FACTUAL
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Jones
filed his Petition in this Court on August 8, 2019.
See Petition at 1. In his Petition, Jones challenges
his convictions and sentence in State of New Mexico case no
D-202-CR-2015-01017. See Petition at 1. A New Mexico
grand jury indicted Jones on April 14, 2015.[1] On October 13,
2015, a twelve-person jury convicted Jones of one count of
aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, one count of leaving
the scene of an accident, one count of reckless driving, and
two counts of criminal damage to property. See
Petition at 1.
The New
Mexico State district court entered judgment against Jones as
a habitual offender and sentenced him to eight years of
imprisonment. See Petition at 1. Jones appealed his
convictions to the Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
See Petition at 2. The Court of Appeals affirmed
Jones' convictions. State v. Jones, No.
A-1-CA-35265, 2018 WL 3425234 at *1 (Ct. App. N.M. 2018).
The
underlying facts, as described by the Court of Appeals of New
Mexico, are as follows:
Defendant's convictions stem from an incident in which a
group of bail bondsmen attempted to arrest him for failing to
appear in court. New Mexico Bonding posted a bond for
Defendant in association with a charge against him for
driving with a revoked license. Defendant failed to show up
for court appearances. As of March 2015, New Mexico Bonding
had been attempting to locate Defendant for approximately six
months, without success.
Aaron Alberti (Victim), a bail bondsman for New Mexico
Bonding, eventually received a tip about Defendant's
whereabouts and that his vehicle was parked in the carport of
an apartment complex in Albuquerque. Based on this tip,
Victim, four other bail bondsmen (Richard Montoya, Gabriel
Diaz, Joe Nash, and Felipe Tapia), and Joe Nash's
fiancee, Crystal Baca went to the apartment complex to arrest
Defendant, but when they arrived, Defendant's vehicle was
gone. While they waited for Defendant to return, Victim and
the other bail bondsmen discussed the layout of the apartment
complex and how best to position themselves and their cars so
that when Defendant returned, he would not be able to get
away. All of the bail bondsmen had a badge or logo on their
vest identifying themselves as such. They were also carrying
equipment, including firearms, tasers, mace, handcuffs, and
flashlights.
Defendant returned to the apartment complex a couple of hours
later, around midnight, and backed his vehicle into a parking
space in the carport. The bail bondsmen approached
Defendant's vehicle. Victim was positioned in front of
Defendant's vehicle near one of the headlights and the
other bondsmen were positioned on the sides of the vehicle.
The bondsmen identified themselves, yelled at Defendant to
get out of the car, and banged on the Defendant's
driver's side window. In response, Defendant, who had met
Victim before, looked directly at Victim with a “blank
stare” and did not say anything. There was testimony
that the carport had sufficient lighting to allow Defendant
to see who the bondsmen were.
Defendant's vehicle started “going back and forth
like he was putting it in gear,” and then “took
off at a real high rate of speed out of that spot[,]”
turning
toward the exit of the carport, which put Victim right
“in the center of the car['s]” trajectory.
This acceleration caused Victim to be struck by the vehicle
and to fall onto the hood. After Defendant had already
started to leave, Richard Montoya broke the Defendant's
driver's side window “to neutralize”
Defendant from running anyone over and so that Defendant
would not smash Victim into a nearby wall. After rolling off
the hood after the first hit, Victim was struck by
Defendant's vehicle again. Victim drew his firearm and
fired seven or eight shots at Defendant's vehicle as he
was being pushed back by Defendant's vehicle during the
second hit. As a result of these hits, Victim suffered sore
knees, a sore back, and a headache. There was testimony that
Defendant could have exited the parking space without hitting
Victim if he had been driving slower.
The carport was located in a narrow alleyway with one
entrance and exit. Victim and Joe Nash (who was driving
Crystal Baca's vehicle) had parked their cars between
where Defendant was parked and the exit of the carport. As
Defendant exited the alley, he collided “head-on”
with Crystal Baca's vehicle. Defendant then “backed
it up and ran over the driver's side portion of the
car[.]” Crystal Baca was in the vehicle during this
collision. Joe Nash testified that there was about $9000 in
damage to Crystal Baca's car. Defendant also hit
Victim's vehicle, causing minor damage. After a short
chase, the bondsmen chose not to continue pursuing Defendant.
There was testimony that Defendant could have exited the
carport without hitting Crystal Baca and Victim's
vehicles.
State v. Jones, 2018 WL 3425234 at *1-2.
Jones'
raised two arguments on his direct appeal: (i) trial counsel
was ineffective, because they did not argue or request that
the jury be instructed on self-defense and duress as
affirmative defenses to aggravated battery; and (ii) the
State's evidence was insufficient to support convicting
Defendant on any of the counts charged. See State v.
Jones, 2018 WL 3425234 at *1. The Court of Appeals of
New Mexico affirmed Jones' convictions in all respects.
See State v. Jones, 2018 WL 3425234 at *6.
Jones
filed his Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on
August 8, 2019. See Petition at 1. In his Petition,
Jones raises three grounds for relief:
Ground One: Failure to raise or tender an
instruction on self-defense to aggravated battery with a
deadly weapon constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.
....
Ground Two: Failure to raise or tender an
instruction on a duress defense for aggravated battery with a
deadly weapon, leaving the scene of an accident, criminal
damage to property and reckless driving constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Ground Three: The state[']s evidence was insufficient to
support Mr. Jones' convictions because it failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with the requisite
intent under the circumstances.
Petition at 14, 21. Grounds One and Two are substantively
identical to the first issue Jones raised in his State court
appeal, and Ground Three is the same as Jones' second
appellate issue. See State v. Jones, 2018 WL 3425234
at *1; Petition at 14, 21. Jones requests that the Court
“vacate his convictions for insufficient evidence or in
the alternative, reverse and remand for a new trial at which
Mr. Jones has a full and fair opportunity to raise his
affirmative defenses and have a jury instruction on those
defenses.” Petition at 13.
STANDARDS
FOR § 2254 REVIEW
Jones
is proceeding in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
See Petition at 1. A prisoner in State custody may
seek federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. §
2254. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Section 2254
provides: “[A] district court shall entertain an
application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on
the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Habeas corpus relief is not limited
to immediate release from illegal custody, but also is
available to attack a sentence of confinement that the
petitioner will serve in the future. See Peyton v.
Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 66-67 (1968). Habeas relief is
available to obtain restoration of good time credits,
resulting in shortening of the length of the petitioner's
sentence. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,
487-88 (1973).
As
amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. 104-132, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 sets limits on a federal court's power to
grant an application
for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254. If, as in this case, the application includes claims
that have been adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings, § 2254(d) expressly limits federal court
review. Under § 2254(d), a habeas corpus application
shall not be granted with respect to [such a] claim . . .
unless the adjudication of the claim: (1) resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under this standard, a federal
habeas court “reviews the specific reasons given by the
state court and defers to those reasons if they are
reasonable.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct.
1188, 1192 (2018). The standard is highly deferential to the
State court rulings and requires that the State court be
given the benefit of the doubt. See Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011); Woodford v.
Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)(per curiam).
The standard is difficult for petitioners to meet in federal
habeas proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).
Section
2254(d)(1)'s reference to “clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the...
