Jones v. Seal
| Decision Date | 09 August 1966 |
| Citation | 56 Tenn.App. 593,409 S.W.2d 382 |
| Parties | Clyde JONES, Complainant, Appellee, v. Edgar SEAL et al., Defendants, Appellants. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
C. Frank Davis and Sam Jack Anderson, Morristown, for appellants.
Ralph H. Noe, Jr., and Taylor, Inman, Tilson & Line, Morristown, for appellee.
This is a suit to rescind and cancel for fraud, duress and lack of consideration a deed executed by Morgan Jones on June 16, 1955, conveying the remainder interest in his farm to eight children of his sister. Complainant is the only child of the grantor. Defendants are the grantees in the deed. The Chancellor after a hearing on oral testimony sustained the bill and defendants have appealed.
At the time of the execution of the deed the grantor was 85 years of age. After the death of his wife in 1954, and until his death in 1964 he lived alone on the farm but took his meals with complainant who lived with his wife and son on an adjoining farm. The undisputed proof shows that a normal, affectionate relationship always existed between the grantor and complainant and his family and that complainant was a dutiful son. In addition to providing his meals, complainant took his father in his car to town and wherever he wished to go.
The deed recites a consideration of one dollar and love and affection. It was withheld from registration and secreted by defendants for a period of nine years and placed of record three days after the grantor's death. Complainant and Mr. Hale, a neighbor and confidante of the grantor, were not aware of the execution of the deed until after the grantor's death. The bill was promptly filed following its registration. Defendants state in their answer that the deed was withheld from registration at the request of the grantor but there is no proof to sustain this insistence.
The proof shows that on June 16, 1955, the date of the deed, and for as much as 30 years theretofore all of the grantees lived in Michigan except the defendant Bessie Seal Irwin who died, without having testified, while this suit was pending. Mrs. Irwin lived in Claiborne County, Tennessee, and visited her uncle, the grantor, about once a month. The other grantees visited him about once each year.
The proof shows that Mrs. Irwin's husband drove the grantor to Knoxville where the deed was executed on a printed form filled in on a typewriter and acknowledged before Mary H. Montgomery, a Notary Public. The bill alleges that on the same date defendants procured the execution of a will devising to them the same property covered by the purported deed. Defendants' answer admits the execution of the will. They failed to produce it in evidence or to call the Notary Public who acknowledged the deed or the witnesses to the will to testify in their behalf.
The record is completely devoid of any explanation of this most unusual and innately irrational and unreasonable act. Why would a father with a dutiful son who was showing every consideration for his welfare and physical needs practically denude himself of his property and convey it without any consideration to his nephews and nieces for none of whom he entertained any peculiar affection so far as the record shows?
Other questions remain unanswered, such as the reason for taking the grantor from Morristown to Knoxville to have the deed and will executed and then withholding the deed from record for nine years. In the absence of an explanation there can arise only the inference that such secrecy was to further defendants' scheme to defraud the grantor of his property. Secrecy, unexplained, has frequently been considered the hallmark of fraud. The absence of consideration...
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Edwards v. Travelers Ins. of Hartford, Conn.
...with plaintiff Edwards, should deceive her; but such direct evidence need not be adduced to support a case of fraud. Jones v. Seal, 56 Tenn.App. 593, 409 S.W.2d 382, 385, cert. denied, (1966). Tennessee courts have recognized that fraud by its nature is often difficult to prove and thus may......
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In re Coleman, CIV.A. 1:03CV00002.
...and fraud for money damages; according to these cases, the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. See Jones v. Seal, 56 Tenn.App. 593, 409 S.W.2d 382 (1966); Pipkin v. Lentz, 49 Tenn.App. 206, 354 S.W.2d 87 (1961); Anderson v. Nichols, 39 Tenn.App. 503, 286 S.W.2d 96 (1955); ......
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Walters v. First Tennessee Bank, N.A. Memphis
...rendered a directed verdict for the Bank with regard to these claims. As the Tennessee Supreme Court has noted in Jones v. Seal, 56 Tenn.App. 593, 409 S.W.2d 382 (1966), "the facts and circumstances proved [at trial] must clearly establish the inference of fraud." 409 S.W.2d at 385. See als......
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Estate of John Acuff, Sr. v O'linger
...in Tennessee assert that fraud must be established under a "clear, cogent and convincing evidence" standard. Jones v. Seal, 56 Tenn. App. 593, 409 S.W.2d 382 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966); Pipkin v. Lentz, 49 Tenn. App. 206, 354 S.W.2d 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961); Anderson v. Nichols, 39 Tenn. App. 50......