Jones v. Sec'y
Decision Date | 26 April 2016 |
Docket Number | Case No. 8:15-cv-185-T-33TBM |
Parties | GLEN T. JONES, JR., Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner Glen T. Jones, Jr., a state of Florida inmate proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) and memorandum of law (Doc. 2). He challenges his convictions entered in 2007 by the Circuit Court for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, Polk County, Florida. Respondent's response (Doc. 30) concedes the petition's timeliness. Jones filed a reply (Doc. 46). Upon review, the petition must be denied.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Jones was convicted of two counts of unlawful sexual activity with a minor. (Doc. 40, Ex. 6.) He was sentenced to 15 years in prison on count one, followed by 15 years of sex offender probation on count two. (Doc. 40, Ex. 7, pp. 102-05.) The state appellate court per curiam affirmed the convictions and sentences. (Doc. 40, Ex. 12.)
Jones filed a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. (Doc. 40, Ex. 28, pp. 9-147.) The court denied the motion after conducting an evidentiary hearing on several claims. (Doc. 40, Ex. 28, pp. 148-51; Ex. 28b, pp. 565-66.) The state appellate court affirmed the denial, but remanded for consideration of Jones' two motions to amend or supplement his postconviction motion, which remained pending. Jones v. State, 141 So.3d 574 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). Upon remand, the state court summarily denied these motions. (Doc. 40, Ex. 78.) The state appellate court per curiam affirmed the denial. (Doc. 40, Ex. 80.)
Jones filed numerous motions to correct illegal sentence under Rule 3.800(a). (Doc. 40, Exs. 42, 42a, 42b, 55.) The state court denied or struck these motions. (Doc. 40, Exs. 43, 44, 45, 56.) The state appellate court affirmed the state court's orders. (Doc. 40, Exs. 51, 73, 75); Jones v. State, 100 So.3d 692 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). Jones also filed several state habeas petitions alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Doc. 40, Exs. 23, 83, 91, 96.) These petitions were all rejected. (Doc. 40, Exs. 25, 84, 92, 96a.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") governs this proceeding. Wilcox v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840 (2000). Habeas relief can only be granted if a petitioner is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Section 2254(d), which sets forth a highly deferential standard for federal court review of a state court adjudication, states:
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000), the Supreme Court interpreted this deferential standard:
In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied-the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
"The focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). Accord Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (). The phrase "clearly established Federal law" encompasses only the holdings of the UnitedStates Supreme Court "as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.
The purpose of federal review is not to re-try the case. "The [AEDPA] modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Cone, 535 U.S. at 693. In other words, "AEDPA prevents defendants-and federal courts-from using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010). See also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180-81 (2011) () (citations omitted).
The state appellate court denied relief of Jones' claims without discussion. The court's decisions warrant deference under Section 2254(d)(1) because "the summary nature of a state court's decision does not lessen the deference that it is due." Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 278 F.3d 1245 (2002), cert. denied sub nom. Wright v. Crosby, 538 U.S. 906 (2003). See also Richter, 562 U.S. at 99 ().
Review of the state court decision is limited to the record that was before the state court:
Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 180-81. Jones bears the burden of overcoming by clear and convincing evidence a state court factual determination. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption of correctness applies to a finding of fact but not to a mixed determination of law and fact. Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 836 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1046 (2001).
EXHAUSTION OF STATE COURT REMEDIES; PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
Before a district court can grant habeas relief to a state prisoner under § 2254, the petitioner must exhaust all state court remedies that are available for challenging his conviction, either on direct appeal or in a state postconviction motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999) (). See also Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 891 (11th Cir. 2003) () (citations omitted). A state prisoner "'must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process,' including review by the state's court of lastresort, even if review in that court is discretionary." Pruitt v. Jones, 348 F.3d 1355, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845).
To exhaust a claim, a petitioner must make the state court aware of both the legal and factual bases for his claim. See Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998) () (quoting Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995)). A federal...
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