Jones v. Shannon
| Decision Date | 21 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 3:05-CV-2255 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
| Parties | WILLIAM SEYMOUR JONES, Petitioner v. SHANNON, ET AL., Respondents |
(JUDGE NEALON)
On November 1, 2005, Petitioner, William Seymour Jones, who is currently confined at the Gilmer Federal Correctional Institution in Glenville, West Virginia, filed a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the calculation by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole ("the Board") of his parole violation sentence of backtime on his Dauphin County criminal case for being convicted of new federal charges. (Docs. 1-2). On February 24, 2006, this Court dismissed the petition because the claims were not yet ripe and were unexhausted. (Doc. 36). Petitioner's motions for reconsideration and to reopen, filed shortly thereafter, were denied. See (Docs. 37-40).
On April 25, 2013, and June 20, 2013, Petitioner filed motions for relief pursuant to Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docs. 42, 45). He alleged that: (1) Respondents committed fraud by, inter alia, doctoring parole records to read "when available"; (2) 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(5.1) dictates that he serve his state backtime sentence before his federal sentence; (3) the Board relinquished jurisdiction to federal authorities; and (4) he exhausted remedies. (Id.). On November 13, 2013, the motions were denied. (Docs. 74-75). It was determined, initially, that the motions for relief were untimely. (Doc. 74). Nevertheless, this Court went on to address the merits of Petitioner's claims and found no basis for granting relief. (Id.). Specifically, it wasconcluded that there was no evidence Respondents doctored records or otherwise committed fraud; that 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(5.1) does not apply to Petitioner's sentence because the statute's effective date was years after the Board's decision; that the Board did not relinquish jurisdiction to federal authorities by recalculating his parole maximum date, by issuing a detainer, or by transferring Petitioner between federal and state custody; and that because the service of his state backtime has not yet begun, Petitioner's challenge to the Board's recalculation remains unexhausted. (Id.).
Petitioner has since filed an affidavit, a supporting brief, a motion for clarification, a motion to take judicial notice, and a motion for reconsideration, all related to and/or challenging this Court's decision dated November 13, 2013. See (Docs. 76-80).1 For the reasons set forth below, the motions will be denied.
On July 13, 2000, Petitioner, who was on parole for a 1981 Robbery conviction in Pennsylvania, was arrested in New Jersey for Hindering and drug-related charges. See (Doc. 74, pp. 2-4, citing (Doc. 36, pp. 2-5).2 On October 16, 2000, federal detainers were lodged against Petitioner for charges under the Hobbs Act.3 See USA v. Jones, et al., No. 2:00-cr-660 (E.D. Pa.filed October 16, 2000). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ordered that he be produced for an arraignment on November 30, 2000. Id. at (Docs. 13, 23). On December 15, 2000, Petitioner pled guilty to Hindering in New Jersey and was sentenced to time-served. (Doc. 74, pp. 2-4, citing (Doc. 36, pp. 2-5). The same day, he waived extradition to Pennsylvania to answer to a state parole violation. (Id.). He was sentenced on February 23, 2001, as a technical parole violator and ordered to serve six (6) months backtime when available. (Id.). On July 12, 2001, Petitioner was allowed a temporary absence to answer to the federal charges in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. (Id.). After his federal sentence of 521 months imprisonment, followed by five (5) years of supervised release, was issued in 2003, he was returned to state prison on October 2, 2003. (Doc. 74, pp. 2-4), citing (Doc. 36, pp. 2-5). A second parole violation hearing, based on the new federal conviction, was held on January 9, 2004. (Id.). Parole was revoked on Petitioner's Pennsylvania sentence and the Board ordered him to serve seventy-two (72) months backtime when available. (Id.). In 2004 and 2005, Petitioner contested the Board's order in the state courts. (Id.). On June 29, 2005, and November 1, 2005, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued Orders directing the United States Marshal and the Warden of the state correctional institution where Petitioner was being held to produce Petitioner for a resentencing hearing. See USA v. Jones, et al., No. 2:00-cr-660 (E.D. Pa.) at (Docs. 205-206). He was resentenced on November 29, 2005, to 494 months imprisonment and five (5) years of supervised release. Id. at (Doc. 208). On March 16, 2006, the federal district court again directed that he be produced before the court, this time for an evidentiary hearing onPetitioner's motion to vacate.4 Id. at (Doc. 223). By March 23, 2007, Petitioner was confined in a federal correctional institution, and the Board had issued a warrant to act as a detainer. See (Doc. 42, Exs. D-E).
