County District Attorney's office before being referred to Sergeant Jack Rickards (Sgt.Rickards) of the Salt Lake City Police Department. On January 14, 1999, Tachiki provided Sgt. Rickards a copy of Judge Iwasaki's order. Sgt. Rickards indicated the weapons could be claimed if the District Attorney signed a release for the firearms. Tachiki obtained the release and provided it to Sgt. Rickards on March 3, 1999, at which time Sgt. Rickards informed Tachiki the firearms were on a list to be destroyed. In a telephone call to Tachiki on March 16, 1999, Sgt. Rickards confirmed the firearms had been destroyed. Jones served the City with a notice of claim on March 2, 2000, and filed suit against the City on February 27, 2001, asserting claims against the City for conversion of the firearms and for depriving Jones of his property without due process of law.

¶ 4 On June 18, 2001, the trial court signed a scheduling order which provided a cutoff date for amendment of pleadings of July 15, 2001, and declared that "fact discovery shall be completed no later than September 30, 2001." On July 11, 2001, Jones filed his first amended complaint, which added the Salt Lake County District Attorney as a defendant. The District Attorney was later dismissed as a party.

¶ 5 Jones filed a motion for partial summary judgment in September 2001 regarding his claims for conversion and deprivation of due process. The City filed its motion for summary judgment in November 2001, alleging, inter alia, that Jones did not state a cognizable claim for conversion. On June 24, 2002, the City filed a memorandum in opposition to Jones's motion for partial summary judgment in which the City argued that Jones failed to allege a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he did not allege the due process violation "was the result of any custom or policy of the city." The City also argued, inter alia, that Jones did not make a cognizable claim for a violation of due process. Twenty-one days later, Jones filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint wherein he sought to "remedy any alleged pleading defects" in the first amended complaint "with respect to his § 1983 claim against the city" and "add Officer Kelly Kent as a defendant." On September 3, 2002, the trial court denied this motion.

¶ 6 After hearing arguments on all remaining issues, the trial court denied Jones's motion for partial summary judgment and granted the City's motion for summary judgment. Jones appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 7 Jones argues the trial court erred in dismissing, at summary judgment, his conversion and due process claims against the City. "Summary judgment is proper solely in cases in which no genuine issues of material fact exist and the movant merits judgment as a matter of law." Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 251 (Utah Ct.App.1998). "We accord no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions, reviewing them for correctness." Id. at 251. Jones also argues the trial court improperly denied his motion to amend his complaint. We will not disturb the trial court's ruling absent "an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice." Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, ¶ 10, 53 P.3d 2 (quotations and citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. Conversion

¶ 8 Jones argues the trial court incorrectly dismissed his conversion claim against the City. Although the trial court found that Jones did not comply with notice requirements under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, see Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1997), we instead affirm on the grounds that Jones does not state a legal claim for conversion.² ¶ 9 Jones claims the City's destruction of his firearms interfered with his right to "control [them], i.e., have them sold by a licensed firearms dealer." (Emphasis added.) This falls short of conversion. "`A conversion is an act of wilful interference with a chattel, done without lawful justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession.'" Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Fin., Inc., 1999 UT 13, ¶ 20, 974 P.2d 288 (quoting Allred v. Hinkley, 8 Utah 2d 73, 328 P.2d 726, 728 (1958)). Specifically, "a party alleging conversion must show that he or she is entitled to immediate possession of the property at the time of the alleged conversion." Fibro Trust, 1999 UT 13 at ¶ 20, 974 P.2d 288 (emphasis added); see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 226 (1965) ("One who intentionally destroys a chattel ... is subject to liability for conversion to another who is in possession of the chattel or entitled to its immediate possession.").

¶ 10 Although Judge Iwasaki's order gave Jones a right to the proceeds from the sale of the firearms, Jones concedes that his previous conviction of a violent crime precluded him from legally possessing or owning the firearms when they were destroyed. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(1)(a) (1999) ("Any person who has been convicted of any crime of violence ... may not own or have in his possession ... any dangerous weapon[.]").³ Thus, Jones's conversion claim fails as a matter of law. Cf. Wichita Falls v. ITT Comm. Fin. Corp., 827 S.W.2d 6, 7, 9-10 (Tex.App.1992) (concluding that although plaintiff city had a right to tax proceeds and judicial foreclosure of forty autos at the time of the alleged conversion, plaintiff had no ownership or possessory rights in the autos and thus had no legal claim for conversion).⁴

II. Failure to Properly Plead 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim

¶ 11 Jones insists the trial court erred in finding that Jones "failed to properly allege a valid federal cause of action against the city pursuant to" 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1999).

¶ 12 A § 1983 claim against a municipality must allege a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States that resulted from the municipality's actions "under color of law." Baker v. Angus, 910 P.2d 427, 430 (Utah Ct.App.1996). A municipality's actions do not fall under color of law unless its employee(s) "acted according to a law, custom, or usage known to and acquiesced in or condoned by the municipality." J.H. v. West Valley City, 840 P.2d 115, 120 (Utah 1992); see Monell v. New York Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037-38, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

¶ 13 Although Utah courts have not previously addressed the minimum wording required for alleging a custom or policy violation in a complaint, other courts at a minimum require "a bare allegation that the individual officers' conduct conformed to official policy, custom, or practice." Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir.1988); see Mulleneaux v. State, 190 Ariz. 535, 950 P.2d 1156, 1160 (Ct.App. 1997) (applying same standard); cf. First Sec. Bank v. Conlin, 817 P.2d 298, 299 (Utah 1991) (noting that Utah courts look to case law interpreting similarly worded federal rules where Utah case law is lacking). We adopt this minimum requirement for pleading § 1983 claims against municipalities in Utah.

¶ 14 Here, Jones's first amended complaint only alleges that the City's destruction of Jones's firearms deprived him of due process. There is no mention, even superficially, that the City's police department acted pursuant to the City's custom or policy, or anything that can reasonably be construed as such. Thus, the trial court properly dismissed Jones's § 1983 claim as a matter of law.

III. Trial Court's Denial of Proposed Second Amended Complaint

¶ 15 Jones argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying Jones's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. In his proposed second amended complaint, Jones seeks to add Officer Kelly Kent, individually, as a defendant, and alleges that the destruction of the firearms was in accordance with City policy.

¶ 16 "Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure directs that leave to amend pleadings `shall be freely given when justice so requires,'" Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, ¶ 19, 53 P.3d 2 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a)), and "[i]t is well established that rule 15 should be interpreted liberally so as to allow parties to have their claims fully adjudicated." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). Factors to consider in...