"A motion for reconsideration is a device of limited utility." Bartelli v. Fedak, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29697, *4 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (Kosik, J.). It may be used only to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered precedent or evidence. Harasco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171 (1986); Sibio v. Borough of Dunmore, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35380, *4 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (Caputo, J.). A motion for reconsideration may also be appropriate in instances where the court has misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the court, or has made an error not of reasoning, but of apprehension. See Rohrbach v. AT&T Nassau Metals Corp., 902 F. Supp. 523, 527 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (Vanaskie, J.), vacated in part on other grounds on reconsideration, 915 F. Supp. 712 (M.D. Pa. 1996). "Federal district courts should grant such motions sparingly because of their strong interest in finality of judgment." Bartelli, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *4. citing Continental Casualty Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 884 F. Supp. 937, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1995). "In order to prevail, a party seeking reconsideration must demonstrate one of the following: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available previously; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or factor to prevent manifest injustice." Rinaldi v. Sniezek, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46547, *2 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (Rambo, J.) (citing Max's Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)). A motion for reconsideration is not to be used as a vehicle for the losing party to rehash arguments already disposed of or as an attempt to relitigate a point of disagreement between the court and the litigant. See Turner v. Apker, 133 Fed. Appx. 849, 850 (3d Cir. 2005); Sibio, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 35383. "Such motions are therefore not appropriate if the movant intends only that the court hear new arguments or supporting facts." Dougherty v. Farmers New Century Insurance Company, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26058, *6 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (Nealon, J.) (citing Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 828 (1992)).
This Court has thoroughly reviewed all of Petitioner's filings since November 13, 2013. See (Docs. 76-80). He makes a number of arguments, citing cases, but fails to demonstrate an intervening change in controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error of law or fact. See Rinaldi, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46547 at *2. Rather, his motions are primarily used as an attempt to relitigate his claims. See Turner, 133 Fed. Appx. at 850. Accordingly, his motions will be denied.
Petitioner argues that this Court overrode Congress's legislative intent not to impose a time limitation in Rule 60(b)(6) by requiring that his motion be filed within a reasonable time. (Doc. 80, p. 10). This claim is without merit because the statute itself imposes the "reasonable time" requirement. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1); (Doc. 74, p. 14 n.11) ( Petitioner'sargument that Rule 60(b)(6) has no time limitation), citing Sillies v. Walsh, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84503, *4 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (Kane, J.).
He further asserts that his Rule 60(b) motion was timely because it presented a jurisdictional question that can be raised at any time.5 (Doc. 76, pp. 1, 7); (Doc. 77, p. 1); (Doc. 78, p. 8). He contends that a court does not have the discretion to ignore a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and cites to Rule 60(b)(4). (Doc. 78, pp. 2-3), citing Joyce v. United States, 474 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1973) (); FED. R. CIV. P. 60(B)(4). Petitioner's argument is unpersuasive. See Gray v. United States, 385 Fed. Appx. 160, 162 (3d Cir. 2010) (). "[A]lthough the reasonable-time requirement does not apply to a motion to reopen a void judgment under Rule 60(b)(4), a judgment is void only if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter...." Azubuko v. Bunker Hill Cmty. College, 442 Fed. Appx. 643, 645 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). Accord United States v. Dailide, 316 F.3d 611, 617 (6th Cir. 2003) (). Petitioner's Rule 60 motion was not filed under subsection (b)(4); rather, he sought relief under subsection (b)(6). Further, he did not allege that the judgment is void; rather, he claimed that this Court...
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